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Abstract 
 
Physicalism can be thought of as the view that the mental is “nothing over and above” the 
physical. I defend a formulation of this view based on supervenience. Physicalism may be 
supported in two ways: either by providing an explanatory account of the mind in physical 
terms, or by philosophical argument. Since we have only a rudimentary scientific 
understanding of the mind, physicalism needs argument. The most promising such argument 
is the causal argument, which may be summarised thus: (i) mental properties have physical 
effects; (ii) physics is causally complete (all physical effects have physical causes); (iii) 
effects are not generally overdetermined; so (iv) mental properties are physical. Of these 
premises, (i) relies on common-sense, (ii) relies on empirical support, and (iii) is a priori. I 
consider the merits of this argument by articulating two kinds of mental property emergence, 
‘weak’ and ‘strong’, both of which are incompatible with physicalism. I show that the 
premises of the causal argument are compatible with weak emergence, and that the argument 
is therefore not deductively valid. The causal argument establishes that one of physicalism or 
weak emergence is true. However, weak emergence is problematic in ways that physicalism is 
not. If these problems are serious, then physicalism is to be preferred on other grounds, such 
as theoretical elegance and simplicity. However, I proceed to show that the soundness of the 
argument is questionable, as premise (ii) is unsupported by the available evidence. Strong 
emergence is inconsistent with (ii), so evidence for (ii) must (on reasonable assumption) be 
evidence against strong emergence. But all currently available evidence is consistent with 
strong emergence, and so this evidence does not support (ii). Future evidence might, but I 
argue that such evidence would need to involve the kind of scientific account of mind the lack 
of which motivates the causal argument in the first place. A well-supported causal argument, 
by the nature of the justification necessary for (ii), is otiose. 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this work is to assess the merits of the causal argument for 
physicalism about the mind. Physicalism about the mind is the claim that the mental is 
nothing over and above the physical. The causal argument for physicalism is a general 
argument scheme, which, if successful, is capable of establishing physicalism about 
any domain of causes that has physical effects. The argument is deceptively simple, 
and is based on three key premises. Two of these premises will be common to all 
causal arguments; they are the completeness of physics, and the no-overdetermination 
rule. The completeness of physics states that all physical effects have sufficient 
physical causes. The no-overdetermination rule states that in general, events do not 
have more than one distinct sufficient cause. The third premise depends on the 
domain of causes for which physicalism is to be established, and is the claim that 
those causes have physical effects. Since my concern is with physicalism about the 
mind, the third premise that concerns me is the claim that mental causes have physical 
effects. By completeness, we know the physical effects of mental causes have 
sufficient physical causes. But by the no-overdetermination rule, we know that those 
effects do not have more than one distinct sufficient cause. The conclusion is that the 
mental causes of physical effects are not distinct from their physical causes. For the 
purposes of this work, I will take the causes and effects in question to be events. The 
causal argument, as I will conceive it, purports to establish physicalism about the 
mind by establishing that mental events are not distinct from physical events. 
 
My overall aim in what follows is to show that this argument is neither sound nor 
valid. It is invalid because there are non-physicalist positions that are consistent with 
its premises, properly interpreted. It is unsound because the completeness of physics 
lacks crucial empirical support – there is nothing in the state of current science to 
suggest that all physical effects have sufficient physical causes. The invalidity of the 
argument, I will argue, is not fatal, for the non-physicalist positions in question are 
dubious on independent grounds. Its unsoundness, on the other hand, is fatal. The 
reason we need the causal argument for physicalism about the mind in the first place, 
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is that we lack a reductive account of the mind in physical terms, which would 
support physicalism empirically. I will argue that the only way to provide empirical 
support for the completeness of physics, is through scientific reductions of the very 
domains about which the causal argument is supposed to establish physicalism. This 
being the case, a sound causal argument (should we ever possess one) will be an 
argument for something we already know. 
 
My arguments for the crucial claims of this work – viz., that the causal argument is 
neither sound nor valid – will depend on the coherence (but not the truth) of 
emergentism about mental properties. Correspondingly, the problems I raise for the 
argument will concern its ability to establish physicalism about mental properties. 
Such problems need only trouble physicalists who are realistic about properties. I 
offer no grounds to doubt that physical substance monism is true, and in fact endorse 
monism myself. Those physicalists who believe, for instance, that a ‘property’ is just 
a class of particulars that we (for whatever reason) group together under a concept, 
need not lie awake at nights wondering whether I am right. I take it as my starting 
point that properties are real, distinct from particulars, and that physicalism makes 
claims about both categories. It will not be sufficient, then, for the causal argument to 
establish that certain relations (such as identity or composition) hold between mental 
and physical event tokens – it must also establish that appropriate relations hold 
between the mental and physical properties of those events. 
 
Here is a brief summary of each chapter: 
 
Chapter 1 
Since it would be of little value to attempt to determine whether or not physicalism is 
true without first determining what it is, I address in this chapter the question of how 
physicalism ought to be defined. 1.1-1.3 form a defence of global supervenience as a 
formulation of physicalism. 1.4 relates the formulation of physicalism to the relations 
that obtain between token mental and physical events if physicalism is true. By 
relating supervenience to sufficiency relations between token events, I show how if 
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the causal argument can establish that the right kind of sufficiency relations hold 
between mental and physical events, it will establish physicalism. 
 
Chapter 2 
The purpose of this chapter is to motivate the causal argument. I argue that the reason 
we need an argument for physicalism about the mind is that we lack a reductive 
account of the mind in physical terms. I give an account of Kim’s functional 
reduction, and show how it is ideally suited to establishing the supervenience thesis 
which, I argued in chapter 1, defines physicalism. 2.1-2.2 describe functional 
reduction, and contrast it with classical, Nagelian reduction. 2.3-2.4 argue (against 
Kim) that functional reductions establish supervenience rather than type identities. 2.5 
speculates as to where we are at present with respect to a functional reduction of 
mind, thereby showing why the causal argument is needed. 
 
Chapter 3 
In this chapter I look in detail at the premises of the causal argument, and give a 
precise formulation of it. 3.1 is concerned with the efficacy of the mental. Since I do 
not doubt that mental events cause physical events, I have little to say about this 
matter that is new. 3.2 is concerned with the completeness of physics. I give a 
formulation of an empirically based argument for completeness, due to Papineau, 
which relies on the success of physiology in explaining bodily movements. 3.3 
examines the no-overdetermination rule, linking it to the impossibility of widespread 
coincidence. I examine Kim’s causal exclusion principle, arguing that the sufficiency 
relation defined in 1.4 is enough to render the co-occurrence of co-occurrent events 
non-coincidental. 3.4 gives a detailed run-through of the argument, and shows how it 
establishes supervenience via sufficiency relations between token mental and physical 
causes. I suggest that weaker sufficiency relations than that required to establish 
physicalism will suffice to dispel the coincidences ruled out by the non-
overdetermination rule. Through this I suggest that there may be non-physicalist 
forms of supervenience that are consistent with the premises of the causal argument. 
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Chapter 4 
In this chapter I respond, on behalf of the causal argument, to a charge of 
equivocation raised by Sturgeon. If the argument equivocates, then it will not 
establish any form of supervenience, physicalist or not. I show that the argument does 
not equivocate. 4.1 details Sturgeon’s argument that the causal argument needs causal 
‘transmission principles’ in order for it to generate ‘causal competition’ between 
mental and physical causes. 4.2 examines and rejects Sturgeon’s argument against 
these transmission principles. In 4.3, I suggest arguments of my own as to why the 
principles might fail. And 4.4 shows that the causal argument does not need the 
principles in the first place, because contrary to popular belief, it does not require that 
mental and physical causes be in competition for the same effects in order to work. 
 
Chapter 5 
Here I offer a detailed study of Kim’s much-discussed causal exclusion argument. 
This argument, if cogent, can be marshalled to establish type identity physicalism. My 
overall aim in this chapter is to show that the exclusion argument rests on a false 
theory of causation. 5.1 examines two versions of the exclusion argument, showing 
how each rests on an unsupported, stronger version of the no-overdetermination rule 
than the one justified by the impossibility of widespread coincidence. In 5.2, I 
describe a theory of causation, based on causal work, to which Kim is plausibly 
committed, and which entails the unsupported premise. 5.3 gives a general 
formulation of the resulting causal exclusion problem, and 5.4 taxonomises possible 
responses to this problem. In 5.5, I argue that by far the most plausible response to the 
exclusion problem is to reject the theory of causation upon which it is based. This 
theory, I will argue, is dubious on independent grounds. There is no causal exclusion 
problem; the causal exclusion argument does not work. 
 
Chapter 6 
In this chapter I appeal to emergence in order to define a non-physicalist position, 
which I term ‘weak emergence’, that is consistent with the premises of the causal 
argument. 6.1-6.3 define two forms of emergence, ‘strong’ and ‘weak’, by combining 
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a general metaphysical claim about emergent properties with two distinct claims 
about their causal novelty. In 6.1, I describe the general metaphysical claim. 6.2 offers 
a general causal theory of novelty and redundancy, according to which there are two 
kinds of novelty, and shows how this enables us to resist an argument, due to Kim, to 
the effect that all supervenient properties are redundant given the completeness of 
physics. 6.3 defines weak and strong emergence based on the metaphysics of 6.1 and 
the two varieties of novelty defined in 6.2. 6.3 concludes with a discussion of why 
weak emergence renders the causal argument invalid. 6.4-6.5 offer two related 
arguments against weak emergence. 6.4 argues that weakly emergent mental 
properties would be redundant. 6.5 argues that weakly emergent properties in general 
suffer from the so-called ‘miraculous coincidence problem’. This chapter concludes 
that although the causal argument is not deductively valid in its own right, this 
problem can be remedied by combining it with additional arguments. 
 
Chapter 7 
Strong emergence as defined in chapter 6 is inconsistent with the completeness of 
physics. But then evidence for completeness ought to be evidence against strong 
emergence. In this chapter I show that there is no current evidence against strong 
emergence. 7.1 examines the putative evidence for completeness, and 7.2 considers 
and rejects this evidence. The argument from physiology is refuted. 7.3 discusses and 
rejects Kim’s supervenience argument against emergence, and through this shows 
what good evidence for the completeness of physics would look like. 7.4 argues that 
what this good evidence amounts to is the very functional reduction of mind the 
absence of which motivates the causal argument in the first place. The only way the 
completeness of physics can be empirically supported is if we already have enough 
evidence to infer physicalism without additional argument. At worst, the causal 
argument is unsound; at best, it is otiose. 
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1. What is Physicalism? 
A physicalist must maintain that in some sense, “everything is physical”; but what’s 
the sense? Some things, like quarks and charge, are transparently physical; others, like 
mentality and life, are not. The desiderata for a successful definition of physicalism 
would seem, inter alia, to be to capture the thought that the non-transparently physical 
things are (i) determined by, (ii) dependent upon and (iii) nothing over and above, the 
transparently physical things. I follow the general consensus in taking the concept of 
supervenience to be the most promising route to such a definition, but it should be 
noted that the purpose of this chapter is not to give a complete defence of any 
supervenience thesis with regard to the above constraints. Rather, its purpose is to set 
up the groundwork for the discussion to follow, and as such it will leave a great deal 
to be said. Since (as is the norm) I will be running the causal argument in terms of 
token events, I will first discuss supervenience based formulations of physicalism 
relating sets of mental and physical properties, and then show how this extends to the 
relations that obtain between mental and physical event tokens if physicalism is true. 
 
In 1.1, I discuss and compare what I take to be the two most popular candidate 
definitions in the literature, namely ‘global’ and ‘strong’ supervenience. In 1.2, I 
argue that strong supervenience collapses into global supervenience if stripped of 
certain implausible commitments. The global supervenience thesis I endorse may well 
be too weak for many physicalists – indeed, there are arguments to the effect that it is 
insufficient to meet any of (i)-(iii) above. I will consider these arguments in 1.3, and 
defend global supervenience against them. My defence is somewhat tentative, which 
would be an issue if my overall aim were to defend the causal argument. However, 
most are in agreement that the global supervenience thesis I favour is a necessary 
condition for physicalism, and since my overall aim is to highlight certain problems 
with the causal argument, a necessary condition is all I need. If the argument is unable 
to establish a plausibly necessary condition for physicalism, then a fortiori it will fail 
to establish physicalism. In 1.4, I give an account of how events can be non-causally 
sufficient for other events, and give a definition of the appropriate sufficiency relation. 
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By appealing to this account, I will show that (i) on reasonable assumption, we can 
infer supervenience from sufficiency; and (ii) if it is to establish supervenience 
physicalism, the causal argument must establish at least that sufficiency of a particular 
strength (which I will term ‘physical sufficiency’) holds between physical and mental 
events. 
 
1.1. Global and Strong Supervenience 
The central intuition behind the supervenience of A-properties on B-properties, as is 
by now familiar, is that there can be no difference in A-properties without some 
difference in B-properties. The idea was suggested by Hare in the context of 
discussing naturalism about evaluative properties. Hare’s by now familiar example is 
that there could not be two pictures, alike in all respects, one of which is praiseworthy 
as a work of art, the other of which is not.1 Of course, as Hare proceeds to argue, 
unless the appropriate respects of similarity are specified without reference to 
praiseworthiness, the supervenience of artistic merit on these properties will be 
vacuous. The natural way to think about the matter is that two works of art alike in all 
intrinsic, physical respects could not differ as to their artistic merit. The determination 
in question is asymmetric, in that there could be no difference in the aesthetic 
properties without some physical difference, but that there are some physical 
differences that make no difference to artistic value. Since then, largely thanks to 
work by Kim, supervenience has come to prominence as a way of formulating 
physicalism.2 A plausible initial attempt is the following ‘global supervenience’ 
thesis, defining physicalism for the actual world wa: 
 
P1. Physicalism is true at wa iff any world wx that is a physical duplicate of 
wa is a duplicate of wa simpliciter. 
 
                                                 
1 See Hare [1963] 5.1. 
2 See for instance Kim [1990]. 
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Roughly put, P1 states that that physicalism is true at the actual world if and only if 
any world that shares the actual world’s distribution of physical properties and 
particulars, shares the actual world’s distribution of all other properties and particulars 
as well. It is not, of course, mandatory for a global supervenience thesis to define 
physicalism as a claim about the actual world only – for instance, we could make it a 
claim about all (at least physically possible) worlds, viz. ‘physicalism is true iff any 
two worlds that are physical duplicates are duplicates simpliciter.’ Now although 
there seems to be something clearly right about P1, it will not suffice as a definition of 
physicalism. This is because it suffers from what Lewis has termed the ‘problem of 
extras’ – P1 rules out a world that is physically indistinguishable from the actual 
world, but differs from it in containing some extra “epiphenomenal ectoplasm”, say. 
This (by definition non-physical and undetectable) stuff just floats around minding its 
own business, passing through the physical stuff completely unnoticed. There is no 
pressure to regard an ectoplasm world as one at which physicalism is true, but surely 
the truth of physicalism ought not to entail that such worlds are impossible. The 
trouble, then, is that physicalism should leave open the possibility of ‘extras’, yet P1 
does not.3 Jackson suggests the following revision of the thesis to accommodate 
ectoplasm worlds: 
 
P2. Physicalism is true at wa iff any world wx that is a minimal physical 
duplicate of wa is a duplicate of wa simpliciter.4
 
The intuitive idea P2 strives to capture is that if physicalism is true, then any world 
that is a physical duplicate of the actual world but contains nothing else, is a duplicate 
in all other respects as well. The ‘contains nothing else’ – that is, the ‘minimal’ aspect 
of duplication – excludes ectoplasm worlds from the antecedent of the conditional on 
the right of the equivalence. The truth of physicalism, on P2, no longer entails that 
such worlds are impossible, for they are by hypothesis not minimal physical 
                                                 
3 Lewis [1983] p.35. 
4 Jackson [1993]. In fairness to Jackson, it should be noted that this point that he proposes P2 only as a 
necessary condition on the truth of physicalism. I give further consideration below (especially in 1.3) to 
the question whether P2 is also sufficient – my view is that it is, but this is a highly contentious matter. 
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duplicates of any world. Further, P2 has the virtue that physicalism comes out false at 
such worlds, considered as actual – for minimal physical duplicates of them will lack 
the ectoplasm, and so fail to be duplicates simpliciter. Here it is the notion of a 
‘minimal physical duplicate’ that is doing the work. Now in both P1 and P2, the 
notion of duplication employed is an imprecise, intuitive concept, about which clearly 
something more needs to be said; I will now attempt to say some of it. 
 
Lewis defines duplication for individuals in terms of shared intrinsic properties. 
However, as Lewis points out, it is natural to understand intrinsic properties as those 
cannot differ between duplicates.5 As a means of breaking out of this definitional 
circle, Lewis and Langton propose an alternative definition of intrinsic. A lonely 
object is the sole occupant of the world it occupies; P is an intrinsic property just in 
case (i) there is a lonely P; (ii) there is a lonely non-P; (iii) there is a non-lonely P; (iv) 
there is a non-lonely non-P.6 If P is an intrinsic property of x, then x would possess P 
whether or not there were any other objects in the world that x occupies. Take any 
wholly distinct object you like out of x’s world, put any such object you like in – you 
will not thereby affect x’s intrinsic properties. So we might try the following as a 
definition of minimal physical duplication for worlds: w1 is a minimal physical 
duplicate of w2 just in case w1 and w2 have all the same intrinsic physical properties. 
But clearly this proposal will not work if ‘intrinsic’ is defined in terms of possible 
worlds. The reason is that it makes no literal sense to classify possible worlds as 
lonely or otherwise – in order for a possible world to be lonely, it would have to 
occupy another possible world at which there was nothing else. We must therefore 
explain world-level duplication by reference to individuals. Suppose duplicate 
individuals to be those that share all the same intrinsic properties. One point is 
immediately clear: if you want to create a duplicate w2 of w1, it is not sufficient to 
                                                 
5 In his [1983] pp.25-33. In that paper he proceeds to break out of the circle by defining duplication 
instead in terms of shared perfectly natural properties. The details of this account are well outside the 
scope of the present work. 
6 This is supposed to capture the idea that if a property is intrinsic, then whether or not an object has it 
is independent of whether or not there is anything else. There are certain complications arising from 
disjunctive properties, but they are beyond the scope of the present work. See Lewis and Langton 
[1998]. 
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populate w2 with all and only individuals that are duplicates of those at w1. First, this 
will leave out any laws of nature that hold at w1; we must therefore include these by 
stipulation. Second, it will leave out a great many relational properties; w2 will not be 
a duplicate of w1 if its individuals stand in different spatiotemporal relations, for 
instance. I tentatively propose that we can define duplication for worlds if we appeal 
to (i) duplication for individuals, as defined above; (ii) the laws of nature, and (iii) 
relations between the duplicate individuals. Let duplicates be individuals that share 
their intrinsic properties, and let us define intrinsic according to the model proposed 
by Lewis and Langton. I propose that: 
 
w2 is a duplicate simpliciter of w1 just in case (i) for every individual x at w1 
there is exactly one individual y at w2 such that y is a duplicate of x; (ii) every 
individual at w2 is a duplicate of some individual at w1; (iii) for any n-adic 
relation R and ordered n-tuple x1,…,xn at w1 such that R(x1,…,xn), there is an 
ordered n-tuple y1,…,yn at w2 such that for any i, the ith member of y1,…,yn is 
a duplicate of the ith member of x1,…,xn and R(y1,…,yn); (iv) any law that 
holds at w1 or w2 holds just in case it holds at w1 and w2. 
 
Now if my proposal is successful, then it defines duplication simpliciter for worlds in 
terms of the intrinsic and relational properties of individuals, and the laws of nature. 
How are we to define minimal physical duplication? We might try modifying the 
above definition of duplication simpliciter by inserting ‘physical’ before occurrences 
of ‘individual’, ‘duplicate’ and ‘relation’, and replacing ‘law’ with ‘law of physics’. 
Take ‘physical individual’ as a primitive – physical individuals are spatiotemporally 
located, have physical properties like mass, energy, charge, are governed by physical 
laws, and so on. (Physical individuals so construed may, of course, possess non-
physical properties as well.) Physical duplicates will be physical individuals that do 
not differ in their intrinsic physical properties. So far so good; unfortunately, it is less 
than clear how we are to understand ‘physical relation’ in this context. In the general 
case, we can not understand physical relations as those that hold between particulars 
with physical intrinsic properties – for one such particular might more beloved of God 
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than another. We might try construing physical relations as those somehow 
determined by intrinsic physical properties and laws, but determined how? Clearly we 
cannot appeal to any supervenience thesis for physical relations that invokes the 
notion of a minimal physical duplicate, for then the definition takes us in a circle back 
to the definiendum. Fortunately, there is a way out. Imagine we are in the business of 
building worlds. We want to make it so that causal relations, particles exerting forces 
on each other, objects being in thermal equilibrium, and so on, are all fixed. My 
stipulation at this point is that all we would have to do as world builders is fix the 
intrinsic physical properties of everything, fix the laws of physics, and fix the 
spatiotemporal location of each object. I take as a further primitive that the laws of 
physics govern the behaviour of individuals, the forces they exert on each other, that 
things are in thermal equilibrium, according to their intrinsic physical properties and 
positions in spacetime. Now we have the following definition of minimal physical 
duplication: 
 
w2 is a minimal physical duplicate of w1 just in case (i) for every physical 
individual x at w1 there is exactly one physical individual y at w2 such that y is 
a physical duplicate of x; (ii) every individual at w2 is a physical duplicate of 
some physical individual at w1; (iii) for any n-adic spatiotemporal relation R 
and ordered n-tuple x1,…,xn of physical individuals at w1 such that R(x1,…,xn), 
there is an ordered n-tuple y1,…,yn at w2 such that for any i, the ith member of 
y1,…,yn is a physical duplicate of the ith member of x1,…,xn and R(y1,…,yn); 
(iv) any law that holds at w2 is true in all physically possible worlds; (v) any 
intrinsic property of any individual x at w2 is instantiated by any physical 
duplciate of x at any physically possible world.7
 
A few notes are in order. First, I have included ‘of physical individuals’ after ‘ordered 
n-tuple x1,…,xn’ in (iii) to allow for the possibility that any non-physical individuals at 
                                                 
7 Note that if a definition of physical duplication – rather than minimal physical duplication – for 
worlds is wanted, then we plausibly get one by removing (ii) and (v) from the above definition, and 
rewriting (iv) as simply ‘any law of physics that holds at w1 holds at w2’. Hereinafter, where I refer to 
physical duplicate worlds, I have in mind a definition of the form just mooted. 
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w1 might stand in spatiotemporal relations; it is very important not to build 
physicalism into the definition of minimal physical duplication. It is not necessary to 
repeat this stipulation for y1,…,yn, for we know by (ii) that all the w2 individuals are 
physical. Second, as to (iv), a previous formulation read ‘any law of physics that holds 
at w1 or w2 holds just in case it holds at w1 and w2’. But this would allow w2 to be a 
minimal physical duplicate of w1 and yet there be non-physical laws that hold at w2 
but not at w1, which is clearly unacceptable. I could have said ‘the only laws that hold 
at w2 are laws of physics’ but then what of psychological, geological, and chemical 
laws? Again, appeals to supervenient laws are to be avoided, on pain of circularity – 
we can not therefore write (iv) as ‘the only laws that hold at w2 are laws of physics 
and any other laws supervenient on them.’ The appeal to quantification over 
physically possible worlds is supposed to avoid these pitfalls. The only laws common 
to all physically possible worlds will, of course, be either physical laws or 
consequences of physical laws. But appealing to the physical necessity of this set of 
laws in order to define its members avoids any tacit appeals to supervenience.8 Third, 
similar considerations to those given in support of (iv) motivate (v) – this condition is 
intended to rule out individuals at w2 that are physical duplicates of w1 individuals 
and yet possess, for instance, Cartesian souls. Clearly not all the properties of w2 
individials will be physical; but once again, we cannot appeal to supervenience to 
specify the acceptable non-physical properties. The problem is exactly analogous to 
the problem with laws; so, I take it to be relatively clear, is my suggested solution.  
 
Now if we plug this definition of minimal physical duplication into P2, we get the 
thesis that physicalism is true at wa just in case any world wx formed by adding one 
particular for every actual physical particular, and nothing else, endowing each one 
with all and only the actual intrinsic physical properties of the corresponding wa 
particular, fixing it so that all wa spatiotemporal relations hold between the wx 
duplicates of wa individuals, and fixing it so that all and only physically necessary 
                                                 
8 I hold that ‘physically possible’ means ‘consistent with the laws of physics’, and ‘physically 
necessary’ means ‘true in all physically possible worlds’. On this account the laws of physics are 
physically necessary, as are any other laws entailed, or otherwise determined, by physical laws. I am 
not entirely satisfied with this solution, but it is the best one I have to hand at the time of writing. 
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laws hold at wx, duplicates wa simpliciter. Notice that given my stipulation that 
spatiotemporal relational properties take care of ‘physical relations’, we could also 
formulate condition (iii) in the definition of minimal physical duplication equivalently 
in terms of dyadic relations between individuals and reified spacetime points. 
 
A few technical comments, in no particular order, before proceeding. First, ‘_is a 
minimal physical duplicate of_’ is non-reflexive and non-symmetric. A world 
containing ectoplasm will not be a minimal physical duplicate of itself, as it contains 
non-physical stuff that won’t survive duplication (nonreflexivity); and a minimal 
physical duplicate w2 of an ectoplasm world w1 will not contain the ectoplasm, and 
so, quite obviously, w1 is not a minimal physical duplicate of w2 (nonsymmetry). 
Second, including the laws of physics in the notion of a minimal physical duplicate 
has the consequence that we do not need to worry about restricting the modal ‘any’ in 
P2: for any possible world in which the actual laws of physics hold will ispo facto be 
a physically possible world. We can therefore leave the modality unrestricted. Third, 
it is not clear that a duplicate simpliciter of a world counts as a distinct possible 
world. But if indistinguishable possibilia are not distinct, then P2 merely claims that if 
physicalism is true, then any minimal physical duplicate of the actual world just is the 
actual world. I reply that this is unimportant. P2 is still a substantive claim, as there 
will be plenty of worlds such that minimal physical duplicates of them are not 
duplicates simpliciter; worlds, that is, such that there are minimal physical duplicates 
of them to which they are not identical. Fourth, P2 will fail to define physicalism if 
there exist at wa nonphysical entities that are metaphysically necessitated by physical 
ones. For if there are such entities, then minimal physical duplicate of wa will be 
duplicates simpliciter, despite the fact that physicalism is not true at wa. I reply that 
there are no such entities – if there are ghosts following me around as a matter of 
necessity, then the necessity is not metaphysical. Nor is it physical. If ghosts obey 
laws that connect them to physical individuals at wa, then those laws hold in addition 
to, and independently of, the laws of physics, and so will not hold at minimal physical 
duplicate worlds of wa.  
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P2 looks promising, but runs into two problems, which are prima facie devastating. 
Both problems stem from the fact that P2 says nothing about worlds that differ from 
actuality. First, P2 is consistent with the existence of ghosts with minds at nearby 
worlds. Let wg be a world that would be a minimal physical duplicate of wa but for the 
existence of a happy ghost, which never makes any difference to anything else at the 
world. (I leave open for now whether it is merely de facto true that the ghost does not 
disturb anything, or due to its having no causal powers. I return to this point in 1.3.) 
P2 is exempt from application to wg, which makes it consistent with the truth of 
physicalism at wa that there are very close possible worlds at which physicalism is 
false. It might be objected on this basis that P2 fails to adequately capture either the 
dependency of the mental on the physical, or (correspondingly) the fact that the 
mental is ‘nothing over and above’ the physical.9 Call this the dependency problem. 
The happiness of the ghost at wg clearly does not depend on physical properties for its 
instantiation; further, its happiness must be ‘something over and above’ the physical. 
Second, there is the so-called wayward hydrogen atom problem, which is that P2 is 
consistent with the existence of a world w1, which minimally duplicates wa in all 
respects save the position of a single hydrogen atom, and at which, for instance, 
nothing has any mental properties. Further, the definition also fails to rule out 
physically identical individuals within the actual world, one of which possesses 
mental properties, the other of which does not.10 Intuitively, these possibilities seem 
at odds with physicalism – for surely they show that global supervenience does not 
posit strong enough connections between mind and body to be physicalistically 
acceptable? If P2 is consistent with the dependency of mental properties on factors we 
know to be psychologically irrelevant, then how can it adequately capture the thought 
                                                 
9 Hendel [2001], for instance, argues that global supervenience theses are insufficient to capture the 
thought that the mental is ‘nothing but’ the physical on the grounds that such theses allow that there are 
possible worlds where non-physical things have mental properties. On Hendel’s account of ‘nothing 
buttery’ it does not matter whether such worlds are close to actuality or not – the instantiation of a 
mental property M by a non-physical being at any world is sufficient to render M something over and 
above the physical. I return to this point, and offer a limited rebuttal, at the end of 1.3 below. 
10 These points are due to Kim. See, for instance, his [1989b], [1990]. It is unclear whether the cases 
described are consistent with P2. Paull and Sider [1992] give (as one horn of a dilemma) an argument 
to the effect that the consistency is merely prima facie, as wayward atom worlds entail (on reasonable 
assumption) other possibilities that directly violate global supervenience. I discuss their argument in 
1.3 below. 
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that given physicalism, physical properties determine mental properties? Putting these 
two objections together, we have reason to doubt that P2 can capture any of the 
desiderata suggested for a definition of physicalism at the outset. I think that both 
these objections can be defeated, and will say why I think this in 1.3.11 For the 
moment, we simply note that these difficulties lead many philosophers to favour 
Kim’s strong supervenience (hereinafter I omit ‘Physicalism is true iff’ for brevity): 
 
P3. □∀x∀M∈M{M(x)→∃P∈P[P(x)&□∀y(P(y)→M(y))]}12
 
Here M is the set of mental properties and P the set of physical properties that 
subvene some mental property, and M and P are members of the respective sets. An 
attractive feature of this sort of formulation is that it makes it possible for us to define 
physicalism independently for different sets of properties. We might, for instance, 
hold that physicalism is true for intentional mental properties and yet false for 
phenomenal properties. By contrast, P1 and P2 are “all or nothing” definitions – on 
these formulations, physicalism will be either true of all properties instantiated at a 
world, or else false. The first modal operator in P3 is intended to convey the 
dependency of mental properties on physical properties, the second the determination 
of the former by the latter. We can translate it like this: necessarily, anything with a 
mental property M has a physical property P such that necessarily, if anything is P 
then it is M. The standard way of understanding the strengths of the modalities here is 
that the first operator expresses physical (sometimes nomological) necessity, the 
second metaphysical. Interpreting the first operator as physical necessity allows for 
the possibility simpliciter of spirit worlds, but disallows any non-physical beings with 
minds at physically (or nomologically) possible worlds. 
 
P3 easily handles the dependency problem. The wide-scope modal operator in P3 
means that the definition rules out the instantiation of any properties in M at 
                                                 
11 In particular, I will argue that the wayward atom ‘problem’ is actually a virtue of P2. Solving the 
dependency problem is much more difficult, and my response to it will be somewhat inconclusive. 
12 See Kim [1990] for details. 
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physically (or perhaps nomologically) possible worlds that lack the relevant properties 
in P. This is dependency with a vengeance – there is no individual, at any physically 
possible world, with mental properties and no physical properties. This clearly rules 
out a fortiori the troublesome ghosts that pose the dependency problem for P2. What 
of the wayward hydrogen atom problem? Provided P is restricted to intrinsic 
properties, the hydrogen atom problem described above is not a problem for P3, as P3 
entails that duplicate physical individuals can not differ mentally. Of course it follows 
a fortiori that minimal duplicate worlds can not differ mentally either, but the 
converse entailment is clearly untrue, which is precisely why P2 is consistent with 
physical duplicate individuals (within or across worlds) that differ mentally in virtue 
of some small difference in the apparently insignificant physical properties of those 
worlds. For the same reason, P3 is also inconsistent with the existence of two physical 
duplicates within a world that differ mentally. However, Paull and Sider argue that the 
Hydrogen atom problem resurfaces in that P3 says nothing about individuals that 
differ in small but psychologically insignificant ways.13 The wayward atom problem, 
they claim, can be internalised – for P3 is consistent with a physical ‘almost-
duplicate’ of George Bush (who would be a physical duplicate save for one wayward 
atom in his brain) who lacks all of actual Bush’s mental properties. This is because P3 
“…only implies that an object must have all the wonderful mental properties that 
Bush actually has if the object shares all his physical properties”.14 This seems right – 
there is nothing in P3 that will ensure that individuals that differ in minute P-respects 
will differ (if at all) in correspondingly minute M-respects. 
 
If Paull and Sider are correct, then strong and global supervenience stand or fall 
together in the face of their respective wayward atom problems. I note in passing that 
I am unconvinced that this is so. In particular, it is unclear to me that no restriction on 
P will rule out the case described. For instance, supposing P is allowed to contain 
only complex neural properties – the kind of properties that our best current theories 
of mind tell us do in fact determine our mental properties. With this restriction, two 
                                                 
13 See their [1992] pp.841-2. 
14 Paull and Sider [1992] p.842. 
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individuals might well fail to be physical duplicates and yet still be P-duplicates – for 
the properties in P may be insensitive to fine-grained physical differences. Changing 
the position of a single atom in Bush’s brain, it seems clear, will not change his neural 
properties. I will not concern myself with this matter further here, for the putative 
restrictions on P are implausible. So too is the wide-scope modal operator. For these 
reasons – or so I will argue in the next section – P3 has no advantage over P2 with 
either the dependency or wayward atom problems. 
 
There are two central problems with P3 that push it towards a position more-or-less 
equivalent to P2. The first of these problems I will call the problem of relational 
properties. The problem is that restricting the set P to intrinsic properties is 
unjustifiable, for reasons discussed below. But unless P is restricted to intrinsic 
properties, P3 is really a global supervenience thesis (P4, defined below) not 
dissimilar (though also not equivalent) to P2.15 The non-equivalence of P2 and P4 
consists in (i) the fact that P4 rules out certain possibilities (to be described) not ruled 
out by P2, and (ii) that fact that P4 defines physicalism for mental properties, whereas 
P2 just defines physicalism. The problem of relational properties is a corollary of the 
wayward atom problem; P3 has the former precisely because it does not have the 
latter. Similarly, mutatis mutandis, for P2. The second problem I will call the modality 
problem. The problem is that the wide-scope modal operators in P3 and P4 have 
undesirable consequences that warrant their removal. But its removal from P4 yields a 
weaker global supervenience thesis (P6, defined below), which is more-or-less 
equivalent to P2. The non-equivalence of P6 and P2 consists solely in the fact that P6 
defines physicalism for mental properties, whereas P2 defines physicalism. 
Correspondingly, if we broaden P6 so as to define physicalism simpliciter, it is 
equivalent to P2. The modality problem is a corollary of the dependency problem; P3 
has the former precisely because it does not have the latter. Similarly, mutatis 
mutandis, for P2. In the next section I will explain why the relational properties and 
                                                 
15 Horgan argues for a similar point in his [1993], but claims that strong and global supervenience 
theses are equivalent if P is unrestricted. I take this claim to be false due to the presence of the extra 
wide-scope modal operator in P3. I will justify this point in 1.2. 
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modality problems are serious enough to warrant rejection of P3. In 1.3 I will explain 
why the wayward atom and dependency problems are not serious enough to warrant 
rejection of P2. 
 
1.2. Two problems for strong supervenience 
1. The problem of relational properties 
If we include only intrinsic properties in P, P3 rules out, for instance, various theories 
of content that claim that mental properties are determined by environmental factors. 
Such theories are numerous, but examples include Burge’s conventionalist account of 
conceptual content, Putnam’s argument that the semantics of natural kind terms are 
environmentally determined, and the various naturalization projects that hold contents 
to be determined by historical and/or causal factors. I will not go into any great detail, 
as the point I wish to make is quite general. Burge [1979] endorses the view that 
conceptual content is determined by correct linguistic practice, which in turn is 
socially determined. Even if I intend my use of the term ‘arthritis’ in ‘I have arthritis 
in my thigh’ to mean cramp, the content of my utterance is that I have arthritis, not 
cramp, in my thigh. But assuming that the content of my belief that I have arthritis in 
my thigh is the same as the content of the proposition, it follows (given that 
intentional states are partially typed by their contents) that my beliefs depend, inter 
alia, on socio-linguistic facts. If this theory is correct, then P must include these facts. 
According to Kripke’s [1980] causal theory of naming, names do not have Fregean 
‘senses’; rather, they have reference only, which is determined by a causal process 
connecting an initial ‘dubbing ceremony’ to subsequent utterances. Putnam [1975c] 
extends Kripke’s theory of names to natural kind terms, claiming that these too are 
ceremoniously named. Captain caveman says “I hereby name this substance ‘water’” 
– and thereafter, ‘water’ means H2O, and not ‘watery, tasteless, colourless stuff’. On 
this account, the contents of our beliefs about natural kinds are determined by their 
deep physico-chemical structures, so P must include many (if not all) the physical 
properties of the believer’s environment. Similar considerations apply to the causal 
covariance accounts of content suggested by Fodor [1987] and Dretske [1981]. If 
content is informational, and the information carried by a token depends on what 
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typically causes it, then mental content is again determined by environmental 
properties, which must then be included in P. Finally Millikan [1993] and Papineau 
[1993] endorse historical accounts of content based on teleological function. Content 
is informational on these accounts too, but mental tokens are said to carry information 
about only those environmental features they are supposed to covary with. On this 
account, P will have to include teleological properties. The crucial point I want to 
make here is that restricting P to intrinsic properties makes it incompatible with all the 
theories of content outlined. Clearly, it would be unwise for a physicalist to rule out 
such theories solely on account of being a physicalist.16
 
If, on the other hand, we include relational properties in P, then without some 
restriction on which of these properties can be included, the thesis (as I will argue) 
collapses into a form of global supervenience. And it seems, short of turning 
physicalism into a substantive theory of mind, that no such restriction can be supplied. 
For instance, what if we restrict the relational properties in P to synchronically 
                                                 
16 As an aside, I should point out that I do not wish to endorse any such theory – like many others, I 
think that broad contents are insufficiently fine-grained to earn their psychological-explanatory keep. 
There are two central classes of problem case, and I follow Fodor [1994] in classifying them as ‘twin-
cases’ and ‘Frege-cases’. As to twin cases, suppose for the sake of argument that natural kind 
externalism is true. Twin Earth is a physical duplicate of the actual world save that it has XYZ 
(superficially indistinguishable from H2O) instead of water. Suppose neither me nor my twin-Earth 
counterpart know anything about the chemical structure of the stuff in Earth and twin-Earth lakes, 
respectively. My twin’s desire for some of what he refers to as ‘water’ is a desire for XYZ, not water; 
ditto for beliefs. And yet me and my twin apparently behave in just the same way because of our 
respective desires – we go to the kitchen, turn on the tap, hold a glass under it, and so on. Broad 
psychology appears to miss generalisations it ought to capture. As to Frege cases, suppose that 
Kripke’s causal theory of names is true. But now (given that Cicero = Tully) the content p1 of Bob’s 
belief that Cicero was put to death on Dec. 7, 43 B.C. is the same as the content p2 of the proposition 
that Tully was put to death on Dec. 7, 43 B.C. But Bob does not know that Cicero = Tully. Broad 
psychology thus struggles to explain certain behavioural facts: why Bob answers ‘yes’ when asked 
whether it is true that p1, but ‘no’ when asked whether it is true that p2; why Bob claims he does not 
know when Tully died; and so on. Broad psychology apparently gets the phenomena wrong. Fodor 
[1994] has a useful discussion of the relationship between broad content and the two problem cases 
mentioned. Fodor asks how, given that content is broad but computation narrow, we can reconcile the 
computational nature of psychological processes with the existence of content-based psychological 
laws. Twin cases and Frege cases are examples of how the narrow computational processes that cause 
behaviour, and broad-based psychological laws, can come apart. Fodor’s answer on behalf of broad 
content based psychology is that such cases are sufficiently rare that the missed generalisations and 
predictive failures go unnoticed, and are as such unimportant. It is plausible that Fodor is right about 
twin-cases; but he is surely wrong about Frege cases. Individuals are frequently known by more than 
one name or description, which immediately raises the possibility of someone having beliefs about a 
given object under two or more ‘modes of presentation’, without the believer knowing that the different 
modes present the same thing. 
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instantiated properties, but it turns out that teleological theorists are right, and the 
determinants of content include historical factors? What if we restrict them to 
“surface features” of the subject’s environment, but it turns out that natural kind 
externalists are right, and contents are determined by deep chemical structure? 
Restricting P in any way would seem to place undue a priori constraints on theories 
of mental representation. But without any restriction on P it seems we must insist that 
the property P that is sufficient for M must be a maximal structural property reflecting 
the total physical state of the world at which the individual has it. The only way to 
make sure all the relevant properties get into the supervenience base is to give up on 
trying to exclude the irrelevant ones, and let them all in. The very feature that 
(arguably) protects P3 from the wayward atom problem turns out to involve untenable 
commitments.17 As in P2, we can appeal to the notion of a minimal physical duplicate 
to define this maximal set of subvenient properties. 
 
The brand of physicalism we get from allowing unrestricted relational properties in P3 
is similar, but as I said, not equivalent to P2. It will be helpful to express the thesis in 
terms of Lewis’s counterpart theory;18 let W(x) = x is a possible world and Wα(x) = x 
is an α-possible world; let I(x,y) = x is in possible world y, and C(x,y) = x is a 
counterpart of y. For generality, let Pw-(x,y) = x is a minimal physical duplicate of y. 
Then we can reformulate P3 in the following way: 
 
P4. ∀u∀v∀M∈M{Wα(v).I(u,v).M(u)→∃w∃x[W(w).Pw-(w,v).C(x,u).I(x,w). 
∀y∀z{W(z).I(y,z).C(y,u).PP
                                                
w-(y,v)→M(y)}]} 
 
Thankfully, we may express this thesis in English as follows: ‘If any individual u in 
any α-possible world v has a mental property M, then u has a counterpart x at a world 
w that is a minimal physical duplicate of v, and any counterpart y of u in any possible 
 
17 In 1.3, I will suggest, correspondingly, that consistency with wayward atom worlds is a strength, not 
a weakness, of global supervenience. 
18 See Lewis [1968] and [1986a] for details. I will utilise counterpart theory quite a lot in what follows, 
as I find  it heuristically invaluable. I do not endorse possible worlds realism – rather I hope that, pace 
Lewis, the relevant bits of the theory can be made to make sense with ersatz worlds of some kind. 
These matters are well beyond the scope of the present work. 
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world z that is a minimal physical duplicate of v, has M’. The quantification over v 
may be restricted by the predicate Wα if desired – we can let the wide-scope quantifier 
range over metaphysically, physically or nomologically possible worlds. I discuss 
such restrictions presently, when I come to the modality problem. While P3 claims 
that any individual with a mental property also possesses a physical property that is 
sufficient for its mental properties, P4 claims only that individuals with mental 
properties at a world have counterparts with the same mental properties at all minimal 
physical duplicates of that world. What is the advantage of this strategy? Well, by 
definition of counterparthood and Pw-, it follows that x and y will not only be physical 
duplicates of u, as counterparts across minimal physical duplicate worlds must be, but 
also possess all the same relational properties as well.19 In this way, we succeed in 
making sure that we do not exclude any properties that might turn out to be relevant to 
the determination of mentality, while at the same time expressing the dependency 
claim that any individual at any possible world with mental properties must also have 
physical properties. This is because an individual with no physical properties fails to 
have counterparts at other worlds that are minimal physical duplicates of its own. This 
is also why the existential quantifiers are needed in P4 – without them P4 would fail 
to rule out worlds with mental but no physical properties, for minimal physical 
duplicates of such worlds fail to contain anything at all, making the antecedent of the 
second conditional false. Let us proceed to compare and contrast P4 and P2. 
 
P4 clearly suffers from the wayward atom problem, as it is consistent with a world 
that would be a minimal physical duplicate of w but for the position of the wayward 
hydrogen atom, and which contains no mentality. It follows, of course, that P3 solves 
the wayward atom problem only if the set P is restricted to intrinsic properties, which, 
as I have argued, is a highly implausible restriction. P4 does not, however, have the 
dependency problem. The wide-scope quantifiers of P4, just as with the wide-scope 
                                                 
19 Lewis, of course, defines counterparthood in terms of resemblance, and as such, I will certainly have 
counterparts that lack some of my mental properties. This does not, however, pose a problem for P4, 
which entails not that I have no such counterpart, but rather that I do not have such a counterpart in a 
world that is a minimal physical duplicate of the actual world. Since P4 is not concerned with worlds 
that differ from each other physically, it is quite consistent with defining counterparthood in Lewis’s 
relatively weak terms. 
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modal operator in P3, means this problem does not arise. Any individual, at any α-
possible world w, that has a mental property, has a counterpart at a world that is a 
minimal physical duplicate of w. But this, as I said above, means that any individual, 
at any α-possible world, that has a mental property, is a physical individual. P4, like 
P3, has dependency in spades. To see this, let Wα(x) = x is a physically possible 
world. Let wa be the actual world, and suppose that physicalism is true here. Once 
again let wg be a physically possible world that fails to minimally duplicate wa only in 
that there is also a happy ghost whose existence, we may suppose, is sufficient to 
render physicalism false at wg. This scenario is consistent with P2, for as I take it is by 
now familiar, P2 says nothing about worlds that differ from the world for which 
physicalism is being defined. But according to P4, since the ghost has mental 
properties, there ought to be a minimal physical duplicate wg- of wg containing a 
counterpart of the ghost. By definition of Pw-, the ghost at wg- must be physical, for 
wg- does not contain anything non physical. Now if the ghost at wg is not physical 
(which, by hypothesis, it is not), it is false that Pw-(wg-,wg), for in this case wg- 
contains a physical individual with no counterpart at wg. Therefore the ghost at wg 
must be physical, hence (contrary to stipulation) not the kind of ghost whose existence 
is inconsistent with physicalism. Ghosts are ruled out by P4 in that it quantifies over 
all physically possible worlds that contain individuals with mental properties. In sum, 
there is a modal difference between P2 and P4, in that the former holds that 
physicalism can be true at a world that has very close neighbouring worlds at which 
physicalism is not true, whereas the latter holds that physicalism, if true, is true of 
entire neighbourhoods of worlds – in our example, all the physically possible worlds. 
It is common in the literature to find philosophers insisting on just this latter sort of 
modal dependency of the mental on the physical; a moment’s reflection, however, 
will show that this requirement is far too strong to be plausible. This leads us nicely 
into the second of our two problems. 
 
2. The modality problem 
The wide-scope quantification in P4 must be restricted somehow. This is because if 
we quantify over all possible worlds simpliciter, then the formulation rules out the 
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possibility simpliciter of ‘spirit worlds’ – for it would then claim (inter alia) that any 
individual in any possible world is such that if it has mental properties, then it has 
physical properties. Many, myself included, would find this far too strong. If 
physicalism is true, then there are certainly no ghosts at the actual world, and 
plausibly none at nearby worlds, but why should it be part of a physicalist’s 
metaphysical commitments that ghosts are impossible? Our definition should not 
entail that there are no possible non-physical things that have mental properties. 
However, on reflection it is less than clear that physical necessity fares any better, for 
the simple reason that it is not obvious why ghosts should be physically impossible 
either. Let ‘physically necessary’ mean true in every physically possible world, and 
let ‘physically possible’ mean ‘consistent with the laws of physics’. Prima facie, 
physical laws do not rule out the intervention of ghosts, Gods, or any other non-
physical stuff in the causal workings of the world, since such laws do not quantify 
over such non-physical entities. Take a physical law of the form ‘P events cause Q 
events’. An exception to such a law will presumably be the occurrence of a P event 
that is not followed by a Q event. But now suppose that, on some occasion, a ghost 
decides to intervene and cause a Q event. Unless its intervention prevents some other 
physical event from preventing this Q event, then its action does not violate physical 
law, as there is no physical law to the effect that ghosts never cause Q events! On the 
other hand, the ghost’s intervention will violate the causal completeness of physics, if 
the Q event it causes lacks a physical cause. However, in the absence of an argument 
that the completeness of physics is physically necessary – and as we shall see in 3.2, it 
is no trivial matter to argue that it is even true – worlds containing ghosts and Gods 
and all sorts of other creepy things will still count among the physically possible 
worlds. But this means that the worlds at which physicalism is true will be a subset of 
the physically possible worlds, and so the wide-scope modality of P4 is too strong. 
 
Can we further restrict quantification so as to make the definition plausible? It is 
difficult to see how. Consider nomological necessity. I understand this necessity to be 
truth in all possible worlds with the same laws of nature as the actual world. I 
distinguish between nomological and physical necessity because it is an open question 
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whether all laws of nature are, or are reducible to, laws of physics. If the world obeys 
‘extra’ laws whose truth is independent of the truth of physical laws, then there will 
be fewer nomologically possible worlds than there are physically possible worlds, and 
nomological necessity correspondingly weaker than the physical variety. (Since the 
laws of physics in this case will be among the laws of nature, the set of physically 
possible worlds will be a superset of the nomologically possible ones.20) Now if the 
nomologically possible worlds are a subset of the physically possible ones, it is open 
to us to maintain that although ghostly interventions are physically possible, they are 
inconsistent with the extra laws that hold in the nomologically possible worlds. But 
how can that be so? These extra laws, although not determined by physical laws, will 
nonetheless be natural and amenable to empirical enquiry, which, I suppose, is 
exactly what ghosts are not! How could a natural law quantify over definitionally 
supernatural entities? 
 
One response at this stage is to adopt a richer notion of possibility. Instead of 
construing X-possibility as merely that which is not ruled out by X-laws, we might 
adopt a version of Armstrong’s combinatorialism, in which (very roughly) a possible 
world is one that can be constructed by recombining the basic properties and 
particulars that exist at the actual world in any way you like.21 Possible worlds so 
understood must of course be compatible with the actual laws of physics, but it must 
also be possible to construct them by recombining actual physical particulars and 
properties. This is not supposed to be an account of mere physical possibility, but 
rather of the whole space of possibilities. Any apparent possibilities that can’t be 
made by recombining what’s already here, are possible in name only, and must be 
reinterpreted as such. Now clearly you can’t construct a ghost in this way, and so 
ghosts are impossible simpliciter. Their apparent possibility must then be re-
                                                 
20 This point is well made by Witmer [2001]. Witmer has this to say (pp.62-3): “By definition, every 
nomologically possible world is a physically possible world, but it is an open question whether every 
physically possible world is a nomologically possible world. It may be that there are laws not 
necessitated by the laws of physics, in which case there are physically possible worlds that are not 
nomologically possible.” This point is of crucial importance, as we shall see in chapter 6. 
21 For the combinatorial theory see Armstrong [1986]. See Lewis [1992] and [1986b]  for detailed 
discussion and criticism. 
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interpreted as something like (mere) epistemic possibility. Ghosts, while not ruled out 
a priori by the structure of our concepts, are no less impossible for all that. The 
trouble is, you can’t construct new basic particulars out of old ones either, nor can 
new basic universals be produced by recombining old ones. And yet it seems perfectly 
possible that the world’s basic ontology might have been otherwise, and not merely in 
the sense that it isn’t a priori that it is the way it is. 
 
We might appeal to combinatorialism as an account of physical possibility only, but it 
seems too strong even for that purpose. For instance, it seems clearly physically 
possible that there might, in addition to everything else that’s here, have been one 
more quark in the world. But by definition you can’t make the extra one by 
recombining the existing ones! If this objection is correct, then the set of 
combinatorially possible worlds is a subset of the physically possible worlds. These 
matters are well beyond the scope of this thesis, however; my view is that 
Armstrong’s theory rules out far too many genuine possibilities to be plausible, but 
this is not the place to attempt a detailed justification. Suffice it to say that on a more 
liberal understanding of the space of possibilities, it looks very much like any 
restriction on the wide-scope quantifier in P4 (and correspondingly, any interpretation 
of the wide-scope operator in P3) will yield too strong a thesis. Problematically, the 
features that enable P3 and P4 to avoid the dependency problem, entail that certain 
genuine possibilities are not possible. 
 
Let us try removing the wide-scope quantification over worlds altogether, making 
physicalism a claim about the actual world wa.22 Consider P5, which is a universal 
instantiation of P4 got by setting the value of the variable v = wa: 
 
                                                 
22 Clearly this move will bring strong supervenience much closer to the global variety. To some it will 
seem as though removing the wide-scope operator also removes a crucial component of P3 that 
expresses the dependency of the mental on the physical; the justification for its removal, after all, is 
precisely to allow for the physical possibility of non-physical things with mental properties.  More on 
this in 1.3 below. 
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P5. ∀u∀M∈M{M(u)→∃w∃x[W(w).Pw-(w,wa).C(x,u).I(x,w). 
∀y∀z{W(z).I(y,z).C(y,u).PPw-(z,w )→M(y)}]} a
 
This tells us that any individual u in the actual world wa with a mental property M has 
a counterpart x at a minimal physical duplicate w of wa, and any counterpart y of u in 
any minimal physical duplicate z of wa also has M. Now while the existential 
quantification was necessary in P4, it is not so here. This is because we know that 
actual individuals are physical, and so will have counterparts at worlds that minimally 
physically duplicate wa. In P4, you may recall, we needed the existential quantifiers to 
prevent the definition being vacuously true of worlds that do not contain anything 
physical. If we are only defining physicalism for the actual world, no such caution is 
necessary. But then we can rewrite P5 thus: 
 
P6. ∀u∀M∈M{M(u)→∀y∀z[W(z).I(y,z).C(y,u).Pw-(z,wa)→M(y)]} 
 
P6 tells us that any actual individual with a mental property M has a counterpart at 
any minimal physical duplicate of wa, which also has M. Because, like P2, P6 says 
nothing about worlds that are not minimal physical duplicates of wa, it has both the 
dependency and wayward atom problems. But P6 does not entail P2 as things stand, 
nor should it. This is because P6 defines physicalism only for mental properties, 
whereas P2 defines physicalism simpliciter. How are we to understand the 
relationship between the two? A natural way to think of the matter is to try to define a 
notion of world duplication with respect to the set M of properties (in this case, of 
course, mental properties) for which P6 defines physicalism. We could then express 
P6 as the thesis that any minimal physical duplicate of wa is a ‘mental duplicate’ of 
wa. Problematically, however, there is no obvious way of understanding mental 
duplication for worlds in terms of individuals that are mental duplicates. Duplication, 
we are supposing to be analyzable in terms of shared intrinsic properties, and mental 
properties, as we have seen, are plausibly extrinsic – individuals that are duplicates 
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simpliciter might differ mentally, if certain externalist theories of mind are true.23 It is 
difficult to see how to formulate a relative notion of world duplication for mental 
properties; fortunately, no such account is needed. A better way to understand the 
relationship between P6 and P2 is to focus on the fact that P6 expresses a necessary, 
but clearly not sufficient, condition for duplication simpliciter, hence for P2. A world 
wx that is a minimal physical duplicate of wa, as we know, contains all and only 
physical duplicates of wa individuals. Now if wx is to be a duplicate simpliciter of (or 
perhaps better, identical to) wa, then those individuals will need to have all the other 
properties their wa counterparts have as well, intrinsic or extrinsic; its mental 
properties are, of course, a subset of these. As I said, it is no surprise that P6 doesn’t 
entail P2, as P6 quantifies only over mental properties – in its present form, P6 
defines physicalism for a subset of the properties covered by P2. But now if we allow 
M in P6 to include all non-physical properties, then it follows that if physicalism (now 
defined simpliciter) is true according to P6, then our physical duplicate counterparts at 
a minimal physical duplicate world wx of wa will have all the same properties as we 
do, intrinsic or otherwise. Which is to say that wx is a duplicate simpliciter of wa. 
Hence if P6 is rewritten so as to define physicalism simpliciter, P6 entails P2. 
 
The converse entailment is a much simpler matter. According to P2, if physicalism is 
true, then a minimal physical duplicate wx of wa is a duplicate simpliciter. But by 
definition of duplication simpliciter, it follows that wx contains all and only 
individuals that are duplicates of wa individuals, and which also have all the same 
relational properties as their wa counterparts. But from this it follows that any 
counterpart at wx of a wa individual has all the same properties, intrinsic or otherwise. 
Whatever the set of properties for which P6 defines physicalism, then, P6 will be 
entailed by P2. If P6 defines physicalism for a subset of properties, then P2 entails P6 
a fortiori; if P6 defines physicalism for all properties (i.e. physicalism simpliciter) as 
does P2, then the two are equivalent. So in conclusion, P3, if not (implausibly) 
                                                 
23 Putnam’s [1975c] ‘Twin-Earth’ thought experiment, on the reasonable assumption that the content of 
intentional mental states is the same as the content of their propositional objects, is an argument in 
support of this very point. See my discussion of the problem of relational properties above for more on 
this. 
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restricted to intrinsic properties, and with the (implausible) wide-scope modality 
removed, is more-or-less equivalent to P2. P3 solves the dependency and wayward 
atom problems only at the expense of implausibility on other grounds. I will proceed 
to argue that those problems are not as serious as they might seem, so that global 
supervenience theses such as P6 and P2 are, after all, plausible definition of 
physicalism. In what follows, for reasons of exposition, I formulate my arguments in 
terms of P6. It should be clear how what I have to say applies mutatis mutandis to P2. 
The structure of the next section is as follows: first, I discuss first the wayward atom 
problem, then the dependency problem; I then proceed to consider the way in which 
P6 captures the thought that the mental is nothing over and above the physical. 
 
1.3. Is global supervenience adequate? 
First, let us reconsider the wayward hydrogen atom problem. This objection, you will 
recall, is that global supervenience does not account for the determination of the 
mental by the physical. It seems intuitively clear that hydrogen atoms around here can 
do whatever they like without affecting the actual distribution of mentality. The 
objector, it seems, wants physicalism to entail this fact. We can put the point like this: 
physicalism should entail the falsity of counterfactuals such as ‘if this hydrogen atom 
were in a slightly different place, then nobody would have any mental properties’. But 
our definition P6 is consistent with the truth of such counterfactuals, for P6 allows 
that the closest possible worlds in which the hydrogen atom is displaced are worlds 
with no mentality at all. Paull and Sider [1992], however, present the objector with 
the following dilemma: either (i) mental properties are intrinsic, in which case the 
world described is not consistent with global supervenience, despite prima facie 
appearances to the contrary; or (ii) mental properties are extrinsic, in which case the 
world described is consistent with global supervenience, but this is as it should be. 
Motivating horn (i) requires an alternative formulation of global supervenience, viz. 
‘A globally supervenes on B iff any two worlds with the same distribution of B-
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properties have the same distribution of A-properties as well’.24 Appealing to this 
form to define physicalism simpliciter (rather than physicalism about a restricted 
domain) gives us a universally quantified version of P1:  
 
P1∀. Physicalism is true iff any two worlds that are physical duplicates, are 
duplicates simpliciter.25
 
As with P1, such a thesis is too strong, due to the problem of extras. P1∀ entails a 
fortiori that no world that is a physical duplicate of the actual world contains anything 
non-physical. I will not comment further on the suitability of this form of 
supervenience for defining physicalism, as horn (i) is implausible anyway due to the 
requirement that mental properties be intrinsic; still, for the sake of completeness, let 
us see how the argument goes. The wayward atom objection claims that P1∀ is 
consistent with the existence of a world wh that is a duplicate of the actual world save 
that a single hydrogen atom is displaced, and at which there is no mentality. Now 
consider wa- and wh-, the actual and displaced atom worlds respectively, but with the 
troublesome atom removed. On the assumption that mental properties are intrinsic 
properties of things with minds, then according the present way of defining intrinsic, 
it follows that no individual at wa differs mentally from its counterpart at wa-; and no 
individual at wh differs mentally from its counterpart at wh-. The reason is simple: the 
intrinsic properties of those individuals are those properties they have regardless of 
what else exists; clearly the removal of a lone hydrogen atom from each world does 
not affect the intrinsic properties of any individuals there. From this it follows that no 
individual at wh has any mental properties, while those at wa- have their wa mental 
properties. But wa- and wh- are by definition physical duplicates. Therefore we have a 
violation of P1∀, which means that the latter supervenience thesis, on the assumption 
that mental properties are intrinsic, is not consistent with the possibility of wh. While I 
do not agree with the letter of this argument, I do think that Paull and Sider have an 
                                                 
24 Paull and Sider [1992] p.834. Their argument, of which I present a somewhat simplified version, 
occurs at pp.841-6. 
25 I do not attribute this supervenience thesis to Paull and Sider, and include it here for expository 
purposes only. I think it likely that they would wish to restrict to domain of A to mental properties. 
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important general point. Prima facie, wh does not falsify global supervenience. But as 
Paull and Sider point out, universally quantified theses such as P1∀ are true, if they 
are true, for entire domains of worlds. From the putative possibility of wh, on the 
assumption that mental properties are intrinsic, we can deduce that wa- and wh- are 
possible, and together this pair are direct counterexamples to the supervenience claim. 
Now to the second horn, which can be motivated without appeal to the rather dubious 
P1∀. 
 
If mental properties are extrinsic, then we can no longer derive counterexamples to 
global supervenience from the putative possibility of wh. This is because it was the 
intrinsicality of mental properties that justified the claim that wh- and wa- do not differ 
mentally from wh and wa respectively. The key point to note about extrinsic properties 
in the present context is that by definition, their instantiation by an individual depends 
on the way things are outside that individual. We have already seen examples of 
extant theories of content that have exactly this consequence – for instance, Burge’s 
social externalism makes mentality dependent on the existence of linguistic 
conventions; Putnam’s natural kind externalism makes natural kind thoughts 
dependent on the intrinsic natures of those kinds. But now as Paull and Sider point 
out, the fact that P6 is consistent with the possibility of wh just means that P6 does not 
rule out a theory of mind according to which mentality depends on the precise 
location of a particular hydrogen atom. Suppose that counterfactual ‘if this hydrogen 
atom were in a slightly different place, then nobody would have any mental 
properties’ is true; its truth does not refute physicalism, it merely entails that much of 
what we believe about the connection between mind and body is mistaken. 
Physicalism as defined by P6 is consistent with the dependency of mentality on any 
physical properties; and this, I maintain, is a virtue, not a vice. Physicalism, after all, 
is not supposed to be a theory of mind.26 This is the central reason why we could not 
                                                 
 
26 See Stalnaker’s [1996] pp.229-30 for a very similar response to the wayward hydrogen atom 
problem. For instance, Stalnaker agrees “…that no sensible materialist would accept the 
possibility…[of wh]. But sensible materialists are not only materialists, they are also sensible; one 
should not define materialism so that there cannot be silly versions of it.” Nicely put. It is worth noting 
that the present state of science in fact does suggest that worlds such as wh are physically impossible. 
The laws of physics just don’t seem to permit lone atoms to exert such a powerful influence on the 
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to restrict P in P3 to intrinsic properties – with that restriction, the hydrogen atom 
problem goes away, but we then place undue a priori constraints on empirical and 
philosophical theorising about the mind. If our liberalism about P is well-motivated 
by the desire to remain neutral qua physicalist as to particular theories of mind, then 
the subsequent consistency of our definition of physicalism with the possibility that 
tiny physical differences might make large-scale mental difference to a world ought 
not to trouble us. If mental properties did depend on the position of lone hydrogen 
atoms, then mental properties would ispo facto depend on physical properties, albeit 
in a rather odd way. Correspondingly, mental properties would still be determined by 
physical properties, but by properties we presently (not without good reason) take to 
have no bearing whatever on the mind. The prima facie implausibility of wayward 
hydrogen atom worlds is not a consequence of physicalism, nor should it be; rather, it 
is a consequence of the empirically well-supported (but possibly mistaken) view that 
brains are relevant to the determination of mentality in a way that lone hydrogen 
atoms are not. Precisely what properties are in the supervenience base for mental 
properties is a matter for theory of mind; physicalism merely informs us that those 
properties are some subset of the available physical ones. This concludes our response 
to the wayward atom problem. 
 
Second, we reconsider the dependency problem. P6 is consistent with the existence of 
very close neighbouring worlds at which physicalism is false. As I argued above, 
while P4 rules out such worlds (this, we saw, was how P4 differed from P2), P6 does 
not. The reason for removing the wide-scope modality from our definitions is that 
ghosts aren’t impossible; but now P6 places them closer to actuality than we might 
wish. Before addressing this problem directly, I will consider a similar problem raised 
by Witmer, who worries that P6 makes physicalism ‘lucky’ if it is true.27 In essence, 
his objection is that physicalism could be true at a world just because the ghosts de 
                                                                                                                                            
global distribution of mentality, or anything else, at a world. My point here, like Stalnaker’s, is just that 
physicalists need not concern themselves with such matters. There is no reason why a definition of 
physicalism should encode substantive theses about the way the world works, however silly the denial 
of these theses may seem. 
27 See Witmer [2001] pp.65-9. 
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facto never get around to showing up. Witmer argues that P6 is consistent with the 
truth of counterfactuals such as: ‘If Desmond had remembered to shave yesterday, a 
ghost would have appeared in his mirror to congratulate him’. The problem is that we 
don’t want physicalism to be true at a world just because, de facto, the antecedent 
conditions of such counterfactuals are not met. Since, as Witmer points out, these 
antecedent conditions are propositions whose truth would not falsify physicalism, and 
are true at very close possible worlds, we can’t allow that their truth alone would be 
sufficient for the truth of ‘physicalistically unacceptable’ propositions. If physicalism 
is true at the actual world, then it can’t be a matter of luck that it’s true – it seems that 
what we need, then, is a definition that entails that such counterfactuals are false. For 
the counterfactual ‘if Desmond has remembered to shave, a ghost would have 
appeared to congratulate him’ to be true, it must be the case that worlds at which 
Desmond remembers to shave and a ghost appears, are not further from actuality than 
worlds at which no ghost appears. That is, if it takes a larger departure from actuality 
to make the antecedent true and the consequent true than it does to make the 
antecedent true and the consequent false, then the counterfactual is false. As usual, let 
wa be the actual world, let ws- be the closest world to actuality at which Desmond 
remembers to shave and no ghost appears, and ws+ be the closest world to actuality at 
which Desmond remembers to shave and a ghost does appear. Why does Witmer 
suppose that P6 tells us nothing about which of ws- and ws+ is closest to wa? 
 
Witmer’s point seems to be that P6 is consistent with there being a peculiar law of 
nature L that holds at wa whose antecedent condition is de facto never met. (We may 
suppose for the sake of argument that Desmond’s remembering to shave is within the 
scope of L’s antecedent.) Now if L is true at wa, then ws+ will be closer to  actuality 
than ws-, for L is violated at the latter but not at the former. Hence if L is true at wa, 
then the troublesome counterfactual is true as well, and the brand of physicalism 
defined by P6 will be lucky. We can make the same point in a less bizarre way: 
perhaps there are physical conditions that would, if they obtained, lead to the 
evolution of Cartesian spirits. The trouble is that we do not want physicalism to be 
true at a world whose total history is such that such conditions de facto never happen. 
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Fortunately, pace Witmer, P6 rules that physicalism is false at such worlds – for as we 
have defined minimal physical duplication and duplication simpliciter – in particular 
condition (iv) in each definition, relating to laws – P6 entails that if L is true at wa, 
then since L is not true at all physically possible worlds, physicalism here is false. The 
reason is simple: according to our definition of minimal physical duplication, L will 
not hold at any minimal physical duplicate w of wa. But then according to our 
definition or duplication simpliciter, w will not be a duplicate simpliciter of wa as w 
has a differing set of natural laws. Similarly, of course, if physicalism is true at wa 
then L is not true at wa, so that ws- will be closer to actuality than ws+ (the latter must 
contain an extra law or a miracle that makes the ghost appear) making our problem 
counterfactual false. Thus I maintain that P6 gets the Desmond counterfactuals 
exactly right; why then does Witmer not see it? Here is why: 
 
Jackson explicitly includes the physical laws in [the] recipe [for making 
minimal physical duplicates] but I wish to exclude them, because I want to 
keep it clear that the worlds over which we are generalizing are physically 
possible worlds. This would be implied by the meaning of a minimal physical 
duplicate if we kept the laws in the recipe, but it would not be as salient.28
 
By the same token, natural laws do not appear in Witmer’s conception of duplication 
simpliciter as indistinguishability in all respects. As a result, Witmer has to do a lot of 
manoeuvring in order to make ws- closer to wa than ws+. In particular, he seems to 
want to argue that all the laws that hold at the actual world are true at all physically 
possible worlds where certain physical conditions obtain. It is far from clear to me 
that this is true, and equally far from clear to me why, if it is true, it solves the 
problem of luckiness. No matter, for P6 defined as I have defined it solves the 
problem without the need for any wriggling.29 Some actual laws of nature may not be 
physically necessary; so much the worse for physicalism if this is the case. 
 
                                                 
28 Witmer [2001] p.65. Witmer’s preference here is stylistic, but if (as I maintain) there are theoretical 
advantages to thinking of the recipe as Jackson and I do, then we surely must do so. 
29 I will not detail Witmer’s solution here, as I find it somewhat convoluted as well as unnecessary. 
Those interested, and those who find my solution problematic, may consult Witmer [2001] pp.67-9. 
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We have thus far seen how P6 entails that physicalism is false at worlds where certain 
problematic counterfactuals are true; and conversely, how it entails that if physicalism 
is true at a world, then certain problematic counterfactuals are not. However, the more 
general dependency problem is unsolved: P6 does not rule out a world wg that is a 
physical duplicate of wa, and would be a minimal physical duplicate, but for the 
presence of a happy ghost. This possibility does not depend on the existence of any 
extra laws at either wa or wg. However, the manner of our response to Witmer’s 
problem suggests a similar response to the more general problem – deny that the 
imagined possibility is close enough to actuality to pose a problem. The remarks that 
follow are intended as a suggestion of what a solution to the dependency problem 
would look like, not a well-worked out solution. Prima facie, wg is very close to wa. 
On reflection, however, this is not true – given certain assumptions, wg is a very 
distant world indeed. First, consider wg*, which would be a physical duplicate of wa 
but for the fact that the ghost there moves Desmond’s razor to confuse him. But for 
the ghost, we may suppose, Desmond’s razor would have stayed exactly where he left 
it. One thing we can say for certain about wg* is that the causal completeness of 
physics is not true there, for by stipulation the exact position of Desmond’s razor does 
not have a physical cause at wg*. Therefore, if completeness is true at the actual world, 
then the world at which a ghost appears is a huge departure from actuality, as it 
requires that a general empirical truth about the actual world does not hold.  If these 
remarks are correct, we have the promise of a way of defining the neighbourhood that 
wa occupies if physicalism is true – all the other worlds in the neighbourhood will be 
worlds where the completeness of physics is true. This looks better – some physically 
possible worlds will be such that physics is causally complete, other not, in virtue of 
containing mischievous ghosts. 
 
On its own, however, the completeness of physics will not do the work we have in 
mind for it. We need also to include the proposition that there widespread 
overdetermination is unthinkable in the condition that defines the relevant 
neighbourhood. This is because ghosts whose mental properties have (either actual or 
potential) physical effects will not violate the completeness of physics at worlds 
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where those effects also have physical causes. Further, ghosts whose mental 
properties are epiphenomenal will be incapable of violating completeness; we 
therefore need to add into the neighbourhood-defining proposition the premise that 
mental events (at least potentially) have physical effects. Now the set of propositions 
that defines the relevant neighbourhood is just the premise set of the causal argument! 
Provided the argument is a sound and valid argument for P6, we can add to P6 
quantification over these worlds “for free”. The resulting modality is difficult to 
incorporate into quantified modal logic, but much easier to define in counterpart-
theoretic terms. If we so desire, we may express the dependency missing from P6 by 
reintroducing the wide-scope quantification we had in P4, thus: let φ = the 
conjunction of the completeness of physics, the denial of overdetermination, and the 
efficacy of the mental; let Wα(x) = ‘x is a physically possible world where φ’. Then 
we have: 
 
P6∀. ∀x∀u∀M∈M{Wα(x).M(u)→∀y∀z[W(z).I(y,z).C(y,u).Pw-(z,x)→M(y)]} 
 
Now there is a clear sense in which mental properties depend on physical properties, 
for if physicalism is true at wa then it is false that there are close possible worlds 
containing ghosts with mental properties. The closest ghost-worlds to actuality will be 
worlds at which φ is false. Our ghost world wg must be a world at which either (i) 
there are physical events with no physical causes; (ii) widespread overdetermination 
is possible; or (iii) some mental properties are epiphenomenal. The truth of any of 
these propositions, provided they are false at wa, means that wg is distant, not close. 
Mentality at the φ-worlds depends on the physical, for there is nothing non-physical 
with mental properties at any of those worlds. In the chapters to follow, for the sake of 
simplicity, I will consider physicalism to be defined by P6 rather than P6∀. 
 
Before closing this section, I will make a few general remarks about how I take 
supervenience formulations of physicalism to capture the thought that the mental is 
nothing over and above the physical. It is unclear to me exactly how to give necessary 
and sufficient conditions for A’s being ‘nothing over and above’ B. Intuition is clear 
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about certain cases in which A is not nothing over and above B; necessary conditions 
are easier to come by than sufficient conditions in this context. For this reason, it is 
much easier to make problems for a relation that purports to capture nothing-over-
and-aboveness than it is to solve them. For my part, I hold that if you can duplicate 
the actual world simpliciter just by minimally physically duplicating it, then there just 
has to be a sense in which everything in it is ‘nothing over and above’ the physical. If 
P6 is true, then when God made the actual world, all He had to do was fix all the 
relevant physical particulars, properties and laws – and everything else took case of 
itself; maybe that’s how come He took Sunday off. I note in passing that P3, too, 
captures this sense of ‘nothing over and above’, because it entails P6. If it is 
metaphysically necessary that if anything is P, then it is M, then there must be a sense 
in which M is nothing over and above P. There are problems, of course; in the 
remainder of this section, I will highlight two of them. I will respond to the first 
problem here; my response to the second, for expository reasons, will be postponed to 
7.3. 
 
First, note that as Hendel [2001] maintains, P6 entails that there is a clear sense in 
which mental properties are not nothing over and above the physical. The argument is 
simple: P6 entails that wholly non-physical beings can have mental properties; ergo, 
mental properties are not nothing over and above the physical.30 As we have seen, 
however, this need not pose a problem for the dependency of mental properties on the 
physical, for there is a neighbourhood of worlds within which there is no having a 
mind without having physical properties. Might we extend this thought to respond to 
Hendel’s objection? I think we might. Suppose for the sake of argument that role 
functionalism is true, and mental property M = the property of having a property that 
plays causal role R. Now reflect on the fact that in the φ-worlds, the only properties 
available as role-fillers are physical. Does it not follow that in the φ-worlds, mental 
properties are nothing over and above physical Ps that play the relevant Rs? If 
                                                 
30 As we have seen, P3 does not have this problem, due to the wide-scope modal operator. The problem 
Hendel poses is a problem for global supervenience only – or more generally, for any supervenience 
thesis that allows the possibility of non-physical minds. 
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anything is ever ‘nothing over and above’ anything else (short of being identical to it) 
then particular instances of functional properties are nothing over and above 
particular instances of their realizers. But if M has non-physical realizers at worlds 
outside the neighbourhood defined by φ, then M itself fails to be nothing over and 
above the physical. I think it makes sense to say this: that ‘M is nothing over and 
above the physical’ is true for the very same neighbourhood of worlds within which 
M depends on the physical – true in the sense that for any of the φ-worlds, every M-
instance is realized by a P-instance. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, for the 
metaphysical necessitation in P3 – if it is true at a set of worlds that every M-instance 
is such that there is a P-instance such that it is metaphysically necessary that if 
anything is P then it is M, then the M-instances at those worlds are nothing over and 
above the P-instances. Provided we can make sense of particular instances of a 
property being nothing over and above the physical, while the property itself is 
something over and above the physical, we can have our cake and eat it: a physicalist 
supervenience thesis that captures the thought that mentality is nothing over and 
above the physical, together with the possibility of Cartesian minds. 
 
Second, there is an argument, due to Wilson, to the effect that neither P3 nor P6 
captures the thought that the mind is nothing over and above the physical.31 The 
argument depends on Shoemaker’s necessitarian view of the relationship between 
properties and causal laws.32 It is relatively uncontroversial that properties contribute 
causal powers to the particulars that instantiate them. According to one version of the 
Shoemaker view, properties are individuated by the causal powers they bestow. 
Assuming that causal laws describe the causal powers that properties bestow, it 
follows that a property is individuated by the causal laws in which it figures. Next, 
Wilson appeals to the possibility of emergence to show that there are properties 
whose existence is inconsistent with physicalism, which nonetheless supervene with 
metaphysical necessity on physical properties. I will describe emergentism in much 
more detail in chapter 6; for now, I can make do with the following: emergent 
                                                 
31 In Wilson [2005], pp.433-9. 
32 See for instance Shoemaker [1980]. 
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properties (i) supervene on the physical, (ii) are something over and above the 
physical, connected by synchronic bridge laws LE that are independent of the laws of 
physics, and (iii) have novel causal powers not reducible to the powers of their 
physical emergence base properties. Let P be the emergence base for some emergent 
E. Wilson’s point seems to be that given the novel powers of E, there will be laws of 
nature featuring P that depend on the instantiation of E. That is, at worlds where LE 
are not true, the set of causal laws of nature featuring P is different, due to the fact 
that the powers conferred by E at LE-worlds are absent. But now given 
necessitarianism, and on the further assumption that a property is individuated by the 
totality of laws in which it features, it follows that the very nature of P depends on 
E.33 P can not be instantiated at worlds where it is not an emergence base for E. But 
that means that P metaphysically necessitates E, rather than merely nomologically 
necessitating E as many – myself included – would suppose. Further, for obvious 
reasons, it means that minimal physical duplicates of worlds where LE hold will have 
to be LE-worlds as well – otherwise they will fail to be P-worlds, hence not even 
physical duplicates. So neither metaphysically necessary supervenience nor minimal 
physical duplication are adequate to capture the ‘nothing-over-and-aboveness’ of the 
mental. 
 
For my part, I am convinced that there is something very badly wrong with this 
argument. One response is just to deny necessitarianism. Properties have natures that 
go beyond the causal powers of their instances; the powers conferred by a property at 
a given world are determined by its nature together with the causal laws that hold at 
that world. I will not take this route, because I wish to remain neutral at present as to 
the truth or falsity of necessitarianism. Another response to the argument is to deny, 
even given the necessitarian view, that properties are individuated by the totality of 
laws in which they figure. P contributes a certain individuative set SP of causal 
powers; E emerges from P and contributes an extra set SE of powers; P is individuated 
by the laws that describe SP, and E by the laws that describe SE. However, there is a 
                                                 
33 The situation, I realise, is somewhat misdescribed. If the nature of P depends on E, then I ought not 
to refer to P’s instantiation at worlds where LE do not hold. I take it nothing of import turns on this. 
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counter to this line of response, endorsed by Kim and arguably by Lowe, too.34 The 
counter is simple: given that P contributes E, why does it not also contribute the 
powers contributed by E? Kim uses this line of argument in his ‘supervenience 
argument’ in support of the view that it is inconsistent to suppose that emergent 
properties both supervene on the physical and have novel causal powers.35 If the 
powers contributed by E are contributed by P as its emergence base, then in what 
sense does E have novel powers? If P contributes the powers of E (by virtue of 
contributing E itself), then given the necessitarian view, the instantiation of P 
metaphysically necessitates the instantiation of E.36 But E is non-physical, so neither 
P3 nor P6 defines physicalism, let alone captures the thought that the mental is 
nothing over and above the physical. This argument, although to my mind quite 
plainly wrong-headed, is a tricky one to refute. For reasons of exposition, I must 
postpone my reply until 7.3, where I will argue that emergence base properties do not 
contribute the causal powers of their emergents. 
 
Even assuming I am right that physical emergence base properties do not contribute 
the causal powers of emergent properties, complications remain. Necessitarians of all 
flavours insist that since properties are individuated by their causal roles, the laws of 
nature are metaphysically necessary. Whatever set of causal powers a given property 
does contribute, it could not contribute a distinct set of powers while remaining the 
same property. It follows from this that effects supervene on their causes with 
metaphysical necessity – but it stretches credibility to maintain that effects are nothing 
over and above their causes. It is not immediately obvious to me, however, that given 
                                                 
34 See for instance Kim [1999a]; Lowe [2000]. I return to Lowe’s views in 3.2, suggesting that he is in 
fact committed to something like the position I am about to describe. Lowe himself would deny that he 
is so committed, and in fact explicitly denies that emergence bases contribute the powers of emergents. 
I am not sure, however, that this position is consistent with Lowe’s view that the novel causal powers 
of emergent propertis is not a violation of the causal completeness of physics. 
35 There are actually several supervenience arguments, which Kim sometimes runs together. All are 
directed against the efficacy of supervenient properties, but sometimes Kim depends on the 
completeness of physics, and sometimes not. I discuss two versions based on completeness in 5.1, and 
a version that does not depend on completeness in 7.3. 
36 I should point out that I do not hereby intend to attribute the necessitarian view to Kim. Rather, my 
point is that if we combine Kim’s views about the relationship between the powers of emergents and 
their emergence bases, and combine it with Wilson’s Shoemakerian position, then we can conclude 
with Wilson that physical properties sometimes metaphysically necessitate emergent properties. 
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necessitatianism, certain prima facie metaphysically distinct particulars are not in fact 
indistinct – effects, we might maintain, really are nothing over and above their 
effects. After all, ‘B is nothing over and above A’ is supposed to express the thought 
that given A, we get B “for free”. But if having a certain effect E under certain 
circumstances is part of the existence condition of a cause C, then given that C occurs 
under those circumtances, surely there’s a sense in which we do get E for free? I 
doubt many necessitarians would be prepared to bite this particular bullet, but that 
doesn’t mean it isn’t a consequence of their position. I have no fixed opinion on this 
matter at the time of writing. A more natural response to this problem is to insist that 
supervenience conditionals that entail that the supervenient property is nothing over 
and above its base must be not only metaphysically necessary, but also synchronic. 
Effects fail to be nothing over and above their causes, for causation is diachronic. 
Things are not so simple, however: some philosophers maintain that simultaneous 
causation is a possibility.37 For reasons of exposition, I return to this particular 
complication at the end of 1.4.  
 
1.4. Sufficiency, events and properties 
For the purposes of this work, I will conceive of events as ‘Kim-events’.38 On this 
conception, as is well known, events are not importantly different from facts, 
conceived as immanent particular states of affairs. Specifically, a Kim event is an 
object – or, more generally, a substance – possessing a property at a time. This 
property is referred to as the constitutive property of the event. For instance, the 
constitutive property of a mental event such as Bob believing that paperwork is boring 
at a given time, is the property of believing that paperwork is boring. We can 
represent such events as ordered triples [x,P,t], but it is important not to regard the 
events themselves as being ordered triples. Rather, Kim events are structured 
particulars, for which we may give the following existence and identity criteria. 
 
                                                 
37 See, for instance, Lowe [2003]. 
38 See Kim [1976] for details. 
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Existence condition: [x,P,t] occurs iff x has P at t. 
Identity condition: [x,P,t] is identical to [y,Q,t*] iff x=y, P=Q and t=t*. 
 
I will sometimes refer to such particulars as events, sometimes as ‘property-
instances’, depending on the context of discussion. A couple of important things to 
note before proceeding. First, it does not make sense, on the present account, to think 
of events having their constitutive properties; an event of a given type occurs just in 
case its constitutive object has the requisite property at a time. Second, although we 
can formulate a token identity thesis for mental and physical Kim events, we can not 
formulate it in isolation to a corresponding type identity thesis, as might those who 
typically endorse token identity. This is because for Kim, events have just one 
constitutive property – there is no room for “two” events to be the same event token 
and yet have unrelated constitutive properties. Token identity, on the present view, 
entails type identity.39 I will have more to say about this entailment in 2.3. And third, 
I should make clear that I do not wish to be seen as endorsing the present conception 
of events. The reason I employ Kim events is that they considerably “simplify the 
maths” surrounding the causal argument. If you run the argument in terms of, say, 
Davidson events, then you have to run it twice, once for events, and again for 
properties. The nice thing about running it with Kim events is that you only have to 
run it once – an argument for physicalism about mental Kim events will have 
physicalism about mental properties “built-in”. Token (and so type) identity is clearly 
one way for a mental event to be physical; what other ways are there? 
 
It is quite common in the literature to find talk of token events supervening on others. 
We might say, as Kim does, that event [x,P,t] supervenes on event [x,Q,t] just in case 
Q is among the supervenience base for P. While I think this is a natural extension of 
                                                 
39 Famously, Davidson [1970] endorses token identity without type identity. For Davidson, event 
identity is a matter of identity of spatiotemporal location, which means a single event can have a lot of 
properties. The purpose of token identity within Davidson’s philosophy is, of course, to reconcile the 
causal efficacy of mental events with their anomalism. Mental and physical event tokens are identical, 
so mental events are efficacious, but mental events instantiate strict deterministic laws only under their 
physical descriptions, so that the mental escapes the threat of physical determinism. This is not the 
place for detailed discussion. Suffice it to say that if this is the primary motivation for being a token 
identity theorist, token identity for Kim events is going to be unmotivated. 
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supervenience to property instances, I will instead talk of synchronic sufficiency 
relations between token events. The matter is terminological, but will greatly simplify 
my analysis of the problem of the validity of the causal argument in chapter 3.4. 
There I will argue that if the causal argument is to establish that the mental 
supervenes on the physical as defined in P6, it must do so by first establishing that 
token physical events are sufficient (in a sense to be defined) for token mental events. 
In chapter 6, I show that the causal argument does not establish a strong enough form 
of sufficiency to license the inference to P6. In the remainder of this section, I will 
define the kind of sufficiency the causal argument needs to establish if it is to license 
that inference. The following desideratum for a theory of sufficiency seems clear: 
sufficiency should carry modal force; I will think of this in the following way: if A is 
α-sufficient for B then in any α-possible world where A exists, B exists. 
 
The synchronic sufficiency relation I am interested in is a form of non-causal 
determination, and this yields a necessary condition on two events that stand in a 
synchronic sufficiency relation: they must share their constitutive substance. Why? 
Events conceived as states of affairs (objects having properties at times) must be 
largely metaphysically independent. How could [x,P,t] be non-causally sufficient for 
[y,P,t] if x and y are wholly distinct (in the sense of having no shared parts)? If such 
sufficiency relations existed, I could make it so that distant objects instantaneously 
changed their properties simply by making adjustments to local objects. But I can’t, 
and neither can you, so they don’t. I anticipate two objections at this point. 
 
The first is that there appears to be just this kind of action at a distance in quantum 
mechanics. As is well known, if the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics 
is true, then due to the phenomenon known as entanglement, we can bring about the 
instantaneous collapse of a wavefunction at distant points by making local 
measurements.40 The details are unimportant for my purposes; I content myself with 
the following two thoughts. Thought (i): action at a distance is one of the central 
                                                 
40 See Hardy [1998] for a detailed but mathematically not-too-heavy description of these issues. 
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problems for quantum mechanics. It has been the motivating factor behind the search 
for hidden local variables that provide non-spooky explanations for the relevant 
phenomena; it also is one of the central motivations behind the ‘no-collapse’ 
alternatives to the Copenhagen interpretation.41 Thought (ii): Even if spooky action at 
a distance happens at the quantum mechanical level, it doesn’t happen with ordinary 
macro level events. And my point is that if there were relations of synchronic 
sufficiency between events whose constitutive substances were distinct, then we 
should expect the opposite. 
 
The second objection I anticipate concerns events that involve a substance having an 
extrinsic property, such as being married. To take Geach’s example, Xanthippe 
becomes a widow at the instant Socrates dies. Geach terms this a ‘Cambridge 
change’, which is understood to be a change in what can be truly predicated of an 
individual without any corresponding change in the individual’s intrinsic properties.42 
So-called ‘Cambridge events’, it seems, are just the sort of events you can bring about 
at a distance. But this makes it look, contrary to my claim, that there are events with 
wholly distinct constitutive substances that stand in synchronic sufficiency relations – 
for instance, the event ‘Socrates being alive at t’ and the event ‘Xanthippe not being a 
widow at t’. I am prepared to agree that this is the case for events (if such there be) 
whose constitutive properties are ‘mere Cambridge properties’. Clearly, however, the 
central case of this work – namely the relationship between mental and physical 
properties – does not involve mere Cambridge properties. Events whose constitutive 
properties are intrinsic properties of their objects do not stand in synchronic 
sufficiency relations if the objects are wholly distinct. Cambridge properties do not 
affect the causal powers of individuals in any way – you could not, for instance, build 
a detector to determine, just by examining Xanthippe, whether or not Socrates is alive 
(provided, of course, she herself does not know). So I am prepared to limit my claim 
of shared substance to intrinsic properties, which, as I said in 1.1, I think of as do 
                                                 
41 The classic argument that quantum mechanics needs hidden variables is Einstein, Podolsky and 
Rosen [1935]; Bohm [1952] develops a hidden variable approach; for a defence of the no-collapse 
view, see Papineau [1996]. 
42 See Geach [1969] pp. 42-64. 
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Lewis and Langton [1998]. It may be objected that mental properties are not intrinsic, 
as mental contents are broad. I reply that to the extent that mental contents are broad, 
they are inefficacious. Indeed, belief in the causal efficacy of content is the central 
motivation for denying that content is broad. I do not wish to endorse either view 
here. What I will say is that I am only concerned with those parts of mental properties 
that do cause behaviours; those parts, I maintain, are intrinsic, and as such, will not 
stand in synchronic sufficiency relations to events whose substance is wholly distinct. 
I will say more about the complications raised by broad contents in 3.4. 
 
One way for two events to share their substance is for the two events to be the 
possession of two distinct constitutive properties by the same object at a time. Now 
this gives us a simple way of thinking about the synchronic sufficiency of an event for 
another: [x,P,t] is sufficient for [x,Q,t] just in case P is sufficient for Q. Clearly, this is 
exactly analogous to Kim’s criterion of event supervenience. The simple view is too 
simple, though, for P and Q will frequently be instantiated in different individuals.43 
To see this, consider the thermodynamic property temperature, whose value in ideal 
gases is given by the statistical function: T = k[Nm<c2>] where m is the mass of each 
molecule composing the gas, <c2>  the ‘root mean square’ velocity of the molecules 
(found by squaring the value for velocity of each molecule, taking the average of the 
squares, then the root of the average), N the number of molecules in the gas, and k an 
arbitrary constant I made up to simplify matters (actually the product of several other 
constants). A cloud of gas being at a given temperature at a time will be a Kim event 
– the cloud’s possession of the property of being at T, say – but will also be composed 
of many other Kim events – namely the molecules that compose that gas having their 
individual velocities. How are we to understand the relationship between composing 
and composed event? 
 
At this point, I introduce the term ‘aggregate’ to denote a mereological sum SM of 
events such that (i) SM has all its components essentially; and (ii) SM essentially 
                                                 
43 See Gillett [2002] for an argument to the effect that dispositional properties like hardness, and the 
microphysical properties that realize them, are not instantiated in the same individual. 
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possesses the structural property PS formed by combining the constitutive properties 
of its components and their spatial relational properties insofar as these latter involve 
only other components of SM or aggregates thereof as relata. I do not claim that this 
usage of ‘aggregate’ accords with accepted philosophical usage; no matter – I will use 
it to denote fusions of parts that satisfy (i) and (ii). A consequence of my definition is 
that you can change neither the parts of an aggregate, nor their configuration with 
respect to one another, without forming a new aggregate. They are, if you like, 
maximally fragile mereological sums, in the sense that they can not survive any 
internal changes without ceasing to be. Aggregates are composed of other aggregates 
(provided we accept single-component aggregates as a degenerate case) and an 
aggregate of two aggregates is itself an aggregate. Note that I am not ontologically 
committed to such aggregates. If you object to them, then recast what I have to say in 
terms of plural quantification – talk instead about those events and their properties.44 I 
introduce them here merely as an heuristic device to save me talking in that way, and 
nothing in what I have to say depends on its being the case that an aggregate of events 
is itself an event. 
 
Now, consider the aggregate formed by the molecules of a gas cloud G that is at a 
certain temperature T. The structural property of this aggregate is clearly sufficient for 
the property of being at a given temperature T. First, there is a clear sense in which 
the temperature of a gas is nothing over and above the velocities of its molecules; and 
second, in any physically possible world where an aggregate of molecules SM has PS, 
there will exist a gas cloud composed of those molecules, which will be at T. From 
this it follows that the event (or events) represented by [SM,PS,t] is (are) sufficient for 
the event [G,T,t]. However, conceiving the cloud of gas as a particular means that 
there is pressure not to identify it with the aggregate. Due to its possession of PS 
essentially, the aggregate is more modally fragile than the cloud. The cloud, arguably, 
can survive rearrangement of its parts, but the aggregate by definition can not. If we 
take modal properties such as these seriously, then it seems a straightforward 
                                                 
44 See for instance Boolos [1984]. 
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application of Leibniz’s law to aggregate and cloud shows that they can’t be identical. 
The familiar way of understanding this relationship is to say that the aggregate 
materially constitutes (but is not identical to) the cloud, in much the same way that 
lumps of clay constitute (but are not identical to) statues. 
 
There is an interesting difficulty here that deserves mention, known in the literature as 
the ‘grounding’ or ‘supervenience’ problem.45 The problem is this – unless we 
endorse sui generis modal properties, then modal properties must supervene on non-
modal properties. But aggregate and cloud at any given time share all their non-modal 
properties (to put it in Olson’s terms, they are qualitatively indistinguishable), so we 
seem to have a violation of supervenience. An obvious response is that the modal 
properties of an individual supervene only on its essential properties, and although 
aggregate and cloud share all their non-modal properties, they possess different 
subsets of these properties essentially. It is, however, natural to define an object’s 
essential properties as those properties such that necessarily, if the object exists, it has 
those properties, which takes us in a circle back to modality – an object’s modal 
properties will now supervene on the apparently unanalyzable modal fact that there 
are certain properties it possesses in all possible worlds where it exists.46  
 
Nothing in what I have to say demands a resolution to these issues; as I have said, 
treat my talk of aggregates merely as shorthand for plural talk about their components. 
Thought of in this way, there is clearly no pressure to regard the aggregate as identical 
to the cloud, for the cloud is one, and the composing molecules are many. There is 
                                                 
45 As far as I am aware, the initial statement of this problem occurs in Burke [1992], but see also Rea 
[1997] and Olson [2001]. 
46 Notice that counterpart theory offers us a nice way around the supervenience problem. Coincident 
“objects” are the same object – lumps are identical to statues, clouds to aggregates. The difference in 
modal properties is explained by the fact that any give statue has a set of lump counterparts and a set of 
statue counterparts, which, due to the fact that resemblance is sortal-relative, are not the same set. 
Some take this to mean that Lewis endorses contingent identity, but this is a mistake. For Lewis, all 
individuals are worldbound and self-identical; it follows that in all possible worlds where a given 
individual exists, it is identical to itself. To say that a given statue-constituting lump of clay might not 
have been a statue is not, on this account, to say that the actual individual that is both statue and lump 
might not have been self-identical – rather, it is to say that there are worlds at which the actual 
individual has lump-counterparts, but no statue-counterparts. See Lewis [1986a] ch.4 for extended 
discussion. 
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nothing in this approach that prevents the cloud from being modally robust compared 
to those events that actually compose it. For the very same cloud, we may say, could 
have been composed of different events. There are, of course, those who believe that 
the plural quantification approach can be extended to cover talk of ordinary objects 
like statues and lumps – terms such as these are to be construed as shorthand ways of 
referring to pluralities of simples.47 I do not wish to endorse this view. I think it 
plausible in the case of aggregates only because there seems little independent 
motivation for ontological commitment to them. (Think, for instance, of an arm-
movement and the complex aggregate of microphysical events that compose it. 
Nothing forces the view that aggregates of events are themselves events.) The same is 
clearly not true of ordinary things like table, chairs and statues. For ease of exposition, 
however, I will continue to talk of aggregates of events as if they were events. 
 
Despite their non-identity, a gas cloud will share the substance of any aggregate that 
composes it at any given time. We can think of shared substance for particulars x and 
y in terms of containment relations between the sets of their parts. In particular, x and 
y, the sets of whose parts are X and Y respectively, will share the same matter just in 
case X⊇Y or Y⊇X, or X-Y=∅. If x and y are such that X⊇Y or Y⊇X, or X-Y=∅ let 
us write x*y. Then we can give the following counterpart-theoretic definition of 
sufficiency for properties: 
  
For any properties P and Q, P is α-sufficient for Q iff: 
1. ∃w∃x[Wα(w).I(x,w).P(x)] 
2. ∀w∀x∀t{[Wα(w).I(x,w).P(x)t]→∃y[x*y.Q(y)t]} 
 
This formula in (2) tells us that P-instances are synchronically α-sufficient for Q-
instances just in case if any individual x in any α-possible world has property P at any 
time t then there is an individual y that shares the substance of x that has Q at t. The 
formula in (1) is included because without it (2) makes any property that is α-
                                                 
47 See for instance van Inwagen [1990]. 
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impossible vacuously sufficient for any property instantiated at an α-possible world. 
For (1) states that it is α-possible that something is P, thereby ruling out vacuous 
sufficiency relations. Notice that sufficiency as defined above it is neutral between 
cases where the individuals that instantiate P and Q are identical and non-identical. 
This is because x*y as I have defined it is perfectly consistent with x=y, for clearly in 
that case X-Y=∅. (For this reason, the definition is also consistent with a property’s 
sufficiency for itself.) Further, since we can vary α according to context, we can 
account, inter alia, for the metaphysical sufficiency of the property of being red for 
the property of being coloured, (or the property of being water for the property of 
being H2O); and the physical sufficiency of realizer properties for the functional 
properties they realize (in this case the realizer properties will need the laws of 
physics in order to play the role associated with the realized property). Now we may 
give a necessary and sufficient condition on the synchronic sufficiency of an event for 
another: 
 
[x,P,t] is α-sufficient for [y,Q,t] just in case P is α-sufficient for Q. 
 
Unlike our previous simple account, we can now understand how sufficiency relations 
can obtain between events where the constitutive properties are instantiated in 
different individuals. 
 
The most important thing to notice now is that if we can establish that physical 
properties are physically sufficient for mental properties, then we will have 
established our supervenience thesis P6. This is because if all physically possible 
worlds where the actual Ps are instantiated are worlds where the actual Ms are 
instantiated too, then individuals at minimal physical duplicates of the actual world 
are going to be mental (and, of course, physical) duplicates of their actual world 
counterparts. But notice: we can only infer P6 from sufficiency if the strength of 
sufficiency is at least physical. Any weaker than that, and minimal physical 
duplication will not preserve the mental properties. Conversely, if the strength of 
sufficiency is physical, then nothing over and above the physical will be required in 
 - 51 - 
order to make a mental duplicate of the actual world. But if we can show that physical 
events are physically sufficient for mental events, then we can infer the same 
sufficiency relation between physical and mental properties. So, I maintain that if it 
can be shown that physical events are physically sufficient for mental events, then we 
can infer P6. And the causal argument, as I will explain in chapter 3, purports to offer 
independent grounds for thinking that, on pain of absurdity, physical events just have 
to be sufficient for mental events. 
 
Before proceeding, as promised at the end of 1.3, a note on synchronic causation and 
synchronic sufficiency. If simultaneous causation is possible, then causes are 
sometimes synchronically sufficient for their effects, and effects are clearly (modulo 
doubts arising from necessitarianism) ‘something over and above’ their causes. Prima 
facie, nothing in my definition of sufficiency rules out cases where the instantiation of 
P causes the instantiation of Q. However, I think this is a mistake. The reason I think 
so is that causes sometimes fail to cause their effects. Cause and effect are distinct 
existences, and other things can always get in the way of the causal process. As I have 
defined sufficiency, however, there is not enough slack between properties standing in 
a sufficiency relation for the relation to be that of causal sufficiency; if P is 
metaphysically sufficient for Q (let P be the property of being H2O, Q be the property 
of being water; or let P be the property of being red, Q be the property of being 
coloured), then there are no P worlds that are not Q, regardless of anything else that 
might exist or occur. And yet – or so, at least, I am prepared to maintain – if P is 
cause and Q effect, then there must be such worlds.48 So sufficiency as defined above 
is non-causal. The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for physical sufficiency. In that case, 
there will be no physically possible worlds where P is instantiated and Q is not, and 
that just doesn’t look like causation to me. This is not, of course, to say that 
simultaneous causation does not occur. But if it does, the relationship between 
                                                 
48 Notice that this argument does not depend on any particular conception of the modal status of causal 
laws, or the relationship between property individuation and causality. A necessitarian, for instance, 
could agree that there are possible worlds where token causes do not have their actual effects. Other 
causes might get in the way; or the circumstances under which the cause occurs might change. By 
contrast, nothing can get in the way of synchronic sufficiency: if P is α-sufficient for Q, then there is no 
α-possible world where anything is P but not Q. 
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simultaneous causes and effects is not the sufficiency relation outlined here. I shall 
return to this matter in 3.3, where I give a brief argument, based on the preceding 
remarks, that the sufficiency relation between physical and mental events cannot be 
one of simultaneous causation. 
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2. Supervenience and Reduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an account of the relationship between reductive 
explanation and supervenience. The account I give leaves much to be said, but as my 
aims are limited, a more complete account will not be required. My aims are twofold. 
First, I want to show that there is a perfectly good sense in which reduction of a 
property to physical science can establish non-reductive physicalism about the 
property. To this end, I will draw on the functional model of reduction described in 
Kim [1998]. Kim takes functional reduction to establish type identity, which is of 
course in no sense non-reductive; however, it is only when combined with some of 
Kim’s other views on causation that his preferred method of reduction has this 
consequence. (I list these views below, and respond to one of them; we will return to 
the others at various points during the present work.) In itself, however, functional 
reduction is ideally suited to the empirical justification of supervenience claims. This 
is because functional reductions entail forms of supervenience strong enough to 
license the view that the supervenient properties, while not identical to them, are 
nothing over and above the properties on which they supervene. This form of 
reductionism is, I take it, just what David Lewis had in mind when he said that ‘[a] 
supervenience thesis is, in a broad sense, reductionist’.49 A reduction that fails to 
establish identity will not, of course, license ontological simplification in the sense of 
showing that what we previously thought as two properties are in fact one. However, 
a reduction that establishes a strong enough supervenience relation (for instance P6) 
will license the view that the reduced properties are nothing over and above those they 
reduce to. Second, I want to motivate the causal argument. It is, I claim, precisely 
because we lack a reductive account of mind in physical terms that we need an 
argument for physicalism about the mind in the first place. Since I conceive 
physicalism in terms of supervenience, this would be a decidedly odd claim if not 
supplemented with an account of the relationship between supervenience 
                                                 
49 Lewis [1983] p.29. I note in passing that I do not agree with Lewis – some supervenience theses are 
not reductive at all. Whether or not the supervenience of A properties on B properties is reductive 
depends on whether or not it is strong enough to license the view that the A properties are nothing over 
and above the B properties. I will say a bit more about this presently. 
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(traditionally, of course, thought of as non-reductive) and reduction. Functional 
reductions of mental properties would, I maintain, give us very strong grounds for 
endorsing a physicalist supervenience thesis about the mind without the need for any 
additional argument. This fact has very interesting consequences for the causal 
argument, as we shall see in chapter 7. During the course of achieving my two stated 
aims, I will draw attention to some very important facts about realization, multiple 
realization, type identity and elimination; these facts will inform the development of 
later arguments. This chapter proceeds as follows: 2.1 discusses a problem for Nagel 
reduction, and 2.2 shows how Kim’s functional reduction solves this problem. In 2.3 I 
explain why Kim takes functional reductions to establish eliminativism, and in 2.4 I 
explain why Kim is wrong about this. I conclude by giving a rough assessment of 
where we have got to so far with the functional reduction of psychological properties. 
 
2.1. Reduction and ‘bridge laws’. 
The classic Nagelian model of reduction is no longer the popular choice of theory. 
According to Nagel, a theory T2 reduces to a theory T1 is the laws of T2 can be 
derived from laws of T1 with the aid of biconditional ‘bridge laws’.50 These bridge 
laws are needed because the predicates of the theory to be reduced will not occur in 
the reducing theory; bridge laws connect up the predicates and so enable the relevant 
deductions to go through. This, as Kim [1998] points out, is essentially a form of 
deductive-nomological explanation applied to theories: theory T2 can be explained in 
terms of T1 if T2 can be deduced from T1 with the aid of bridge laws. There are 
numerous problems with this model of reduction, and I will not attempt to summarise 
them all here. Instead, I will focus on one particular problem, which is that derivation 
                                                 
50 As seen in Nagel’s [1961]. There is controversy over whether Nagel requires these laws to be 
biconditionals – prima facie, it seems clear that conditionals taking T1 predicates as antecedents and 
T2 predicates as consequents will enable deduction of T2 laws from T1 laws just as well. See 
Richardson [1979] for an argument that Nagel reduction only requires conditionals that express 
sufficient conditions in T1 for T2 predicates; Marras [2002], however, argues that if bridge laws only 
give sufficient T1 conditions for T2 predicates, then T2 laws in fact cannot be deduced. Marras thinks 
that proper deducibility requires replacement of T2 predicates with T1 predicates, but does not say why 
he thinks this. One possible reason is that a putative T2 law derived from a specific T1 law via one-way 
bridge laws will have the same modal force as the T1 law, but in general (assuming T2 to be multiply 
realized in T1) the T2 laws will hold across all possible T1 realizations. Finally, see Kim [1998] pp.90-
2 for a brief discussion of the merits of biconditionals over one-way conditionals. 
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of a theory via bridge laws is not sufficient for anything that deserves the name 
‘reduction’. My issue is not with the D-N model of explanation; in fact, I do think that 
Nagel ‘reductions’ provide explanations (of a sort) of the ‘reduced’ theory. Rather, the 
problem is that the bridge laws themselves stand in need of explanation just as much 
as the theory to be reduced. For instance, dualists, epiphenomenalists, emergentists 
and physicalists alike can all agree that there are bridge laws connecting physical and 
mental properties; the disagreement is over the ontological status (and, relatedly, the 
modal force) of these laws. If bridge laws are to yield ontological reduction, then they 
can not be laws that hold independently from the laws in the reducing theory. 
Physicalists will take the bridge laws to be true in all physically possible worlds, and 
hold that they are explicable in terms of basic physical laws; dualists and emergentist 
will take the bridge to hold in addition to, and independently of, physical law, and so 
will maintain that there are physically possible worlds where the bridge laws do not 
hold; epiphenomenalists could go either way, depending on their view of the 
ontological status of the mental. Proponents of any of these positions can endorse a 
supervenience thesis, and hold that D-N explanations of psychology can be given in 
physical terms. The point here is that unless the bridge laws are physically necessary, 
then minimal physical duplicates of a world at which the bridge laws hold will be 
worlds at which the bridge laws do not hold. A reduction of psychology to physical 
theory, then, must be one in which the bridge laws themselves can shown to hold in 
all physically possible worlds. The mere fact of a lawful correlation between mental 
and physical is not sufficient for any kind of ontological reduction; what is needed is 
an explanation of this fact.51 Not just any explanation will do: what we need in order 
to establish physicalistically acceptable forms of supervenience is an explanation that 
shows why the bridge laws are physically necessary. 
 
                                                 
51 This point is well made in Kim [1992b] pp.124-7 and [1998] pp.95-7; Beckermann [1992] p.112; and 
Horgan [1993] pp.577-8. Kim and Beckermann are explicitly concerned with Nagel reduction, whilst 
Horgan’s concern is in explaining supervenience, however their central concerns are the same. All 
three hold, in essence, that ontological reduction demands not only on lawful correlations, but on 
explanations of these correlations as well. I will say more about these matters presently. 
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There is a growing consensus that only properties that can be ‘functionalized’ can be 
shown to be necessitated by physical properties and laws. Functionalization of a 
property involves construing it as a second order property, along the standard lines: ‘P 
= the property of having a property that plays causal role R’. Rigidity, for instance, 
just is the property of being such as to resist change of shape; transparency just is the 
property of being such as to transmit a significant proportion of incident radiation. 
Now it is no coincidence that there should be a connection between functionalization 
and reduction. The resources available to us at the reducing level are, in broad outline, 
laws that tell us how things with certain properties will behave. If the property to be 
reduced can be construed as the property of having some other property that behaves 
in a certain way, then it is at least possible for us to show that the role property is 
physically realized. In the case of the property of being transparent to visible light, 
say, if we can deduce from physical theory that the material that composes a given 
sample does not absorb light in the visible range, then there is no further question 
whether or not the sample is transparent. We can effectively deduce whether or not 
certain samples will be transparent, from a functional specification of transparency, 
along with a physical theory of the samples in question. And crucially, we can do so 
without the need for any bridge laws as auxiliary premises. We can derive physically 
necessary one-way bridge laws relating specific microphysical structures to 
transparency – any conditional that takes a realizer property in the antecedent and 
transparency in the consequent will be physically necessary. That is, given the laws of 
physics, a substance with the appropriate microphysical properties can’t help being 
transparent, as those laws determine that the microphysical properties in question play 
the causal role that individuates transparency.52
 
                                                 
52 The method of functionalization fits quite well with other scientifically reduced properties. For 
instance, thermodynamic properties such as that of being at a certain temperature can be construed 
(inter alia) as the property of being such as to cause thermometers to display certain values. A 
mechanical explanation of how molecular collisions affect the molecules in thermometers in the 
appropriate way will count as a deduction of temperature from mechanics. 
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Beckermann53 and Horgan54 both tentatively suggest that functionalizable properties 
are the best candidates for reductive explanation. It should be noted that Horgan’s 
concern is not with reduction directly, but with the question what form a 
physicalistically acceptable supervenience thesis ought to take. Horgan claims that 
‘bare’ supervenience theses of the kind we saw earlier are not sufficient for 
physicalism; rather, to confer ‘materialistic respectability’ on the supervenient 
properties, the supervenience relation itself must be “robustly explainable in a 
materialistically acceptable way”.55 Horgan calls this ‘superdupervenience’. For my 
part, I hold that the ‘bare’ supervenience relations are sufficient to express 
physicalism, and that Horgan conflates the metaphysical question of what form a 
physicalist supervenience thesis ought to take with the epistemological question why 
anyone should believe it. Superdupervenience, for Horgan, is really just P3 above 
with empirical support in the form of a reduction of the mental properties; it’s 
reduction that puts the ‘duper’ in ‘superduper’. 
 
Chalmers, too, holds that there is an intimate connection between functionalizability 
and reduction.56 Because phenomenal concepts can’t be analyzed in functional terms, 
he maintains, the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness can’t be solved – the explanatory 
gap between physical and phenomenal concepts is here to stay. Here, in very brief 
outline, is how the story goes. Most philosophers agree that Jackson’s so-called 
‘knowledge argument’ shows that phenomenal concepts are not functionalizable.57 
Mary the colour scientist, as is familiar, learns all there is to know about the physical 
processes (including all the higher-order sciences that supervene on those processes) 
that realize colour perception without ever having seen anything coloured. It seems 
intuitively clear that when she first sees red, she learns something new – “so this is 
what it’s like to see red” being the most common candidate. The disagreement 
                                                 
53 Beckermann [1992] p.112-3. 
54 Horgan [1993] p.579. 
55 Horgan [1993] p.566. 
56 Chalmers [1996]. For instance, p.44: “…the possibility of this kind of [functional] analysis 
undergirds the possibility of reductive explanation in general.” Compare Kim [1998] p.99: “Indeed the 
possibility of functionalization is a necessary condition of reduction.” 
57 Jackson [1982]. 
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between physicalists and non-physicalists is whether or not the something new Mary 
learns is a new (non-physical) fact. Both sides agree that there is a ‘psychological’ 
aspect of phenomenal redness, and that this concept can be functionalized – for 
instance, we might (partially) define phenomenal redness as the state normal 
individuals go into when they look at something red in the right conditions. By 
hypothesis, Mary already possesses this concept, and can deduce that she will have 
the phenomenal experience so defined, from the relevant physical facts – in this case 
facts like surface reflectance’s of objects, ambient lighting conditions, and so on. 
However, both sides also agree that Mary gains a new concept when she first 
experiences phenomenal redness. If this is so, then the new concept she gains can’t be 
a functionalizable concept.58 Kim, for the same reasons, is also pessimistic about 
closing the explanatory gap between physical science and consciousness; he confines 
his reductionism to those properties that can be functionalized, while at the same time 
doubting that functional accounts of phenomenal properties can be given.59
 
2.2. Functional reduction 
Let us agree, then, that functionalization is a necessary condition on the reduction of a 
property, and take a closer look at the model that Kim proposes. Functional reduction, 
for Kim, involves four stages. The first three are enough to establish supervenience; 
the fourth is independently motivated, and (mistakenly, in my view) turns realization 
relations into type identities. As we shall see in 2.4, the problem with Kim’s argument 
for stage 4 is that it turns on a flawed conception of realization. Before proceeding to 
                                                 
58 See for instance the deflationary response in Horgan’s [1984] for agreement that Mary does, indeed, 
learn a new non-functional concept – one that expresses a fact she already knew in physical-functional 
terms. The fact expressed by her new concept (that it is like this to see red), while not explicitly 
physical, is nonetheless, ontologically physical. Similar deflationary themes are to be found in 
Papineau’s [1998], who also sees the connection between functionalization and reduction. Papineau, 
however, thinks in terms of Lewis’s [1966] ‘argument from realization’ according to which concepts 
associated a priori with a functional description are reduced by finding the physical states that play the 
associated role. Roughly, for Lewis ‘mental state M’ is by definition equivalent to ‘the occupant of 
causal role R’. Nothing for my purposes turns on the epistemic priority of such associations. 
59 Kim [1998] pp.101-3. 
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discuss that issue, I will detail the first three stages, explaining how they establish 
supervenience.60
 
Step 1 E must be functionalized – that is, E must be construed, or reconstrued, 
as a property defined by its causal/nomic relations to other properties, 
specifically properties in the reduction base B. 
 
Step 2 Find realizers of E in B.  If the reduction…of a particular instance of E 
in a given system is wanted, find the particular realizing property P in virtue of 
which E is instantiated on this occasion in this system; similarly, for classes of 
systems belonging to the same species or structure types. 
 
Step 3 Find a theory (at the level of B) that explains how realizers of E 
perform the causal task that is constitutive of E (i.e. the causal role specified in 
Step 1). 
 
The first step is relatively a priori, and involves the specification of the causal role 
that individuates the property to be reduced. The second and third steps are empirical, 
and jointly involve showing that E is realized in by properties in B. Step 1 makes it 
possible to deduce E from B, by establishing a conceptual link between E and causes 
and effects specifiable in B. That is, if E just is the property of having some property 
that stands in certain “causal/nomic relations” to properties in B, then if some 
property P in B stands in those very relations, there is no further question as to 
whether or not P is a realizer of E. It is important to note how important steps (2) and 
(3) are in this context. First, note that the mere fact that a property can be construed as 
functional does not entail that the property is physically realized, or indeed that it is 
realized at all. This is an important point – any property E with a typical causal role R 
(i.e. any property) will, in general, be coextensive with the second-order concept ‘the 
property of having a property that plays R’. But it does not follow from this fact that 
                                                 
60 The details of the formulation that follows are taken from Kim [1999a] pp.9-18, and Kim [1998] 
pp97-112, unless stated otherwise. 
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having E consists in having some other property that plays R. Cartesian mental 
properties, for instance, have characteristic causal roles, but are not realized by any 
other properties. The functional reconstrual of E required in step (1) depends only on 
E’s having a typical causal role, and entails only that it is possible that E is realized in 
another domain of properties. Steps (2) and (3) together identify putative realizers for 
E, and show that they are in fact its realizers. Merely finding a putative realizer is of 
course insufficient; without (3) we would have only a correlation between a second-
order functional property E and a (putative) physical realizer property P, which is no 
more use than a Nagelian bridge law when it comes to ontological reduction. In order 
to deduce the functionalized property from physical theory we need to show that it 
follows from B that P in fact plays the causal role that individuates E. The crucial 
point now is this: if E is individuated by its functional role, and it is deducible within 
B that P plays that functional role, then E is deducible from B without the need for 
bridge laws. 
 
Now the connection between deducibility of this kind and supervenience is a simple 
one. Suppose for the sake of argument that B = physics. Let some particular 
instantiation of E be realized by a physical property P, and allow that there is a 
physical explanation of how it is that P plays the causal role that individuates E. From 
the laws of physics along with the instantiation of P, we can deduce that E is 
instantiated on this occasion – and we can do so without auxiliary premises. But this 
entails that the instantiation of P is physically sufficient (in the sense articulated in 
1.4) for the instantiation of E.61 In every physically possible world, P-instances will 
be sufficient for F-instances. The connection between sufficiency and physicalism, we 
are already familiar with; but it bears rehearsing. Any minimal physical duplicate of 
the actual world will (by definition) have the same physical property distribution, and 
                                                 
61 Notice that I do not claim that deducibility is equivalent to sufficiency – rather, I claim only that 
deducibility of the functional property from physical properties and physical laws entails sufficiency. I 
remain neutral as to whether it is possible for a physical property to be physically sufficient for a 
functionalized property, and yet the latter fail to be deducible from the former. This will be the case if, 
for instance, a functionalized property is physically realized but there is no way to show, given the laws 
of physics, that the realizer property does, in fact, play the appropriate causal role. I return, briefly, to 
this issue in 6.1, where I discuss the metaphysical commitments of emergence. 
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these properties (since the laws of physics are also preserved by the duplication 
‘process’) will have their actual causal roles. But from this it follows that any second-
order functional properties realized by physical properties in actual world individuals 
will also be realized by their counterparts at minimal physical duplicates of the actual 
world. So if particular instances of functionalized mental properties are deducible 
within physical theory, then all counterparts of actual world individuals at minimal 
physical duplicates of the actual world, will have all the same mental properties as 
their actual world counterparts. And this is just supervenience physicalism (according 
to definition P6) about mental properties. 
 
Thus, I maintain that steps (1)-(3) in the functional reduction process are ideally 
suited to establishing supervenience (i.e. non reductive) physicalism. These steps are 
clearly compatible with there being many alternative physical properties available to 
realize E on different occasions; thus (as, indeed, Kim maintains), multiple realization 
is no obstacle to functional reduction. The reduction procedure outlined above is 
consistent not only with different physical properties realizing E across different 
species, but also with different physical properties realizing E in different individuals, 
and even in the same individual at different times. So why not stop there, and be 
happy with supervenience physicalism as ontological reduction? After all, there is a 
clear sense in which second-order functional properties that are fully physically 
realized are nothing over and above the physical (again, construed broadly so as to 
include physical laws as well as properties), despite not being identical to any of their 
realizers. This option is not for Kim, however, and we shall now see why this is so. 
 
2.3. Kim’s eliminative reduction 
The next step for Kim in the functional reduction procedure is to identify E with P. As 
we shall see, given that E is multiply realized (which Kim accepts) the identification 
of E with its realizer properties leads to elimination. It is tempting to think of 
eliminative reduction as a reductio of the theory that entails it. I will not pursue this 
line of argument here; rather, I will show how to undermine the argument that Kim 
endorses for the identification of E and P. In fact, Kim has (at least) three interrelated 
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argument for taking this further identificatory step. Two of them – the ‘causal 
exclusion argument’ and the ‘redundancy argument’ – we must postpone for later 
chapters.62 The argument that concerns us in the remainder of the present chapter is 
based on a particular view of the nature of realization, and may be termed the ‘causal 
inheritance argument’. Steps 1-3 above tell us that particular E-instances are realized 
by P-instances; the causal inheritance argument adds to this a particular and prima 
facie plausible conception of realization to show that the instances must be identified. 
 
The argument depends on Kim’s ‘Causal Inheritance Principle’ (CIP hereinafter), 
which goes like this: 
 
If a functional property E is instantiated on a given occasion in virtue of one of 
its realizers, Q, being instantiated, then the causal powers of this instance of E 
are identical with the causal powers of this instance of Q.63
 
Kim endorses this principle because: 
 
…to deny it would be to accept emergent causal powers: causal powers that 
magically emerge at a higher level and of which there is no accounting for in 
terms of lower-level properties and their causal powers and nomic 
connections”.64
 
Set aside for the moment the question whether denial of the principle has this 
consequence, and grant the principle for the sake of argument. Now functional 
reduction (up to and including stage 3 above) of a particular E-instance to a particular 
P-instance (in the sense that the E-instance can be derived from the P-instance as 
detailed above), combined with CIP, tells us that this E-instance has exactly the same 
causal powers as the P-instance. Kim goes on to say that CIP “exerts powerful 
                                                 
62 The causal exclusion argument is based on prima facie plausible premises concerning the nature of 
causation, in particular the claim that there is no causal work left for supervenient properties to do 
given the causal powers of their base properties, and receives a detailed treatment in chapter 5. The 
redundancy argument is based on a conception of what it is for a property to be novel, in particular the 
claim that novel properties must do causal work not done by anything else, and receives a summary 
treatment in 6.2. 
63 Kim [1999a] p.15. 
64 See his [1992a] p.326. 
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pressure to identify [the E- and P-instances]”. I do not wish to take issue with the 
view that identity of causal powers presents such a pressure, and am willing to grant 
for the sake of argument that if the E- and P-instances have identical causal powers, 
then the instances are identical. Now given multiple realization, CIP leads, by both a 
direct and an indirect route, to a form of eliminativism about the mental. The direct 
route relies on the inference from identity of causal powers to identity of the instances 
themselves; the indirect route relies solely on the identity of causal powers of the two 
instances, and is the one Kim favours. The direct route is direct because it follows 
deductively from instance identity that mental designators are non-rigid; the indirect 
route is indirect because it does not entail elimination, but recommends it on 
methodological grounds. It should be noted in what follows that although I take Kim 
to be committed to the direct route, I do not attribute it to him, and can nowhere in his 
work find an explicit statement of it as an argument. Let us briefly consider both these 
routes. 
 
First, the direct route. Consider: how is ‘this instance of E’ to be understood? In his 
[1999a] pp.14-5, Kim is quite clear that a ‘property-instance’ is to be understood as a 
system having a property on some occasion. That is, a property-instance is not the 
system that has the property, nor a ‘trope’ of that property, but the system’s having the 
property at that time.65 But this means that property instances are not metaphysically 
different to objects having properties at times, which is to say that ‘property-instance’ 
for Kim is just another term for ‘event’. Now as we saw in 1.4, token event identity, 
on a Kimian conception of events entails the identity of the constitutive properties of 
‘those’ events. The claim that the E-instance is identical to the P-instance, then, 
entails that E is identical to P. But multiple realization flatly denies this latter identity. 
If E is multiple realizable, then there must be some Q that also realizes E on some 
                                                 
65 Tropes are ‘abstract particulars’, which some (e.g. Ehring [1999]; Robb [1997]) maintain to be the 
relata of causation. A trope of the property of being yellow, say, is best thought of not as something 
possessing the property of being yellow, but as something like ‘this yellowness’. The property itself is 
usually taken to be ontologically derivative, and understood as a resemblance class of tropes. A central 
motivation for being a trope theorist is that the theory promises to solve the so called ‘causal exclusion 
problem’; the burden of chapter 5 will be to show that there is a much more straightforward way of 
solving that problem. Suffice it to say for the moment that whatever the merits of trope theory, it is not 
a theory to which Kim subscribes. 
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occasion, such that Q≠P. But then the identity of the E-instance with the Q-instance 
on that occasion entails, mutatis mutandis, that E=Q. And unless ‘E’ is a non-rigid 
designator, it is, of course, incoherent to maintain that E=P, E=Q, and Q≠P. In 
addition to this, there is the further incoherence that if E rigidly designates, then it 
designates a second-order functional property, which we are not free to identify with 
any first-order realizer property. Kim explicitly recognises this latter difficulty, and 
holds that mental predicates are in fact non-rigid, second-order designators of first-
order physical properties.66 Now if two individuals both possess E, but one E-instance 
is realized by a P-instance, and the other by a Q-instance, then the two individuals do 
not share a mental property at all. What they do share is the property of falling under a 
second-order mental concept ‘E’ that picks out P in one case, Q in the other. And this, 
clearly, is a form of eliminative reduction. 
 
Second, the indirect route that Kim tends to favour. For multiple realization to be true, 
it must be the case that the physical realizers of E do not share all the same causal 
powers. Unless there are causal differences between the realizers, then the realization 
won’t be ‘multiple’ at all – the central theme of multiple realization is that physically 
heterogeneous properties get to realize the same functional properties, and what is 
physical heterogeneity if not causal heterogeneity? But combine this with CIP, and 
we get the result that the causal powers of E vary according to its realization in 
particular instances. That is, due to their different realizations, different E-instances 
will clearly have different causal powers. Now take all the physically possible 
realizers P1, P2, P3,…,Pn of E and disjoin them. The biconditional 
‘E↔(P1vP2vP3v…vPn)’ is physically necessary. Heterogeneous disjunctions, Kim 
                                                 
66 The solution he gives is very similar to Lewis’s ‘realizer functionalism’, which treats mental 
predicates as first order definite descriptions; for Lewis E = ‘the occupant of causal role R’ and not, as 
for Kim, ‘the property of having a property that plays causal role R’. If anything Lewis’s strategy is the 
more elegant, as it is obvious that his definite descriptions are non-rigid. It is less obvious that we can 
make sense of predicates that appear to rigidly designate second-order properties in fact non-rigidly 
designating first-order properties. See Lewis [1966], [1972], [1980] for details of the realizer 
functionalist approach; see Kim [1998] pp.103-10 for Kim’s argument for the non-rigidity of second-
order functional designators. 
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argues, are unsuitable for framing laws, as they are not projectible predicates.67 But 
given the physically necessary biconditional relating E to just such a disjunction, it 
follows that E isn’t suitable for framing laws either. Notice that it makes no difference 
in the present context whether E is thought of as identical to the disjunction of its 
realizers, or merely necessarily co-extensive with the disjunction. Either way, it seems 
E will inherit the non-projectibility of the disjunction. In support of this view, notice 
that we can make the same point without appealing to disjunctions at all.68 Put very 
simply, the argument may be stated like this: a given E-instance – say a P1-instance 
that realizes E on some occasion, and from which (by CIP) E inherits its causal 
powers – having a causal power C does not license induction to future E-instances 
having C, as the next E-instance may inherit its causal powers from a P2-instance, and 
P2 by hypothesis possesses different causal powers to P1. But a property that can’t 
figure in laws isn’t worth having. The indirect route thus recommends the elimination 
of E as a genuine property on the grounds that it isn’t a property worth holding on to. 
Once again, CIP leads us to the eliminative reduction of mental properties. 
 
There is a rejoinder to the argument that both the above routes lead to elimination, and 
it bears mention, as it is a position that Kim has, on various occasions, and in various 
forms, endorsed. Given the identification of multiply realizable functional properties 
with their realizers, they become “sundered into their diverse realizers in different 
species and structures, and in different possible worlds.”69 Why, however, can we not 
hold on to such properties as real but relative to the structures in which they have 
particular realizers? Suppose the structures in question divide up neatly along species 
boundaries. Rather than pain per se, we are left with pain-for-humans, pain-for-dogs, 
pain-for-Martians, and so on. Each of these properties, one might wish to claim, is a 
perfectly homogeneous, projectible, physical kind. Such “species-specific” type 
identities are endorsed by Lewis as a means to square the non-rigidity of mental 
                                                 
67 Kim [1998] pp.107-9. I will not rehearse the details of Kim’s argument here; we examine the 
problem of heterogeneity in a somewhat different context in 6.5. There, I follow Papineau [1985] in 
offering a teleological response to Kim’s projectibility challenge. 
68 See Kim [1998] p.110 for a brief statement of this very point. 
69 Kim [1998] p.111. 
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designators with the evident reality of human mental properties.70 But evidently this 
theory makes the reality or otherwise of human mental properties dependent on their 
being uniformly realized in humans. What if it turns out that your mental states and 
mine have different realizers? We are left with pain-for-me, pain-for you, pain-for-
Jane, and so on – the structures relative to which mental properties are genuine and 
shared are now individuals. Or perhaps multiple realization goes even deeper than 
that, and Jane’s pain is realized in different ways at different times. Call this kind of 
multiple realization ‘radical’ – if mental properties are radically multiply realized, 
then the reductions get so local as to render the appeal to structure-specificity 
pointless, at least insofar as it was supposed to enable us to avoid eliminativism. If it 
does turn out that the realization of mental properties varies between different 
individual, then according to CIP, mental properties will be sundered into their 
different realizers in those individuals. But then mental concepts will not express a 
property that is common to all human individuals that fall under it – there will, 
literally, be nothing in common to those who have a shared belied save that both fall 
under a second-order concept. How plausible, though, is radical multiple realization? 
It isn’t just plausible, it’s actual. In what follows I will argue that temperature, despite 
being functionally reducible and a perfectly legitimate physical property, is multiply 
realized as well. And as a result – so I am prepared to maintain – it too suffers 
elimination by CIP.71
 
Temperature, as is widely remarked, is a locally reduced property. It is, as we have 
seen, identical to mean molecular kinetic energy in gases, but it is identical to a 
different statistical function, mean maximal kinetic energy, in a solid. The difference 
is due to the fact that the molecules in a solid exhibit much more restricted freedom of 
                                                 
70 See Lewis [1980] for details. Kim [1992a] esp. pp.322-30, endorses such a view. There, he suggests 
that “multiple local reductions…are the rule,” and rightly argues that the suitability of this strategy for 
avoiding eliminativism will depend on how multiple the multiple realization of psychology turns out to 
be. Kim suggests that the possibility of psychological laws that quantify over humans points to the 
uniform realization of human psychology. The putative law ‘Sharp pains administered at random 
intervals cause anxiety reactions’, if true in humans, “is true for humans…due to the way the human 
brain is ‘wired’….” (Kim [1992a] p.324). 
71 Since formulating the argument that follows, I have become aware of a very similar case for radical 
multiple realization in thermodynamics, to be found in Bickle [1998]. 
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motion that they do in a gas. This would appear to endorse the local reductionist 
strategy described above. Temperature thought of as a second-order functional 
property capable of being instantiated in both solids and gases is sundered into 
temperature-in-gases and temperature-in-solids, both of which are genuine properties. 
This strategy won’t work, however, because both temperature-in-gases and 
temperature-in-solids are realized by different base properties on different occasions. 
This is due to the simple mathematical fact that the same overall kinetic energy for a 
given ensemble of molecules can be realized by a great many different particular 
distributions of velocities over the molecules. Consider an ensemble of three 
molecules, A, B and C, each with a mass of 1 unit. The temperature of this ensemble 
will be T = ½∑m<c>2. Allow for the sake of argument that the result on some 
occasion is 18 units. It follows (I leave the reader to verify this) that the ∑c2 = 36 for 
this ensemble. The table below shows a few ways in which the molecular velocities of 
A, B and C might realize this sum on this occasion. 
 
A B C ∑c2
4 4 2 36 
3 3 3√2 36 
4 3 √11 36 
6 0 0 36 
 
Of course, this is artificial – an aggregate of three molecules does not an ensemble 
make. Aggregates of such small numbers of components don’t really have 
temperatures at all. Readers concerned by this can think of A, B and C as aggregates 
of a billion molecules each, and the specified molecular velocities as the average 
velocities of the component molecules of those aggregates. Now the crucial point is 
that each row in the above table represents an aggregate, whose structural property 
can be thought of as the molecules having the velocities specified. Suppose on this 
occasion that T = 18 units is realized by the aggregate described in row 1. Now once 
again we have two property-instances: an instance of T = 18 units in the ensemble, 
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and a realizing instance of the structural property. For despite being identified with 
mean molecular kinetic energy, temperature remains second-order with respect to the 
particular aggregates that realize it. The ‘role’ that specifies this second-order 
property is no longer a causal one, but is instead the condition that a mathematical 
function takes a specific value.72 The property of having a temperature of 18 units is 
identical to the property of having mean molecular kinetic energy of 18 units. But for 
this ensemble, this latter property will be the property of having a property such that 
∑c2=36, for this gives ½∑m<c>2 = 18. And the table above shows four ways of 
meeting that second-order specification – four first order realizers, that is, of the 
second-order property of being at a specified temperature. Rest assured, there are 
quite a lot of alternatives.73 Now by CIP (assuming, as before, that causal power 
identity for instances entails instance identity), this instance of the gas’s being at 
temperature 18 must be identical to the particular aggregate possessing the structural 
property defined by row 1. But that means, mutatis mutandis, that temperature-in-a-
gas (which we thought we had saved by local reduction) is sundered into its diverse 
realizers not only within different gas clouds, but even in the same gas cloud at 
different times! Reductions don’t get much more local than that, nor eliminations 
much more eliminative. 
 
Of course, the mere fact that temperature is radically multiply realizable does not 
entail that mental properties are. It is perfectly consistent to maintain that temperature 
does not survive local reduction, but mental properties do, precisely because they are 
not radically multiply realized in humans. This, I suggest, is not particularly plausible. 
                                                 
72 Kim apparently does not think that anything of import turns on how the roles are specified. See for 
instance Kim [1998] p.115-6: “…functional properties, as second order properties, do not bring new 
causal powers into the world: they do not have causal powers that go beyond the causal powers of their 
first-order realizers.” (My italics.) What motivates CIP is the thought that second-order property-
instances are instantiated wholly in virtue of first-order property-instances that meet the relevant 
specification, and so whatever the powers of the former, they cannot go beyond the powers of the 
latter. 
73 Notice that the causal powers of these possibilities is bound to differ. They will, for instance, cause 
distinctive and heterogeneous microphysical changes in adjacent aggregates. Despite their causal 
heterogeneity, however, the aggregates in question all manage to play the causal role of temperature. I 
need not speculate as to how this is possible (although it is an interesting question). My argument in 
this section requires only that such multiple realization within thermodynamics is actual, and given the 
mathematical form of the function that defines temperature-in-a-gas, I do not see how this much can be 
denied. 
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Even if human beings in the same psychological state have the same 
neurophysiological properties, it is hugely unlikely that they will have the same 
physical properties. Suppose a given mental property M in humans is uniquely 
realized by a neural structure, N. On the basis of CIP, we must conclude that M=N. 
Now particular N-instances play the M role by consisting of neurones firing in a 
particular way, and interacting with each other in such a way as to cause the effects 
that define of M. The trouble here is that properties like that of being a neuronal firing 
are statistical in precisely the same way temperature is. For instance, let’s say that 
neuronal firings involve the rapid diffusion of ions along ion channels. Nothing in 
specifications such as this one will tell us how many ions, or precisely how fast, or 
exactly how the velocities of the ions have to be distributed. The property of being a 
neuronal firing, too, will be second-order, and multiply realizable, with respect to 
particular aggregates of ions moving with certain velocities along ion channels. It 
does not matter how similar each of the aggregates is, for identity is an equivalence 
relation. If we are forced by CIP to identify particular N-instances with particular 
aggregates, then particular M-instances, by the transitivity of identity, will be 
identified with non-identical aggregates. Which is to say that it is hugely unlikely 
(although, I suppose, not impossible) that anyone will ever be in the same mental state 
twice. 
 
2.4. Against the causal inheritance principle 
My response to Kim’s eliminative reductionism is that CIP is false, and that contra-
Kim, its falsity does not entail “causal powers that magically emerge”. I could treat 
CIP’s eliminativist consequences as a reductio and simply dismiss it – as we shall see 
in 5.4, a very similar (and intimately related) reductio (the problem of causal 
drainage) can be run against Kim’s causal exclusion argument. The trouble with this 
kind of line is that CIP is intuitively quite plausible, and a mere reductio of it will 
offer no diagnosis of why, despite this initial plausibility, the principle is false. To see 
why CIP is false, we will consider a possible objection to step (1) of the functional 
reduction procedure. It is not difficult to respond to the objection, but the natural 
response brings to light some extremely important points about the relationship 
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between functional properties and their realizers, points that I think Kim does not 
fully appreciate. The objection is simple: it is crucial to step (1) that the causal role 
that individuates E can be specified in terms of properties of B. But how plausible is 
that? 
 
Suppose for the sake of argument that the reducing theory is physiology, and that E is 
a mental property – the desire to ring the doorbell with the index finger of your left 
hand, say. In the right circumstances, part of the causal profile of E will be that its 
instances cause me to ring the doorbell with my left index finger in some way or 
other. It is no part of the individuation of E that it has the power to cause me to do so 
in one particular way, rather than another. I could, for instance, carry out this action 
with a wide range of movements of my arm, the positions of my other fingers could 
vary, the force applied to the doorbell will differ from one occasion to the next, and so 
on. Putative physiological realizer P, however, will be a property that causes 
particular muscles to contract, and my body to move in a comparatively specific way. 
These points, of course, are not unfamiliar – it is virtually platitudinous that the causal 
roles that individuate functional mental properties are to be specified not in terms of 
particular bodily movements, but in terms of behaviours. 
 
Interestingly, the same is true of temperature-in-a-gas. Now I do not wish to maintain 
here that the causal role of temperature-in-a-gas is different to the role of the average 
molecular kinetic energy, for I do accept that ‘these’ are the same property. However, 
a given instance of temperature-in-a-gas will, as we have seen, be realized by an 
aggregate of molecules with a particular velocity distribution. This aggregate has the 
power to cause very specific changes in other aggregates, through specific molecular 
collisions and transfers of momentum, say. But it is no part of the individuative causal 
role of temperature, construed as a functional property, that is has these very specific 
powers. Rather, it causes thermometers to display certain readings, causes pressure on 
containers, and so on. I think it quite plausible that in general, the causal roles of 
realizer properties are not the same as the roles that specify the properties they realize. 
The causal roles of E and P are different; how then is E to be realized in B at all? The 
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resolution of this difficulty requires an account of the manner in which realizer 
properties “play the causal role” associated with the functional properties they realize, 
one that acknowledges that the causal roles that individuate the realized properties is 
different to the causal role of any particular realizing property-instance. 
 
There are many examples in the literature of just such an account; I will mention but a 
few. Shoemaker, for instance, holds that properties are identical to sets of “conditional 
powers”.74 For instance, the property of being knife-shaped is (inter alia) the power to 
cut butter conditionally on being made of wood, the power to cut wood conditionally 
on being made of steel, and so on. As Shoemaker points out in his [2001], this 
metaphysic extends in a natural way to realization: P realizes E just in case the latter 
is a proper subset of the former. Now Shoemaker also point out that this theory of 
realization can be held independently of the either the view that properties are 
identical to sets of causal powers, or are wholly individuated by the causal powers 
they confer. The subset theory of realization is consistent with the far less 
controversial view that properties confer sets of causal powers on their bearers. On 
this view, P realizes E just in case the powers conferred by E are a subset of those 
conferred by P. Now clearly, on this view, the causal powers of functional properties 
will not be the same as those of their realizers. The constitutive effect of a functional 
property, for Shoemaker, will be a proper part of the effect of any particular realizer. 
This is because particular realizers will be identical to the union of the properties they 
realize and some other set of powers. What such a property-instance causes will be a 
property-instance part of which is the constitutive effect of the realized property. 
 
Yablo (to whose position Shoemaker likens his own) holds that mental properties are 
related to their physical base properties as determinate to determinable.75 In addition, 
                                                 
74 Shoemaker [1980]. Most would agree that properties confer causal powers on their bearers. The 
controversial part of Shoemaker’s account is the claim that the causal powers conferred is all that 
individuates properties. Shoemaker actually considers two versions of this theory, one according to 
which properties are wholly individuated by the powers they confer, and a stronger version according 
to which properties are identical to the powers conferred. These matters are beyond the scope of the 
present work. 
75 Yablo [1992]. We will examine Yablo’s theory at greater length in 4.3. 
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Yablo endorses the view that the causal roles of determinate properties and their 
determinables differ. This seems clearly right – you can build detectors for scarlet 
things that don’t detect other shades of red; detectors for red things that don’t detect 
yellow things; and detectors for coloured things that detect any of the above. On the 
proviso that the determinate-determinable relation can incorporate the realizer-role 
relation, then, again it follows that realizer and role properties do not have the same 
causal powers. Finally, there is the view of realization endorsed by Gillett. He too 
holds that realization is not as simple a matter as the realizer properties having the 
causes and effects that individuate the properties they realize, but maintains that the 
subset view endorsed by Shoemaker does not do justice to the differences in causal 
powers of realizer and realized properties. Gillett gives as an example the hardness of 
a diamond, and argues that the realizer properties in this case are relational properties 
of carbon atoms, not properties of the diamond itself. Our temperature example of 2.3 
supports this view, provided it counts as a case of realization – for the realizer 
property there is instantiated in aggregates of molecules, and temperature instantiated 
in the gas. And as we saw in 1.4, there are good reasons not to identify these entities. 
Hardness, on the other hand, is a property of the diamond – carbon atoms do not cut 
glass, but diamonds do. Still, the properties of the carbon atoms that compose a 
diamond realize its hardness, and hardness in diamonds is functionally reducible to 
those properties.76 The central point for my purposes is that hardness is individuated 
by the power to resist changes in shape, but realizer properties play this role by 
holding atoms together. 
 
Now it seems to me that theories such as those sketched above have a common 
feature: broadly, they entail that realizer properties play the causal roles that 
individuate realized properties by causing events that are sufficient for their 
constitutive effects, in the sense detailed in 1.4. The particular realizer P of E on some 
occasion “plays the causal role” of E by causing an event x that is non-causally 
                                                 
76 I should point out that Gillett would not agree with this last point, but that is because he assumes a 
Kimian conception of functional reduction. Gillett would, however, agree that we can explain the 
hardness of diamonds by reference to the laws of physics and the properties of their constituent carbon 
atoms. And that, for me, is a perfectly good functional reduction. See Gillett [2002], [2003] for details. 
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sufficient for an event X, where causing X is among the constitutive effects of E.77 
The upshot of these remarks is that in step (1) above, we should not hold that the 
functionalization of E requires specification of its causal role in terms of properties in 
B. This, at least in the case of mental properties, is far too implausible. Rather, we 
should require that the causal role of E be specified in terms of properties that 
supervene on B properties. And in step (3), we will, correspondingly, be looking not 
to explain how a specific P-instance causes a behaviour, but how it causes events that 
are sufficient for that behaviour. On the present view, functionally reducing mental 
properties is a matter of finding implementing mechanisms for causal relations 
between supervenient properties.78 I am aware that these remarks leave a great deal to 
be said; but they ought to be sufficient for my purpose, which, as I said, is to 
undermine CIP. Now consider again E = the desire to ring the doorbell with the index 
finger of your left hand, and its realization base P1, P2, P3,…,Pn. If the remarks of the 
preceding paragraphs are correct, then there is good reason to believe that CIP is false. 
The reason is simple: the causal role that individuates E is not the same as the role 
played by any particular Pi-instance. This is not in itself inconsistent with CIP, for it is 
the individuative role of E itself that differs from the roles of the P-instances, and CIP 
identifies only the powers of specific E-instances with the powers of Pi-instances. But 
let E be realized on some occasion by P3. Properties confer causal powers on objects. 
If it is accepted that the causal role that individuates E is not the same as that of any of 
its realizer properties, then E will not confer the same powers on objects as P3. But 
then how are we to avoid the conclusion that the causal powers of the E-instance 
differs from the powers of the P3-instance? 
                                                 
77 Common sense seems to suggest that, in causing x, P must thereby also cause X as well. In addition, 
many share the intuition that if E is to cause X, then the only way for it to do so (given that x non-
causally suffices for X) is to cause x. There are good reasons, however, to doubt whether either of these 
intuitions is correct – we take up this matter in detail in chapter 4. 
78 There is a complication inherent in the view expressed here, which bears mention. If the causal role 
individuative of E is specified in terms of a property E* that supervenes on B-properties, then it is 
essential, if the functional reduction of E to B-properties is to go through, that the supervenience of E* 
is physically necessary. If, on the other hand, E* is an emergent property, then B-laws and properties 
alone will not be sufficient to explain how E’s putative realizer P plays the role individuative of E. We 
will also need to appeal to the synchronic laws that govern the emergence of E* from the property P* 
that P causes. In this case, E fails to be functionally reducible to B, precisely because something over 
and above the properties and laws of B are required in order to deduce E. As we shall see in 6.3, this 
fact is what makes what I will term weakly emergent properties functionally irreducible to their 
emergence bases. 
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In fairness to Kim, he does at certain times acknowledge the causal differences I have 
been describing between role and realizer property-instances. Refer back to our 
formulation of CIP in 2.3. It is interesting to note that in an earlier formulation of CIP, 
Kim has (in parentheses) ‘or are a subset of’ after ‘identical with’. Let us reformulate 
CIP accordingly: 
 
If a functional property E is instantiated on a given occasion in virtue of one of 
its realizers, Q, being instantiated, then the causal powers of this instance of E 
are identical with (or a subset of) the causal powers of this instance of Q.79
 
Let the principle so formulated be CIP’. Now CIP’ is not falsified by the fact that 
realized and realizer properties have different causal roles. It is unclear to me whether, 
in fact, the subset relation is the right one to account for those differences; however, 
CIP’ at least promises to incorporate them, where CIP rules them out. Still more 
interesting is what Kim says in fn.45, which is attached to the parenthesised part of 
CIP’: 
 
Whether the principle is to be understood in terms of identity or inclusion will 
depend on how “realizer” is understood. On a reasonable construal if P is a 
realizer of F, then any stronger property P* (say P&Q, for a nontrivial Q 
consistent with P) is also a realizer of F, and P* may have stronger causal 
powers than P, powers that we may not wish to attribute to the instance of F in 
question. The main point, though, is that an instance of a second-order 
property cannot have causal powers that go beyond those of the realizing 
property involved.80
 
I agree with all of this. Kim and I differ in two ways. First, CIP (the principle 
“understood in terms of identity”) cannot do justice to the difference in causal roles of 
realizer and realized properties; and as we have seen, such differences are common to 
many, if not all, role/realizer pairs. Second, CIP’ (the principle “understood in terms 
of inclusion) does not provide motivation for identifying the instances of realized and 
realizer properties. Quite the opposite, in fact: if the realized property-instance lacks 
some of the powers of its realizer property-instance, then their non-identity follows 
                                                 
79 Kim [1998] p.54. This is not Kim’s actual wording; I have reformulated for typographic consistency. 
The reader may rest assured that nothing of importance was lost in the translation. 
80 Kim [1998] p.129. 
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straightforwardly from Leibniz’s law. Further, if it turns out that functional and 
realizer properties are instantiated in different individuals (e.g. E in persons and P3 in 
an aggregate of neurones), then again the E-instance will not be identical to the P3-
instance, since property-instances by definition can’t be identified if their constitutive 
objects differ. 
 
Now, it is worth taking a moment to show why elimination does not follow from 
CIP’. Recall our direct and indirect routes of 2.3. The direct route is easily blocked 
given CIP’, as it depends on identification of mental and physical property-instances, 
and CIP’ entails their non-identity. Blocking the indirect route is a little more tricky. 
Let the causal powers of a mental property-instance E be a subset S1 of the powers of 
its realizer P1. Let the powers of the next E-instance be a subset S2 of the causal 
powers of its realizer P2. Suppose for the sake of argument that P1 andP2 are the only 
nomologically possible realizers of E. As before, it is nomologically necessary that 
E↔(P1vP2). Does this not render E unprojectible, as before? It need not, but there are 
conditions. Specifically, if E is to be projectible, then its instances must all share a set 
of causal powers. In 2.3, we saw how CIP makes this impossible by identification of 
the causal powers of E- and (heterogeneous) P-instances. CIP’ makes it possible for 
different E-instances to have the same causal powers, via the subset relation. 
However, the powers of E-instances will only be homogeneous provided 
S1=S2=P1∩P2. And this in turn means that on CIP’, the intersection of the sets of 
powers of the Pi-instances that realize any mental property M must be (i) non-empty, 
and (ii) identical to the set of powers that individuates M.81 To put the point in a less 
abstract way, let E=the desire to ring the doorbell in some way or other. For E to be 
projectible, the intersection set of the powers of all the Pi-instances that realize E must 
                                                 
81 Clapp [2001] offers a very similar account of how it is that disjunctions can designate genuine 
(nondisjunctive) properties. Clapp holds that in general, a predicate F denotes a property P just in case 
there is some nonempty set S of powers such that F(x)↔x has all the powers in S. Applying this to 
disjunctions of properties, we obtain the condition that a disjunction expresses genuine property P just 
in case the intersection set S of the causal powers of the disjuncts is non-empty, and anything that 
possesses all the powers in S is P. See also Penczek [1997] for an argument that disjunctive properties 
can be causally efficacious with respect to a property P only if each of the disjuncts is capable of 
‘standing on its own’ – in other words, just in case all the disjuncts share the power to cause a P-
instance. 
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contain (inter alia) the power to cause the doorbell to ring. Now suppose that P1-
instances have the power to cause the index finger of my left hand to press the 
doorbell, and P2-instances have the power to cause the finger of my right hand to do 
so. The set P1∩P2 contains (inter alia) the  power to ring the doorbell, which is as 
required. An attractive feature of CIP’ is that the causal powers of mental property-
instances are, in essence, the powers of their realizer-instances, minus the extraneous 
details such as which hand you ring the bell with, how hard you press it, and so on. 
An interesting and important question remains: how come the intersection set of 
powers of the physically heterogeneous realizer property-instances of a mental 
property is non-empty? (Alternatively, how come physically heterogeneous properties 
get to share causal powers?). In 6.5, we will examine a teleological response to this 
question. 
 
2.5. Functionally reducing the mind 
Finally, I will make a few remarks on the current state of play with regard to the 
ongoing functional reduction of mind. None of these remarks is particularly 
tendentious; however, their truth has profound implications for the causal argument, 
as we shall see in chapter 7. First, note that functionalization seems highly plausible 
for intentional mental properties. As I mentioned earlier, there is good reason to 
believe that phenomenal properties will resist construal in causal-functional terms. 
But properties such as beliefs are, it seems, prime candidates for reduction. On 
reflection, this is relatively unsurprising. Mental concepts are embedded in a folk-
psychological theory that ascribes to mental properties certain characteristic roles. In 
addition, however, as interpreters, application of the theory is how we decide, in 
particular cases, whether or not people possess those properties. Just as we are 
reluctant to attribute to something a certain temperature if our thermometer tells us 
different, so we are reluctant to attribute a belief, say, to an individual for whom the 
available evidence suggests different. Of course, auxiliary hypotheses are available in 
both cases for those who really want to persist with attributing properties that don’t 
provide causal evidence of their instantiation. But there is a clear sense in which, for 
the purposes of interpretation, we are all functionalists. Now I do not for one second 
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think that functionalism follows from our interpretive practices. Rather, my point is 
that there is a good fit between the two, precisely because mental properties possess 
characteristic causal powers. That’s why interpretation based on largely functionalist 
criteria works. Once this much is admitted, it is not too great a step to the view that 
mental properties have their causal powers constitutively. Let’s accept, then, that the 
first stage of the functional reduction process is largely complete. We know quite a lot 
about the causal powers of mental properties. As skilled interpreters, we have a head 
start. That isn’t, of course, to say that we don’t still have much to discover about 
psychology; but it seems to me that we know enough to get started. 
 
We’re not doing too badly with stage 2, either. Scientific study of the brain has 
revealed all sorts of interesting things. For instance, we know that there are 
correlations between certain mental activities and levels of activity in certain parts of 
the brain. We know that damage to specific areas of the brain is correlated with 
specific impairments of mental ability. We know roughly which bits of the brain are 
responsible for speech processing, emotional responses, dreaming, and so on. 
Unfortunately, at least in the simplified terms of functional reduction theory, that is 
where the matter ends. While we have an idea what the putative realizer properties 
look like, we are not even close to being able to deduce functionalized mental 
properties from the neurophysiology, biology, chemistry, or physics of brains. This is 
because we do not possess sufficiently complete neurophysiological, biological, 
chemical or physical theories of brains to explain how the putative realizers play the 
causal roles we associate with mental properties. Knowing that certain brain 
properties correlate with certain mental properties, as I have argued, is no use at all in 
itself when it comes to establishing that the mind is nothing over and above the 
physical. What we need are theories that tell us how the brain properties play the 
causal roles we specify in step 1, and this, I take it to be relatively uncontroversial, is 
something we just don’t have right now. We can be quite confident in our knowledge 
of what a physical property would have to do if it were to be realize a mental 
property; and we can be equally confident that if mental properties are physically 
realized, then their realizers are brain properties of some kind. However, providing 
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explanations of how our putative realizers play the causal roles in question is beyond 
us. And this, in turn, precludes our knowing whether, in fact, the relationship between 
brains and minds is realization at all. As I said in 2.1, just about every metaphysic of 
mind thus far advanced (physicalist or otherwise) proposes a correlation of some sort 
between mental and physical properties. I stress these points because there seems to 
me to be a tendency among philosophers to suppose that the plausibility of 
functionalism about the mind somehow lends support to physicalism in and of itself. 
And as I said in 2.2, this is not so: that we can construe a property as functional tells 
us nothing about how the property is realized. That’s one of the attractions of 
functionalism. Mental properties are not yet functionally reduced to anything else, and 
empirically, at least, metaphysics of mind is up for grabs. That’s where the causal 
argument comes in. 
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3. Premises of the causal Argument 
The causal argument depends on three crucial premises: the efficacy of the mental, the 
completeness of physics, and a principle of non-overdetermination. These three 
premises intuitively entail that the mind ‘is’ in some sense physical. The purpose of 
this chapter is to clarify the premises, and to give some justification for each, before 
proceeding to examine the causal argument. In 3.1, I summarise the evidence for the 
efficacy of the mental. I will not do much to convince anyone who isn’t already 
convinced that the mind is efficacious that they ought to be. Rather, I simply draw 
attention to the fact that there is a strong body of prima facie evidence that mental 
events cause physical events. In 3.2, I focus on physicalist responses to Hempel’s 
dilemma, and so formulate an inductive argument for the completeness of physics, 
based on evidence from the successes of physiology. This argument will prove of 
central importance in chapter 7. In 3.3, I examine what is bad about 
overdetermination. It is a confusion in the literature on mental causation that different 
authors group principles different both in content and motivation under the banner of 
non-overdetermination. I clarify what I take it to mean, and why physicalists should 
take it to mean the same as I do. In 3.4, I give a run-through of the causal argument, 
and show how it establishes supervenience. I show that there is room to question the 
deductive validity of the argument, for it leaves open varieties of supervenience 
consistent with non-physicalist positions. 
 
3.1. Efficacy of the mental (EM) 
This premise simply states that mental events cause physical events. When I decide to 
pick up my glass, my arm moves, my hand grasps the glass. We can intervene in the 
physical world, change where things are located, how they move, and so on. Does it 
make sense to deny EM? One might wish to claim that epiphenomenalism is 
incoherent. The relations between our mental lives and events in the world are, one 
might say, paradigm case causal relations. If the concept of ‘cause’ applies to 
anything, then it surely applies to mental events! Such arguments, however, are 
famously question-begging:  that mental events are paradigm case causes is exactly 
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what epiphenomenalists will deny. However, perhaps the thought involved does 
contain the genesis of an argument – even if we can’t argue directly that EM is true on 
conceptual grounds, there may, nonetheless, be a more circuitous conceptual route to 
it. It is tempting to argue, for instance, that the concept of causation is logically 
posterior to the concept of causal explanation.82 If this view is correct, then a decision 
about whether an event or property is causally efficacious ought to be taken against a 
background of facts about the sort of role the entity in question plays in our 
explanatory practices. So, for instance, if an event figures in a singular causal 
explanation of some effect, then there is no further question about its efficacy. 
Explanatory relevance is what its efficacy consists in. 
 
There are two lines of response to this argument. The first is to point out that it differs 
from the paradigm case argument only in that it begs, so to speak, a different question. 
Suppose it to be sufficient for the efficacy of an event that we can give a causal 
explanation in terms of that event. The obvious question now is, can we give causal 
explanations in terms of mental events? If epiphenomenalists are right, then 
presumably the mental epiphenomena will somehow (depending on your chosen 
metaphysic) accompany genuine physical causes. And the point now is, it is open to 
the epiphenomenalists to insist that putative causal explanations given in terms of the 
epiphenomenal events are merely apparently causal, and no more than this precisely 
because the events they cite are not efficacious. The second response is due to 
Jackson and Pettit, and directly challenges the claim of a conceptual link between 
causal explanation and causation.83 The challenge takes the form of counterexamples: 
they claim that we can give causal explanations of an effect in terms of properties that 
don’t cause it, provided those properties are (perhaps ceteris paribus) sufficient for 
the instantiation of other properties that do cause it. In their view, mental states are 
functional, their contents broad, and as such are inefficacious; such properties are 
                                                 
82 See, for instance, Burge [1993]; Baker [1993]. 
83 See their [1990a]. Jackson and Pettit’s aim is not, I should point out, to offer such a challenge. 
Rather, they wish to accommodate the causal relevance of (functional) mental properties in a 
theoretical framework that assumes them to be causally inefficacious. However, their views are clearly 
relevant to the points at issue here. I consider their views further in 5.4. 
 - 81 - 
nonetheless causally relevant, as their instantiation is sufficient for the instantiation of 
some realizer properties or other that are efficacious. This is not the place for a full 
discussion of this interesting theory; suffice it to say that if the theory is to some 
extent plausible, then to that extent it undermines the claim that the causal facts are 
determined by the causal-explanatory facts. For if true, it entails that all the facts 
about our causal-explanatory practices are consistent with the inefficacy of the 
properties we invoke as explanans. 
 
It looks as though a priori arguments are out of the question; to what extent, then, is 
EM supported by everyday experience? Well, suppose Bob – a non-philosopher – tells 
you he took a break from playing the guitar because his muscles started to cramp, and 
he decided to rest them. If you then ask Bob whether his instantiating the property of 
deciding to rest his muscles was a cause of his taking a break, he will probably look at 
you funny. Still, we can surely explain to Bob the distinction between causally 
relevant and irrelevant properties, in the usual way: is it the colour, or the momentum, 
of the brick that is responsible for the window breaking? Do you think mental 
properties are, in relation to behaviour, more like the brick’s momentum, or its 
colour? I think it’s clear which way Bob will answer, provided he hasn’t wandered 
off. But why? If this commitment to the efficacy of mind is mere intuition, then how 
come we all (at least those of us not persuaded otherwise by philosophical argument) 
share it? Consider a closely related question: why are we all so sure that the brick’s 
impact is the cause of the window breaking? Hume famously argued for scepticism 
about causation understood as a ‘necessary connection’ between distinct events, on 
the grounds that we don’t ever observe the necessity, but see merely the constant 
conjunction of events.84 According to Hume, we never gain knowledge of necessary 
connections, but merely become conditioned, over time, to expect the effect to follow 
the cause. I take it we are rather less sceptical nowadays about knowledge of 
necessities, but Hume is surely right about the appearances. Constant conjunction, 
                                                 
84 I leave open at this point what such a necessary connection consists in. My point here is that 
whatever causation is, it must go beyond the mere conjunctions that we observe. As is familiar, I might 
observe, each day of my life, the milkman turning up on my doorstep immediately after the postman, 
without there being a causal link between the two events. 
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although clearly not sufficient for causation, is just about the only evidence we have 
that a deeper (necessary) connection exists. Conversely, a necessary connection will 
often (but not, it goes without saying, always) count as the best explanation of why 
events of a certain type are always followed by events of another. For if there isn’t a 
necessary connection between brick impacts and windows breaking, then we have our 
work cut out in explaining the truth of the de facto generalisation: ‘window breakages 
always follow brick impacts’. If this much is granted, it seems as though the evidence 
for EM is on exactly the same footing as the evidence for any other causal claims we 
might wish to make. It’s hard to see a principled difference between the evidence 
available in support of (i) that a brick’s impact will break a window, and (ii) that a 
desire for water will make me go get some. 
 
It isn’t just post-hoc that we see conjunction either – folk psychology enables us to 
predict to a remarkable degree of accuracy just what physical states of affairs will 
obtain at very specific future times. There are those who deny this, but I really don’t 
see why. If I felt like it, and had enough cash at my disposal, I could arrange to meet 
my good friend Owen by the gas barbecues at Coogee beach 6pm Australian time, 
February 7th 2006 for a party. He’s not the most reliable person I know, but still I 
reckon there’s a better than evens chance he’d be there. But that’s a prediction, based 
on the interpretive attribution of mental properties alone, about the state of a very 
specific part of the world at a future time. Not only that, it’s significantly more likely 
to be right than comparable predictions, made using the best available science, about 
what the weather is going to be like that weekend. If the psychological properties 
attributed in order to make predictions like these are not the properties in virtue of 
which Owen ends up at Coogee, then it is a very strange thing indeed that my 
prediction turns out to be right. 
 
Of course, the evidence for causal connections supplied by these appearances is 
defeasible – sometimes we’ll get epiphenomena constantly conjoined with effects 
they (obviously) don’t cause. And in such cases, there is a perfectly good non-causal 
necessary connection between the epiphenomenon and the effect. Suppose, for 
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instance, that car engines that are about to give up tend to emit a characteristic death 
rattle just prior to doing so. The rattle and the end of the engine are, of course, effects 
of a common cause – and the (assumed) fact that they are constantly conjoined is, I 
take it, just one of the many reasons why constant conjunction is not sufficient for 
causation. The point extends to prediction, too: the engine’s death-rattle significantly 
raises the probability of the occurrence of the events that actually do cause the engine 
to die – components interacting in ways that cause them to stop working, say. Then of 
course the occurrence of the epiphenomenon will be a good predictive indicator of the 
occurrence of an effect of that type.85 But that’s not a problem, as I only claim an 
evidential link between such conjunctions and the truth of causal claims, and no 
evidence deductively entails the truth of a proposition. What evidence does is warrant 
belief in a theory, and the constant conjunction of mental events and physical events 
is no exception. What our experience tells us is that prima facie, EM is true. What 
evidence would defeat this prima facie justification? In the case of our rattling engine, 
we can test the theory that rattles cause engines to stop – say by letting two 
qualitatively identical engines run, one in a vacuum, the other not, and seeing if they 
stop. If they both do, then we need to look for other causes of the rattling engine’s 
failure. This is because we are apt to treat counterfactual dependency as a necessary 
condition for causation, and although we can’t test counterfactual claims directly, if 
two engines of similar constitution behave in the same way whether the rattle is 
present or not, this surely suggest that the counterfactual ‘if this engine hadn’t rattled, 
it wouldn’t have stopped’ is false. Unfortunately, there is no obvious way to run 
similar experiments involving mental properties. What we can do, however, is look to 
see whether EM is consistent with other equally well supported aspects of our world 
                                                 
85 Jackson and Pettit [1990a] go further, arguing that we can appeal to such epiphenomena to give 
causal explanations of the effects of the events whose probabilities they raise. They draw an analogy 
with computer programs, which, they maintain, do not cause the patterns I see now on my computer 
screen as this footnote, but make probable the occurrence of other events that do cause the patterns. In 
essence, they argue that functional mental properties are not efficacious, but that this is okay as the 
phenomena that really matter to us – namely the predictive and explanatory powers of mental property-
attributions – can be saved without endorsing their efficacy. Functional properties get to figure in 
causal explanatory laws without being causal. I need not take issue with this claim here, but I will 
return to their views in chapter 5, where I discuss the causal exclusion problem. Denying EM, as we 
shall see, is among the possible solutions to that problem, but it is far from being the least implausible 
one. 
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view. The key phrase here is ‘equally well supported’: for all I know, there may be a 
philosophical argument sufficient to defeat the justification for EM afforded by 
experience. Given the strength and availability of the evidence, however, it had better 
be a pretty compelling argument. In particular, if a candidate argument rests on 
premises or theories whose justification is obscure, then we should have no hesitation 
whatever in rejecting it as unsound. The burden of proof rests squarely on the 
shoulders of those who think EM is false. As I said, I have nothing to say about EM 
that would convince a sceptic. Rather, my purpose here has been to urge the sceptic to 
have reasons at least as compelling for their scepticism as the prima facie evidence is 
for EM. 
 
3.2. Completeness of physics (CP) 
This widely held view is supposed to be empirically supported, and amounts to the 
claim that every physical effect is sufficiently determined by prior physical causes. I 
prefer the following formulation: 
 
CP: Every physical event y that has a sufficient cause at t, has a complete, 
sufficient physical cause x at t. 
 
This version of completeness is close to what Montero terms ‘Causal Closure’, 
differing only in respect the stipulation that x must be a complete cause of y.86 
Following Papineau, I will consider a physical cause complete just in case it has its 
effects entirely according to physical laws.87 We will see presently just what work 
this extra stipulation is doing, and why the principle is relativised to a time. Montero 
also outlines other completeness theses, for instance ‘Strong Causal Closure’, which 
she defines as the thesis that ‘[p]hysical effects have only physical causes’. The denial 
of this thesis is consistent with CP, as the latter does not rule out the sufficiency of 
non-physical events for physical effects. However, strong causal closure appears to 
                                                 
86 See Montero [2003] for details. 
87 Papineau [1993] p.22. 
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follow from CP and a suitable ‘principle of non-overdetermination’; if every physical 
event has a sufficient physical cause but it is also true in general that events have at 
most one sufficient cause, then any event that causes a physical event is ipso facto 
physical. And conversely, if an event is not physical, then it does not cause any 
physical effects, which amounts to the strong causal closure of the physical domain. 
Hereinafter, when I talk of completeness, I have in mind the weaker version defined 
above. 
 
A few points are in order before proceeding. First, in order to accommodate 
indeterministic causation, ‘has a sufficient cause’ must be read as ‘has its chances 
determined’. CP is then the claim that to the extent that the probability of occurrence 
of a physical event is determined, it is determined to that extent by prior physical 
events. Second, CP is relativised to times in order to avoid an objection raised by 
Lowe, that CP is consistent with x being a sufficient cause of y via some nonphysical 
intermediary cause M.88 Including the temporal parameter ensures that every physical 
event has a complete physical causal history. At any point in the causal aetiology of 
an event at which it has a sufficient cause, we can find physical events that are jointly 
causally sufficient for its occurrence. Third, and most importantly, there is the related 
objection, also due to Lowe, that CP is consistent with a physical event x that 
simultaneously causes a mental event M, and x and M together are causally sufficient 
for a physical event y.89 Lowe maintains that y still has a sufficient physical cause, 
even if it true that x somehow requires the action of M in order to cause y. Appeals to 
times in this case will not distinguish M from x, since the causal relation between 
them is by hypothesis simultaneous.90 For now, notice that contra-Lowe, the imagined 
scenario is plausibly inconsistent with CP. For x is in no sense a sufficient cause of y 
according to physical laws. The laws by which x causes M govern x’s causing non-
physical events, and as such clearly cannot be physical laws. But since M is a 
                                                 
88 Lowe [2000] pp.575-6. 
89 Lowe [2000] p.576-7; Lowe [2003] pp.148-9. 
90 I will argue in 3.3 that simultaneous causal relationships are problematic when applied to the mind-
body relation. The reason I will give there is that the fact that there are always mental causes of 
behaviour strongly suggests a non-causal relationship between the physical causes of behaviour and the 
mental causes. 
 - 86 - 
necessary causal condition for y, it follows that x does not cause y according to 
physical laws alone, and as such fails to be a complete cause. In Lowe [2000] (p.3) the 
formulation he terms ‘1B’ due to Papineau has ‘complete’ built in as a condition on 
the nature of the causal relationship between x and y. However, Lowe does not 
consider whether simultaneous causation poses a problem for such formulations, 
focussing instead on formulations of CP that require only the sufficiency of the 
proximal cause. Despite the fact that I disagree with Lowe that the imagined 
possibility is inconsistent with CP, I do agree that such possibilities are apt to make 
any special causal contribution on the part of M ‘invisible’ to certain kinds of 
empirical enquiry.91 In particular, scientists would quite likely frame causal laws to 
describe situations such as this one without reference to M at all. Causal explanations 
such as the explanation of y by reference to the law ‘xs cause ys’, Lowe says, can 
appear to be complete if the mode of enquiry is limited to observing, inter alia, that 
ys always follow xs, despite the fact that such explanations are in fact incomplete.92 
During the course of chapters 6 and 7, we will derive this very conclusion by different 
means. As we shall see, what Lowe calls the ‘invisibility’ of mental causation has 
profound implications for the argument (to follow) that is supposed to justify CP, and 
for the causal argument. 
 
So why believe CP? If CP is true, then a scientist wanting to find the cause of a 
physical event will never have to go outside the physical domain; the evidence for it is 
supposed to stem from the amount of progress scientists have made in finding 
explanations for various phenomena within the physical domain. That scientists have 
made such progress is undeniable; whether their progress licenses CP is another matter 
entirely. In this section, we will consider the problem widely known as ‘Hempel’s 
dilemma’. A good initial account of this problem is to be found in the exchange 
between David Papineau and Tim Crane. Papineau [1989] appeals to CP to argue that 
                                                 
91 Lowe [2003] pp.150-1. 
92 I note in passing my puzzlement at Lowe’s apparent endorsement of the conjunction of (i) the 
efficacy of M does not render CP false and (ii) a causal explanation of y in terms of x is incomplete due 
to M’s role. 
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mental properties supervene on the physical.93 Crane’s [1991] response is that the 
defender of CP is faced with a dilemma.94 Either the ‘physical’ in CP means part of 
current physics, or else some idealised future physics. If ‘physics’ means current 
physics then CP is probably false, as there are most likely causal gaps in current 
physical theory, requiring entities beyond those already posited to fill them. No 
physicist I ever met thought that current theory had the resources to explain 
everything. If, on the other hand, ‘physics’ refers to whatever future theory is causally 
complete (‘PHYSICS’, say), then CP is analytic. The analyticity is due to our apparent 
inability to describe PHYSICAL theory without reference to its completeness. After 
all, we don’t know what entities, laws, properties, and so on, will be essential to the 
explanations PHYSICS provides. The obvious worry now, of course, is that if mental 
properties turn out to be necessary to fill the causal gaps in Physics, then the 
supervenience of the mental on the PHYSICAL will be trivial. Papineau responds to 
Crane by equating ‘physical’ with ‘PHYSICAL’, and arguing that the supervenience 
of the mental on the PHYSICAL will non-trivial provided there is good reason to 
think that PHYSICS will not include mental properties. Papineau is confident that 
PHYSICS will not require mental properties; during the remainder of this section, we 
will try to isolate the source of this confidence. 
 
Spurrett and Papineau95 attempt to shift the focus of debate away from the issue of 
interpreting ‘physics’ in CP, and replace the completeness of physics with the 
completeness of the non-mental. This completeness thesis states that all non-mental 
events are sufficiently determined by other non-mental events; whatever causal holes 
there are in current theories about non-mental entities, they won’t be filled by mental 
plugs. Notice that this thesis can’t be used in a causal argument for physicalism – 
                                                 
93 Papineau appeals to CP to establish that the causal powers of mental properties must depend on the 
powers of physical properties. He endorses the additional thesis that any difference in properties must 
be manifestable as (at least potentially) differential effects. His claim is that these theses together entail 
that there can be no difference in mental properties without a corresponding difference in physical 
properties. Papineau’s argument will not suffice to establish physicalism, for ‘no A-difference without 
B-difference’ is a component common to all supervenience theses – including the ones that aren’t 
compatible with physicalism. 
94 See also Crane and Mellor [1990]. 
95 In their [1999]. 
 - 88 - 
rather, its use in the causal argument will tell us that the mental is non-mental. A 
natural term for such a position is ‘non-mentalism’. At first blush, this sounds like a 
contradiction, but it’s not, as ‘non-mental’ here is to be understood as non sui generis 
mental. ‘Sui generis’ translates as ‘of its own nature’, and in the present context refers 
to mental entities whose mental natures exhaust their natures. A sui generis mental 
property, for instance, will be one whose instantiation does not consist in having any 
other properties; a sui generis mental force will be a force exerted by a sui generis 
mental event, property, substance, etc.96 Now it seems that the causation of bodily 
movement is the best place to look for possible incompleteness of the non-mental. 
That is to say, if there is evidence that all physiological phenomena have sufficient 
non-mental causes, then there is evidence that mental properties aren’t essential 
anywhere; so if we can find evidence there of completeness with respect to the 
mental, we will have evidence that the non-mental is complete.97 Papineau ends up 
giving just this kind of account – in his [2001] he explicitly attributes the plausibility 
of the completeness of physics to twentieth century advances in physiology. There, he 
argues that since physiology has enjoyed significant explanatory success without 
mental properties, there is proportionately less motivation for believing in ‘sui generis 
mental forces’. And if there is no need to posit such forces to explain the causation of 
bodily movements, then they won’t be required anywhere else either. 
 
This line of argument, although prima facie plausible, is rather more problematic on 
closer inspection. Recall the dilemma pointed out by Crane – if ‘physics’ in CP is 
defined by current theory, then we’ve good inductive grounds for thinking CP false; 
and if defined according to future theory, then how do we know what it will 
essentially refer to? In response, Papineau cites the absence of mental properties from 
                                                 
96 Note that sui generis mental properties might be related to physical properties. What distinguishes 
them from e.g. the functionally reducible properties we discussed in chapter 2 is that by contrast, sui 
generis mental properties are something over and above the properties they are related to. More on 
these matters in chapter 6. 
97 Although some maintain that quantum processes are incomplete with respect to the mental. We lack 
a physical explanation of the apparent wavefunction collapse that occurs when a measurement is made. 
It has been suggested that consciousness plays a central role – it is not measurement per se that causes 
the collapse, but measurement by a conscious observer. If this were true, then quantum mechanics 
would be incomplete with respect to consciousness. See Wigner [1962] for an endorsement of such a 
position. 
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physiological explanations as evidence that the non-mental is complete – for if mental 
properties are not essentially involved in the causation of bodily movements, then 
where? The claim here is that evidence from physiological research supports the claim 
that all bodily movements are determined by preceding non-mental events or 
properties. However, the evidence from physiology, Gillett and Witmer98 argue, does 
not mention the ‘non-mental’ at all – rather, such evidence could only support the 
completeness of the non-mental by supporting the claim that all physiological effects 
(including bodily movements) have physiological causes, ceteris paribus. The 
familiar clause at the end allows for the incompleteness of physiology per se, which is 
fine – we don’t require the completeness of physiology here, but rather its 
completeness relative to the mental. What is problematic, though, is that 
‘physiological’ here seems equally subject to the original dilemma as ‘physical’ in CP! 
If understood in terms of current theory, then the claim is probably false – 
physiological theory can almost certainly be improved within its own domain. That is, 
although perhaps incompletable, physiology is nonetheless not as complete as it could 
be. And as before, if ‘physiological’ refers to future theory, then how do we know 
what properties that theory will require? Perhaps the theory will involve ineliminable 
reference to mental properties. 
 
The argument Gillet and Witmer offer is not too difficult to block. It is certainly true 
that “…no working scientist goes through the trouble of saying that such-and-such 
bodily movements have ‘non-mental causes’”, but that does not make it false that 
those events have such causes, nor that evidence can be gleaned from physiological 
research to support this conclusion. All a successful induction requires is a stock of 
successful physiological explanations whose success depends only on appeals to 
entities or properties that have the property of being non-mental – it matters not 
whether physiologists refer to that property when they frame their evidence.99 And, 
                                                 
98 In their [2001]. 
99 There is an interesting question here concerning the definition of ‘success’ in the present context. In 
point of empirical fact, the successes of physiology thus far are lacking in a way that turns out to 
undermine the justification of CP. For reasons of exposition, I postpone discussion of this point until 
chapter 7. 
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given that physiological theory has not had to posit sui generis mental forces to 
explain physiological effects, it seems that the induction will be good – for to be non-
mental just is to be specifiable in non-mental terms. We can state the crucial induction 
very simply, as follows: no past physiological successes have required the 
incorporation of sui generis mental properties, so we should expect that no future 
successes will require the mental either. Or equivalently, like this: all past successes 
in physiology have involved appeal to properties that lack the property of being sui 
generis mental, so we should expect all future such successes to involve properties 
that lack this property as well. 
 
There is, however, a more serious problem, for similar inductions can be run to show 
that we should not expect any new property to be introduced into a scientific 
ontology, which is absurd. Consider a property P not yet discovered, which, if 
discovered, would plug some of the present causal gaps in physiology. Now by 
hypothesis, no previous successes in physiology have involved appealing to P – this 
fact, inter alia, is what makes current physiology incomplete. But if we are 
inductively justified in expecting future successes in physiology to involve the 
introduction of non-mental entities, should we not also expect those entities to be non-
P? That is, to induce completeness of the non-mental from physiological evidence, we 
need the fact that all past successes in physiology have involved entities that lack sui 
generis mental properties to support the conclusion that future successes in 
physiology will be similarly lacking in such properties. But then doesn’t the fact that 
past physiological successes have involved the introduction of entities that lack P 
support the conclusion that P will never be introduced? Since P can be any property 
you like, and nothing depends on physiology being the science in question, it follows 
that we should not expect there to be any further modifications in any sciences, and 
that all the ones that have happened so far have been quite surprising. Clearly 
something has gone wrong – far from expecting that no new entities will be 
introduced to theories we acknowledge to be incomplete, in fact we expect just the 
opposite. The problem here is that sciences that are not yet complete within their own 
domains – not yet as complete as they can be – are quite likely to require entities not 
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yet within their ontologies in order to be completed. In the case of physics, for 
instance, it is unlikely it can provide maximally complete explanations of the relevant 
phenomena with its present ontology. But if this is so, then we should expect future 
revisions to physical theory to introduce entities of a kind not introduced by any 
previous revisions. For this reason, I think, no induction will be possible from what 
past revisions in a given scientific domain have not included to what future such 
revisions will not include. Surely, though, you may object, we don’t expect future 
physiological theories to introduce sui generis mental entities? If this expectation is to 
be inductively justified, then we must look elsewhere for its source. In what follows I 
will argue that the source of the expectation is that there are similarities between past 
and present theories that license inductions about the nature of future theory. I’ll 
explain. 
 
There are good reasons for supposing that we can negotiate Hempel’s dilemma 
without recourse to the non-mental at all; that is, without giving up on defining 
PHYSICAL. The dilemma, remember, is that CP is  either false or vacuous: false if 
defined by current physics, vacuous if defined by future physics as we have no idea 
what that will be like save that it will be complete. But this is a bit quick for my 
liking. Typical recent advances in physics, for instance, have involved the 
introduction of new particles, forces, and suchlike. And these must be similar in some 
ways to the old particles and forces and suchlike, otherwise they wouldn’t be new 
particles and forces and suchlike.100 If this is true, then the claim that we have no idea 
what PHYSICS will be like is false, and a moment’s reflection on past scientific 
progress supports this conclusion. Arguably the biggest revolution in scientific 
thinking of the last, and possibly any, century, is the shift from Newtonian to 
Quantum mechanics. Even so, quantum particles are really quite similar, in many 
                                                 
100 In his [1999], R F Hendry claims, in support of Papineau, that there is an evidential link between 
current theory in a particular domain and the types of entities that a future version of that theory will 
have to postulate. In fact Hendry only grants Papineau this only for the sake of argument. His concern 
is to argue that even if it is clear that mental properties will not figure in complete physics, it is far less 
clear that, for instance, chemical properties won’t. Current physical explanations, although they do not 
involve explicit reference to mental properties, often do invoke chemical properties, and it’s less than 
clear that such references are eliminable. 
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respects, to their superseded Newtonian counterparts. Quantum particles may not 
simultaneously have precise positions and momenta, but they are still located within 
spatial regions, and still have velocities that fall within certain ranges. And they 
engage in collisions, exert forces upon one another, form bonds with other particles 
due to these forces, and generally do most of the things the Newtonian atoms used to 
do – albeit in a very different manner. My general point here is simply that quantum 
particles resemble Newtonian atoms much more closely than they resemble glaciers, 
or strawberries, or mental contents, to name but a few. For instance, given the 
extraordinary predictive success of the probabilistic approach of quantum mechanics, 
it would be extremely surprising (some might go further – miraculous, perhaps)  if 
nature were not inherently probabilistic in character. As such, it will be equally 
surprising is PHYSICS doesn’t involve, inter alia, the assignment of probabilities to 
various outcomes. Why does any of this matter? Because now we can frame the 
relevant inductions without problematic appeals to what past advances in a given 
theoretical domain have not involved. 
 
The reason Spurrett and Papineau turn to the completeness of the non-mental in the 
first place is to avoid making a commitment viz. the nature of PHYSICS. But that 
now seems too cautious – for if the preceding remarks are right, then it seems we can 
say quite a lot about PHYSICS after all, without mentioning its completeness. Now it 
is tempting at this stage to construct a simple induction based on the nature of current 
physics to the conclusion that PHYSICS won’t contain mental properties. After all, 
sui generis mentality is nothing like atoms, spin, and superposition states. Why not, 
then, simply argue from (i) that future successes in physics will involve the 
introduction of entities similar to those involved in past successes, and (ii) mental 
properties are nothing like current physical entities, to (iii) PHYSICS won’t involve 
appeals to mental properties? There is nothing formally wrong with this qua 
induction, but the nature of the successes referred to in (i) means that the argument 
contains a sampling error. The reason is that current physics doesn’t even attempt to 
account for any effects that might plausibly be attributed to sui generis mental 
properties. If the successes referred to in (i) contained a large enough number of 
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physical explanations of the effects of mental causes, then the induction would be just 
fine. However, as I take to be relatively uncontroversial, the success of current 
quantum theory in explaining things like bodily movements is nil. Put simply, the 
trouble with this kind of strategy is that past successes in physics have mostly been 
concerned with explaining what goes on in particle accelerators and cloud chambers, 
and even the most diehard Cartesian would not insist that sui generis mental 
properties are needed to explain what goes on in places like that.101 However, there is 
no reason why we can’t appeal to the inductive link between present and future theory 
outside of physics. And that is exactly what Papineau does when he appeals to 
physiology, for physiological effects are the likeliest explananda to require sui 
generis mental explanans. The business of at least some branches of physiology is 
precisely to explain effects we know to have mental causes, and to do so in non-
mental terms. The new inductive argument can be stated like this: 
 
(i) Future successes in physiology will involve appeals to entities and 
properties of a broadly similar nature to those involved in past 
successes; 
(ii) sui generis mental properties are nothing at all like anything in the 
ontology of current physiology; so 
(iii) PHYSIOLOGY will not contain sui generis mental properties.102 
 
Now if sui generis mental properties are not required to explain why our bodies move 
as they do, then they will not be needed to explain why atoms move as they do. If this 
is so, then whatever PHYSICS does contain, we can confident that it won’t contain 
mental properties, so that the supervenience of the mental on the PHYSICAL will not 
be trivial. For this reason, I refer to this argument, in what follows, as the non-
triviality argument.  
                                                 
101 Melnyk [2003] runs a slightly more subtle version of the argument mentioned and rejected here. Its 
extra subtlety, as we shall see in 7.2, does not prevent it too from containing the very same sampling 
error. 
102 We will grant the physicalist this argument for the time being. Later on, I will argue that here too 
there is a sampling error, but this point takes some justification, and so I must postpone my argument 
until 7.3. 
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 Notice that from (iii) above we can infer the completeness of the non-mental – for (iii) 
entails that all PHYSIOLOGICAL effects have non-mental causes. Combining this 
again with the thought that if we don’t need sui generis mental properties to account 
for effects like bodily movements, then we don’t need them for anything else either, 
we can infer that all non-mental effects have non-mental causes. Notice also that no 
problematic induction from what past theories have lacked is necessary here: provided 
the non-triviality argument establishes its conclusion (iii), the completeness of the 
non-mental follows deductively, on reasonable assumption. This completeness thesis, 
however, is no longer motivated by Hempel’s dilemma, for given the non-triviality 
argument, the dilemma doesn’t bite. If the non-triviality argument is sound, then 
Papineau is right to be confident that PHYSICS will not require sui generis mental 
properties. We have two completeness theses at our disposal, then – is there any 
reason to prefer one or the other? I think there are at least two reasons to prefer the 
completeness of physics. 
 
First, the non-mental appears highly gerrymandered, for the only thing in common to 
all non-mental entities is that they lack the property of being sui generis mental. But if 
this is right, then it follows that from ‘X is non-mental’ we can’t really infer anything 
else about X. No amount of observations of physiological entities, say, will confirm 
‘all non-mental entities are physiological’; the motion of tectonic plates causes 
earthquakes, but that fact does not justify designing an early warning system that 
monitors the motion of clouds. The non-mental lacks the scientific unity for the 
property of being non-mental to be of any real use. Don’t get me wrong: as I said, I do 
think that the completeness of the non-mental follows from the non-triviality 
argument. However, it is far from clear to me what ‘non-mentalism’ about the mind 
really amounts to. As metaphysics of mind go, it certainly isn’t as informative as 
physicalism, for all non-mentalism tells us is that the mind, whatever it is, is really 
something else. 
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Second the completeness of physics allows us to use the causal argument to argue for 
physicalism about any classes of events that have physical effects. If the argument is a 
good one, then it can be iterated to give a broad physicalism, not just about the mind, 
but about everything. Completeness of the non-X as a premise of the causal argument, 
however, establishes a different metaphysical claim about each X. About the mental, 
we will get non-mentalism; we will get non-geologism about the geological; non-
sociologism about the sociological; and so on. It is unclear how, if at all, these 
different ‘isms’ should be united. All that each one says is that the X in question is 
really something else. The completeness of physics removes the worry – for the 
conclusion of causal arguments based on this premise is that everything with a 
physical effect is physical. 
 
What these two arguments show is that other things being equal, the completeness of 
physics is a much more useful premise than the completeness of the non-mental. In 
chapter 7, I will argue that despite initial appearances to the contrary, current evidence 
does not, in fact, support the conclusion that PHYSIOLOGY does not contain mental 
properties, and that as such, neither the completeness of physics nor the completeness 
of the non-mental is supported. For the purposes of the intervening chapters, however, 
I assume that CP is both true and non-trivial. 
 
3.3. Principle of non-overdetermination (OD) 
Philosophers often maintain that overdetermination is at worst anything from 
impossible to absurd, and at best extremely rare. I disagree. For my part, I take 
overdetermination to be the sort of thing that happens when two assassins shoot the 
same person, the bullets arrive at the same time, and each bullet would have been fatal 
on its own. Contrary to popular received philosophic wisdom, I think that this sort of 
overdetermination happens quite a lot. Your average firing squad, for instance, is set 
up so that more than one of the marksmen kills their victim. The reason I do not think 
there is anything absurd about overdetermination in the firing squad case is that the 
overdetermining causes are effects of a common cause (prior arrangement, the order 
to fire, etc.), and this is sufficient to render the co-occurrence of the multiple causes 
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non-coincidental. It does not matter how often overdetermination occurs, on this 
account – what matters is the relationship between the overdetermining causes.103 
Now EM and CP together entail that certain physical effects (specifically the physical 
effects of mental causes) always have both mental and physical causes. What really 
would be absurd in the case of mental causation is if there were no relationship at all 
between mental and physical causes sufficient to render their co-occurrence non-
coincidental. For then we should have a case of widespread coincidence, which is 
something we really can’t allow. In order to formulate OD, we need to know what 
relationship must obtain between mental and physical causes if their co-occurrence is 
to be non-coincidental. In what follows, I argue that the appropriate relationship is 
sufficiency as defined in 1.4. I am sympathetic to much of what Kim has to say about 
overdetermination; I discuss his views below. 
 
What is a coincidence? Think of the two assassins case. It has the following features: 
(i) both shoot the same person at the same time; (ii) the bullets strike the victim at the 
same time; (iii) either bullet alone would have been sufficient for the victim’s death in 
the absence of the other. We are compelled, when faced with this sort of situation, to 
look for an explanation. The most plausible explanation is to assume some sort of 
collusion between the assassins; alternatively, some design on the part of a third party. 
If no such explanation can be supported, then we are apt to regard it as a freak 
occurrence. Now suppose causation were always like that. Either the world is full of 
unexplained, freak occurrences or coincidences, or else there is widespread design on 
the part of some agent to render the otherwise coincidental occurrences explicable. 
Malebranche, for instance, thought that whenever we decide to act in a certain way, 
God causes the right action; Leibniz, on the other hand, thought that God was too 
busy to be following our every move, and takes care of it all in advance. Both these 
                                                 
103 Those wishing to claim that overdetermination is absurd sometimes explain away double assassin 
cases as cases of joint sufficiency. Events, they maintain, are fragile with respect to the time and 
manner of their occurrence, so that the victim would have died a different death had he been shot by 
just one of the assassins. This implausible theory rules out many things we would ordinarily wish to 
say about events, such as that they might have occurred a bit sooner, or in a slightly different way. We 
return to this issue in 5.5; see Lewis [1986c] for discussion. 
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philosophers recognised the inconceivability of widespread coincidence.104 I take it, 
however, that neither position wholly satisfies. 
 
The question remains, then, as to what relation must obtain between two causes in 
order for their joint causal sufficiency for an effect to be non-coincidental. One 
answer is obvious – identity. It is no coincidence that an event has the same effect as 
itself. It seems, however, that much weaker relations will also render simultaneous 
causal sufficiency non-coincidental. Consider again the two assassins case, and 
suppose that the person who arranged the assassination also arranged it so that the two 
would shoot from positions equidistant from their victim, and pull their triggers at 
exactly the same time. This is not freaky – as I said above, there is nothing at all 
wrong with the thought that assassinations are always like that. If you wanted to set 
one up, then you could do a lot worse than set it up specifically so that the poor 
victim’s death is overdetermined. What we can’t accept is the thought that 
assassinations might always be like that even in the absence of an explanation as to 
why they were. What is it about explanations that make certain cases of 
overdetermination acceptable? In this case, the actions of our assassins are effects of a 
common cause, and this seems sufficient to render their joint occurrence non-
coincidental. For surely, given the cause – the co-ordinating actions of the person who 
hires them – it is not at all spooky that the assassins behave as they do.105 What, then, 
of cases where it is no-one’s intention that two causes overdetermine an effect? Well, 
in the absence of a third entity that explains their joint occurrence and efficacy, the 
                                                 
104 Of course, neither Leibniz nor Malebranche were concerned with overdetermination. Rather, their 
concerns were with the nature of the interaction between mental substance and the world, in response 
to the Cartesian problematic. Both accept that EM is false, but use God to explain why it looks true. For 
Malebranche, neither mind nor body have any effects at all – bodily movements and the mental and 
physical states that precede (and appear to cause) them are caused by God, who can do anything He 
wants. For Leibniz, mental effects have only mental causes, physical effects have only physical causes, 
but God, who can do anything He wants, sees to it during the Creation that mental events happen 
immediately prior to the bodily movements they explain, and at the same time as their physical causes. 
Notice, however, that if global coincidences were acceptable, then the appeal to God would be 
unnecessary. 
105 The explanation here has exactly the same form as the Leibnizian and Malebranchian solutions to 
the Cartesian problematic. 
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two causes must, so to speak, take care of each other. Kim agrees, and we turn now to 
a much-quoted principle of his, the ‘Causal Exclusion Principle’.106
 
Kim state this principle in a variety of (relatively similar) ways in different papers on 
the subject. For present purposes, the following formulation is appropriate: 
 
There cannot be two or more sufficient and independent causes of a single 
effect, except for cases of genuine overdetermination.107
 
Kim argues for this principle by showing that it has no counterexamples. The thrust of 
his argument is that when we consider putative cases of two causes of the same effect, 
then they are either insufficient, or dependent, or a case of ‘genuine 
overdetermination’. Here, in no particular order, and slightly altered for 
terminological consistency, are the central cases Kim considers: (i) The two causes 
jointly determine the effect, “as when a car crash is said to be caused by the driver’s 
careless braking and the icy condition of the road.”108 But in this case neither cause 
alone would be sufficient for the effect – rather, each is a partial cause of it. This is 
not in conflict with the exclusion principle, as it denies only the possibility of distinct 
sufficient causes of a single effect. Case (ii): the “two” causes are really one cause, 
hence clearly not independent from “each other”. Case (iii): one cause is 
synchronically sufficient for the other.109 This will be the case, as we have seen, when 
(for instance) a fluid heats up its container in virtue of a succession of molecular 
collisions with the container in which the molecules transfer their energy to it, and in 
virtue of its temperature (which, you may recall, is defined in terms of the average 
                                                 
106 Although Kim himself names it the ‘causal exclusion principle’, the principle, rather unfortunately, 
has nothing at all to do with Kim’s well-known causal exclusion argument, or the attendant problem of 
causal exclusion. I will say more about this at the end of this section, and examine the causal exclusion 
argument in detail in chapter 5. 
107 See his [1989a] for this statement of the principle, and the details of the argument that follows; and 
see also his [1998] pp.64-5 for an enumeration of the possible counterexamples. I have replaced Kim’s 
usage of ‘complete’ with ‘sufficient’, due to my earlier appeal to ‘complete’ causes in defining CP. The 
point that Kim appeals to the absence of counterexamples to justify the exclusion principle is due to 
Marras, and is well made in his [1998]. 
108 Kim [1989b] p.254. 
109 Kim frames this case in terms of supervenience rather than sufficiency. See my discussion in 1.4 for 
details of the connection between these two relations. 
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molecular kinetic energy). These two causes, although distinct and each causally 
sufficient for the heating, are clearly not independent, for the aggregate of the 
molecules and their velocities is sufficient for the temperature of the gas, and the 
temperature of the gas is nothing over and above (and so depends on) the molecules 
and their velocities. Case (iv): there is a causal relationship between the two causes. In 
the double assassination case, as we have seen, the two bullets are effects of a 
common cause, hence not independent. Other causal relations are possible here – one 
cause might cause the other, for instance. This licenses two further possibilities. 
Either the two causes are successive links in a causal chain leading to the effect, or 
else one cause simultaneously causes the other, and both then cause the effect at the 
same time. In none of these cases are the two causes independent. Case (v): This is a 
case of genuine overdetermination. We have to understand ‘genuine’ here as 
‘coincidental’. I am not sure that Kim would agree; no matter, for my purposes, 
genuine overdetermination is the nasty sort that, if it happens at all, is extremely rare 
due to the absurdity of widespread coincidence. The ‘unless’ clause in the principle 
explicitly exempts it from application to such cases. 
 
I do not know how to prove that there are no further cases, but I can’t think of any. 
So, the principle as stated has no counterexamples. Notice, however, that in 
exempting itself from application to cases of ‘genuine overdetermination’, the 
principle (provided there are no further cases) is a tautology! That is, the manner in 
which we have understood the (admittedly rare) cases of genuine overdetermination 
just is in terms of two distinct, independent causes are simultaneously sufficient for a 
given effect. What’s strange about the assassin case that cries out for explanation just 
is that the two appear to be independent, sufficient, simultaneous causes of the same 
effect. But now the principle says nothing. Kim, it seems, agrees: in his [2003], Kim 
acknowledges that the principle, stated in the above manner, is analytic! The 
analyticity is easily remedied, however, for the proposition that genuine 
overdetermination is extremely rare is not analytic. The conjunction of this 
proposition with the exclusion principle means we can replace the ‘unless’ clause with 
the usual ‘ceteris paribus’. But which of the cases is appropriate in the case of 
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apparent overdetermination by the mental and physical events that cause our bodies to 
move? 
 
Of the five possibilities mooted, arguably only (ii) and (iii) will do the trick. Case (i) 
is ruled out by CP, for that principle (which we are assuming true) tells us that all 
physical events have sufficient physical causes. Case (v) is ruled out, as the co-
occurrence of mental and physical sufficient causes is not rare at all, but happens all 
the time. Case (iv), on the other hand, is more tricky. Suppose neurophysiological 
events cause mental events, and both these events then cause a given bodily 
movement. Since there is no principled limit to how small the interval between your 
making a decision and acting on that decision can be, it follows that if both these 
causes are to precede their effects, the neurophysiological event and the mental event 
must be simultaneous. It is difficult to rule out simultaneous causation, as I mentioned 
in 1.4. There, you will recall, I argued that synchronic causal sufficiency does not 
satisfy our definition of synchronic sufficiency. However, it is one thing to distinguish 
causal from non-causal synchronic sufficiency, and quite another to argue that the 
former does not occur. Here is an (admittedly inconclusive) argument to the effect 
that simultaneous causation is not appropriate as an explanation of the co-occurrence 
of mental and physical causes. 
 
As I argued in 1.4, it must be possible for causes to fail to have their effects. All sorts 
of things can get in the way of a causal relation. So how come my behaviours always 
have mental causes? Of course, there are bodily movements, like twitches, that lack 
mental causes. But these are not behaviours. The point is this: if CP is true, then my 
behaviours will have physical causes. But if the relationship between the physical 
causes and the mental causes is causal, then how come we don’t see more cases of 
psychologically uncaused bodily movements that nonetheless look just like 
behaviours? It should be possible, if the relationship between mental and physical is 
causal, for the physical causes of my behaviours to cause them without causing the 
mental causes, but we don’t observe the sort of irrationality that this possibility 
licenses. So the evidence suggests that the relationship between mind and body can’t 
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be causal. This argument is inconclusive, as I said, for nothing in it prevents a 
proponent of the simultaneous causation theory insisting that the causation of the 
mental by the physical is strict. Nonetheless, I will continue as if (iv) is not an option, 
given the widespread co-occurrence of mental and physical causes of behaviour. If 
these remarks are correct, then OD tells us that two events or properties causally 
sufficient for the same effect are either identical or related by (non-causal) 
sufficiency. Now as I defined sufficiency in 1.4, identity is a limiting case. We may 
therefore state OD as follows: 
 
OD: if an event y has a sufficient cause x at t, then no event x’ is a cause of 
y at t unless (i) x is sufficient for x’, or (ii) x’ is sufficient for x. 
 
We include the qualifier ‘at t’ for obvious reasons: without it, the principle is false, for 
events will have many sufficient causes given the transitivity of causation. An 
obvious objection. As formulated, OD may seem unsupported by the arguments given. 
Those arguments, after all, surely only rule out independent causes each of which is 
sufficient? But in the above formulation, I make the stronger claim that if there is one 
sufficient cause of an effect, then any other cause of it can not be independent of the 
first cause. Surely, the objector continues, OD should be formulated like this: 
 
OD2:  If an event y has a sufficient cause x at t, then no event x’ is a sufficient 
cause of y at t unless (i) x is sufficient for x’, or (ii) x’ is sufficient for 
x. 
 
It is with good reason that I prefer OD to OD2 – if the causal argument is formulated in 
terms of OD2, it faces obvious objections. The problem is that with OD2, EM must take 
up the slack – that is, we must now claim not just that mental events cause physical 
events, but that mental events are sufficient causes of physical events, for otherwise 
OD2 will not apply and the argument will be invalid. On the other hand, it is far from 
clear that EM strengthened in this way is true. I will not get drawn into arguing the 
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point either way. This is because in fact, the stronger OD is every bit as well supported 
by the arguments given as OD2 is. Allow me to explain. 
 
The important thing to notice is that given CP, whatever causal role the mental has 
will be such that unless the mental and physical causes are not independent, we are 
left with coincidences of an unacceptable sort. Consider again the two assassins, but 
this time suppose that one of them has a gun loaded with rubber bullets. The causal 
role of this assassin is that he makes the victim’s death slightly more probable – there 
is a non-zero probability that the victim would die as a result of the impact of the 
rubber bullet in the absence of the other assassin’s bullet. Crucially, we still require 
an explanation of why there are these two independent causes, despite the fact that 
they do not have the same causal potency with respect to the specified effect. The 
explanation might be that the assassins agreed beforehand that neither of them ought 
to know which one fired the fatal shot – firing squads are set up this way as a matter 
of course. The central point here is that the overdetermination problem that licenses 
OD does not consist in both causes being sufficient – rather, the worry is that given 
that one of the causes is sufficient, then whatever the other one is doing, unless there 
is an explanation of why it is doing it, we have a coincidence. We can make the point 
more dramatically: Suppose, just as the assassin’s bullet strikes, a clown rides up to 
the victim on a monocycle and shouts “sausages”. There is a non-zero probability that 
the victim (killed, we may assume, by the  bullet) would die of a heart attack even in 
the absence of the bullet. If that sort of thing happens all the time, then it stands no 
less in need of explanation than more conventional constructions where the clown is 
replaced by another assassin. The fundamental things apply: if a sufficient cause of 
some effect is always accompanied by another cause of a different type, but a cause of 
the same effect nonetheless, then the two causes cannot, on pain of widespread 
coincidence, be independent. Of course, if they fail to be independent in virtue of 
being identical, then both causes will be sufficient. But in cases where one cause is 
causally sufficient for the effect and non-causally sufficient for the other cause, OD 
leaves open the possibility that the causal roles of the properties differ. 
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Before proceeding, I want to clear up a few misunderstandings that might arise. In the 
literature, it is a commonplace that distinct and unrelated notions of overdetermination 
are run together. Kim distinguishes the different notions, but often speaks as if they 
were more of less equivalent. In his [1993b] he asks us to consider a case in which a 
supervenient mental property M causes the instantiation of another supervenient 
mental property M*, where M is subvened by P, and M* by P*, and P causes P*.110 
Kim argues that the only way for M to cause M* is by causing P*, which we may 
grant him for now. Kim’s asks ‘whether M should be given a distinct causal role in 
this situation’, and answers in the negative, thus: 
 
First, there is the good old principle of simplicity: we can make do with P as 
P*’s cause, so why bother with M?…Moreover, if we insist on M as a cause of 
P, we run afoul of another serious difficulty, “the problem of causal-
explanatory exclusion”. For we would be allowing two distinct sufficient 
causes…of a single event. This makes the situation look like one of causal 
overdetermination, which is absurd…The exclusion problem, then, is this: 
Given that P is a sufficient cause of P*, how could M also be a cause…of P*? 
What causal work is left over for M, or any other mental property, to do?111
 
There are three separate strands in this passage, which really ought to be kept apart. 
The first strand involves is an appeal to the familiar epistemic principle known as 
‘Ockham’s Razor’: that we should not multiply entities beyond what is necessary to 
account for the phenomena. But this is no mere ‘principle of simplicity’ – when Kim 
says we can ‘make do with P as P*’s cause’ he means that given that P is sufficient 
for P*, we don’t need any further entities in order to account for the occurrence 
(/instantiation) of P*. Unless supervenient properties add something to the world that 
isn’t already there in virtue of their subvening properties, then they are somehow 
redundant, and we may dispense with them. Something like this principle underpins 
just about all our theorising; however, the principle is very difficult to define. If CP is 
true, then physics will presumably account for all the phenomena; does that make all 
                                                 
110 For Kim, there is no important difference between talking of events as causes, and talking of 
properties as causes, and he uses the two interchangeably. I do not think that anything much hangs on 
this terminology, provided it is understood that the properties in question are causes in the sense that 
they are the constitutive properties of efficacious events. 
111 See Kim [1993b] p.354. 
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properties not required to express completed physics redundant? In one sense, it does. 
We will look at redundancy arguments in chapter 6.2, where I will distinguish two 
ways (‘singular’ and ‘general’) in which a property can exhibit novelty, and argue that 
a property is redundant only if it is not novel in either sense. Given CP, it follows (by 
the definitions I will give) that supervenient properties lack singular novelty; it is 
much harder to argue that they are redundant. 
 
The second strand in the passage is the coincidence problem. Confusingly, Kim goes 
on to mention the ‘problem of causal-explanatory exclusion’, which he links to the 
absurdity of overdetermination. He does not say what he takes overdetermination to 
be, nor why it is absurd, but it seems clear it can’t have anything to do with 
explanation – if it did, why would we need Ockham’s Razor? Surely that principle is 
needed precisely because multiple causal explanations of the same phenomena do 
make sense. What rules out a second causal explanation of a given effect is not that, 
given the first explanation, it is absurd, but that it is (arguably) otiose. As we have 
seen, the absurdity of cases (like the one where two assassins shoot the same person) 
of overdetermination is that they seem to involve coincidences, which nobody likes. 
Of course, isolated coincidences are not absurd at all – if anything is absurd here, it is 
the supposition that such coincidences happen all the time. However, it is clearly no 
coincidence, in the example Kim describes, that two events that stand in a 
supervenience (sufficiency) relation occur at the same time. But now, obviously, there 
is nothing coincidental about the overdetermination that happens in the case of 
supervenient causation!112
 
The third strand I want to distinguish in the quoted passage is the thought that “after” 
P has done its “causal work”, there is nothing left over for M to do.  The causal work 
                                                 
112 This point is well made by several authors. For instance, Loewer [2001b] terms this sort of 
overdetermination ‘dependent’ as opposed to ‘independent’, and rightly maintains that only widespread 
overdetermination of the latter sort is problematic on grounds of widespread coincidence. Sider [2003] 
makes a similar distinction, but calls dependent overdetermination ‘systematic’; he too rightly 
maintains that there is nothing absurd in supposing such overdetermination to be widespread. And 
Funkhouser [2002] draw the same distinction by distinguishing independent (coincidental) from 
‘incorporating’ overdetermination. 
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to be done presumably involves something like pushing and pulling the various bits 
and pieces until they are so structured that P* is instantiated. If you want to build a 
wall, your work will involve cutting and moving bricks, mixing cement, laying bricks, 
and other tasks. If it overwhelmingly plausible that at least some cases of causation 
involve causal work – causing something involves making something happen, and if 
you want to do that, you have to be prepared to work at it. Now if causes are 
responsible for doing this causal work, then it does seem hugely plausible, given that 
P is sufficient for P*, that there isn’t really anything left for M to do. For surely no 
part of the causal work involved in causation is done twice? This, as Kim says, is the 
causal exclusion problem. But notice, as I said above, that this problem has nothing at 
all to do with the causal exclusion principle, for as saw, that principle is concerned 
with coincidences and not causal work. We examine the causal exclusion problem in 
chapter 5. 
 
As far as I can make out, just about every philosopher who has expressed a worry that 
the efficacy of mental or other properties seems to be ‘screened off’ or excluded by 
the physical has had in mind one or more of the three problems briefly characterised 
above. Sider agrees, and thinks that something very much like these three problems 
must represent the central concerns of those who worry about overdetermination.113 
Sider calls the three worries epistemic, coincidence and metaphysical, and they are 
exactly analogous to the three problems detailed above. There may something else 
that is bad about effects that have two causes, which may be the true ground of the 
worries about mental causation – Sider speaks of a “phantom fourth reason”, but he, 
like me, is unable to see what it could be. Now it is possible to run arguments for 
physicalism based on any of the above conceptions of overdetermination, and Kim 
does exactly that. However, as Kim understands them at least, the arguments based on 
redundancy and causal exclusion are arguments for type identity. In fact (and the 
quoted passage is a case in point) Kim most often deploys these arguments not as 
arguments for type identity physicalism, but as arguments against supervenience 
                                                 
113 In his [2003]. 
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physicalism. Kim’s strategy in deploying them is to start with the strongest form of 
non-identity relation between mental and physical properties (for which purpose he 
enlists his own strong supervenience) and show that even if this relation obtains, 
mental properties are either inefficacious or redundant. The exclusion argument 
purports to show if mental properties supervene on physical properties, there is no 
way to account for the efficacy of mental events, as there is no causal work left for 
them to do given their supervenience bases. Physical properties do all the causal 
work, and only properties identical to them are genuinely efficacious. This argument 
is the subject of chapter 5. The redundancy argument purports to show that if mental 
properties supervene on physical properties, then they do not have genuinely novel 
causal powers, and anything they causally explain can be explained just as well by 
their base properties. Only physical properties have genuine explanatory novelty, and 
any properties not identical to them will be redundant. We will examine this argument 
in 6.2. For my part, I think that the redundancy argument is much easier to resist than 
the exclusion argument – that’s why the latter gets a full chapter, the former only a 
section. For the moment, notice that both these arguments, in pushing physicalism 
towards type identities, are the sorts of arguments most physicalists would spend their 
time resisting rather than defending. Multiple realization is the consensus view, and as 
we saw in 2.3, you can get into an awful mess if you try to combine multiple 
realization with type identity. Physicalism should be neutral between the various 
possible metaphysics of mind, and should certainly not entail eliminativism; as such, 
physicalism demands an argument that establishes supervenience rather than identity. 
That is why, in formulating the causal argument, we shall ignore the redundancy and 
exclusion problems, and see if the coincidence-based principle formulated above is 
enough to give us the kind supervenience we want. 
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3.4. How the causal argument works 
Before we formulate the argument, a quick note is in order to resolve an issue that 
arises from the way in which I have defined OD. Recall the definition that I gave 
above: 
 
OD: If an event y has a sufficient cause x at t, then no event x’ is a cause of 
y at t unless (i) x is sufficient for x’, or (ii) x’ is sufficient for x. 
 
Now suppose x’ is a mental event and x is a physical event. This definition leaves 
open the possibility that the mental cause is sufficient for the physical cause without 
them being identical. This is the position, of course, of idealists such as Berkeley. 
Berkeley thought that we perceive only ideas – we are never aware of anything 
outside our own mental lives. However, we clearly perceive ordinary objects – it 
follows that ordinary objects are ideas. It is not difficult to respond to this sort of 
argument, as it seems to clearly equivocate between direct and indirect perception. It 
is only plausible that we only perceive ideas if perception is understood in a direct, 
immediate sense. But then it is scarcely plausible that we are aware of ordinary 
objects in the same way. A similar position was once endorsed by Russell, who also 
thought that the traditional view of the relationship between the material and the 
mental got it backwards.114 He thought this on epistemological grounds: (i) we know 
quite a lot about material objects, (ii) certainty is necessary for knowledge, (iii) we 
can only be certain of the objects of our acquaintance, i.e. ‘sense-data’, so (iv) 
knowledge about material objects is really knowledge about sense-data. It’s true that 
Russell treats sense-data as objective, intersubjectively available entities; however, 
this is arguably just a mistake. To the extent that they are intersubjective, it is unclear 
how our knowledge of them can be any more certain than our knowledge of material 
objects, for I should then have to know about everyone else’s sense-data in order to be 
acquainted with an object. However, I am acquainted only with my own sense data; 
from this it follows that I am not acquainted with material objects. But once this much 
                                                 
114 Russell [1917]. 
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is allowed, the epistemological motivations for positing sense-data evaporate, and we 
might as well stick with an ontology of mind-independent objects.  In what follows I 
take it that the reasons for rejecting idealism, phenomenalism, and other doctrines that 
proclaim the ontological priority of the mental over the physical, are well understood. 
Having said that, it is far from clear to me that the majority of what I have to say 
would fail to apply, mutatis mutandis, if such a doctrine were true. Given the 
ontological priority of the physical, however, we may rule out the sufficiency of the 
mental for the physical. Call the priority claim OP, and define it as the claim that 
unless the mental and physical events are identical, the mental ones are never 
sufficient for the physical ones. 
 
We can now generate the following causal argument for physicalism: 
 
EM: Mental events cause physical events. 
CP: Every physical event y that has a sufficient cause at t, has a complete, 
sufficient physical cause x at t. 
OD: If an event y has a sufficient cause x at t, then no event x’ is a cause of 
y at t unless (i) x is sufficient for x’, or (ii) x’ is sufficient for x. 
OP: Mental events are not sufficient for physical events unless mental and 
physical events are identical. 
∴ Physical events are sufficient for mental events. 
 
The situation can be depicted like this: 
 
[y,M,t] 
[x,P,t] 
[z,E,t+] 
 
 
 
 
 
EM fills in the causal arrow from mental event [y,M,t] to physical effect [z,E,t+]; CP 
fills in the arrow from physical event [x,P,t] to [z,E,t+]; and OD fills in the sufficiency 
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arrow from to [x,P,t] to [y,M,t]. There are many diagrams similar to the one above in 
what follows; the convention I follow throughout is that single arrows indicate 
causation, and double (vertical) arrows indicate synchronic sufficiency. In addition, 
my diagrams will always depict relationships between instances of properties (i.e. 
events), and not the properties themselves. 
 
Now we have established that physical events are sufficient for mental events. It is 
worth quickly going over again how this is supposed to establish physicalism. Recall 
our definitions of physicalism in 1.2 (P6), and of sufficiency in 1.4: 
 
Physicalism is true just in case: 
  ∀u∀M∈M{M(u)→∀y∀z[W(z).I(y,z).C(y,u).Pw-(z,wa)→M(y)]} 
 
[x,P,t] is α-sufficient for [y,M,t] just in case: 
1. ∃w∃x[Wα(w).I(x,w).P(x)] 
2. ∀w∀x∀t{[Wα(w).I(x,w).P(x)t]→∃y[x*y.M(y)t]} 
 
Prima facie, they do not look too similar. However, as I explained in 1.4, and as we 
saw again in 2.2 in the context of functional reduction, establishing sufficiency will be 
enough to yield physicalist supervenience, provided Wα(x) = ‘x is a physically 
possible world’. The reasoning is relatively simple. If physical events are α-sufficient 
for mental events, then physical properties are α-sufficient for mental properties. Now 
if α-sufficiency is physical sufficiency, then follows immediately that a minimal 
physical duplicate of the actual world is a world in which my physically 
indistinguishable counterparts have the same mental properties as me. Since we can 
generalise the argument over any efficacious mental properties and any individuals, it 
follows that a minimal physical duplicate of the actual world is one in which all our 
counterparts have their efficacious mental properties. On the assumption that all 
actual mental events and properties are at least capable of causing physical events, 
physicalism as defined follows from the physical sufficiency of physical events for 
mental events. Before proceeding, a brief mention is in order of a possible problem 
 - 110 - 
posed by broad content for this argument. [x,P,t] above is the cause of a behavioural 
effect; as such, it seems that P must be an intrinsic property, and not the sort of 
relational feature that externalists standardly hold to determine content. But if this is 
true, then [x,P,t] will not be sufficient for [y,M,t], as it does not include certain 
determinants of M’s content. I will give two brief replies. First, externalists typically 
do not want their externalism to preclude EM; as such, they typically endorse theories 
of causation according to which the extrinsic properties of an individual make a 
difference to its causal powers. But if this is true, then there is no reason why P should 
not be extrinsic, as well as M. Second, if causal efficacy is limited to intrinsic 
properties, then [x,P,t] will be sufficient for the efficacious part of [y,M,t]. The 
missing part (M’s content) should not worry a physicalist, for if externalism is true, 
then this part will involve relations to the believer’s physical or social environment. 
Adding in, say, causal covariance with a natural kind, to [y,M,t] adds to it only extra 
physical properties. This being so, we can rest content with establishing physicalism 
about M’s efficacious part, and let broad content take care of itself. 
 
The position we are in is this: if the causal argument establishes that physical events 
are physically sufficient for mental events, then it establishes physicalism. Still, there 
is a question mark over the validity of the argument. The trouble is that the theoretical 
work that sufficiency does in the causal argument consists in rendering the co-
occurrence of mental and physical causes non-coincidental. Problematically for 
proponents of the causal argument, nothing forces the view that the sufficiency must 
be as strong as physical sufficiency in order to do this work. The central question, 
then, is this: is there a form of non-causal sufficiency consistent with the premises of 
the causal argument, but inconsistent with physicalism? If there is, then the argument 
is invalid. Forms of sufficiency weaker than physical sufficiency are easy to come by. 
For instance, if certain forms of emergentism are true, then there are extra, non-
physical, laws according to which physical properties are sufficient mental properties. 
Now if that is so, then in our definition of sufficiency Wα(x) = x is a nomologically 
possible world. From this, however, we can’t infer physicalism, as minimal physical 
duplicates of nomologically possible worlds fail to duplicate the extra laws. However, 
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it is no easy task to define an emergentist position that is consistent with the premises 
of the causal argument. We take up this task in chapter 6. For now, notice that the 
causal argument establishes (at least) the falsity of Cartesian substance dualism. For if 
I am right about the nature of non-causal sufficiency, then the view that physical 
events are sufficient for mental events entails that the constitutive objects of mental 
events have only physical parts. Notice also that even if it turns out that we can only 
establish nomological sufficiency, we will still be able to infer that the mental is 
nothing over and above “the natural”. We might define a predicate Nw-(x,y) = x is a 
minimal natural duplicate of y. If we replace Pw-(z,wa) with Nw-(z,wa) in the above 
definition of physicalism, we get a position we could reasonably term ‘metaphysical 
naturalism’ – that the mental is nothing over and above “the natural”. And this is a 
position we can infer from nomological sufficiency, as this form of sufficiency by 
definition ranges over all possible worlds with the same laws of nature as the actual 
world. 
 
Before proceeding to examine weaker forms of sufficiency, however, there are two 
arguments that demand discussion. The first, which we discuss in the next chapter, is 
due to Scott Sturgeon, who argues that the causal argument doesn’t establish anything 
at all, due to equivocation on the sense of ‘physical’. Clearly if this is true, then there 
is no need to worry about whether or not the causal argument establishes a form of 
sufficiency from which we can infer physicalism; if Sturgeon is right, then a fortiori it 
does not. The second, due largely to Kim, but endorsed, in one way or another, by 
many others, is the ‘causal exclusion argument’ to the effect that the only position 
consistent (on reasonable assumption) with the premises of the causal argument is 
identity. If Kim is right, then again we have no need to worry about whether the form 
of sufficiency the causal argument establishes is one from which physicalism can be 
inferred, for any putatively non-physicalist forms of sufficiency will be ruled out, 
along with any physicalist forms of sufficiency other than identity. We discuss the 
exclusion problem is chapter 5. We will find neither Sturgeon’s argument nor Kim’s 
argument compelling, and return in chapter 6 to the question whether there is a non-
physicalist form of sufficiency consistent with the premises of the causal argument. 
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4. Does the Causal Argument Equivocate? 
Sturgeon argues that the causal argument equivocates on the on the sense of 
‘physical’.115 EM, he suggests, is true for macrophysical effects; but CP is true only for 
microphysical effects. In order to prevent equivocation, Sturgeon claims, physicalists 
need to endorse causal ‘transmission principles’ to push causal efficacy around 
between the macro and micro levels. Without such ‘pushing around’ of causation, 
there is no competition between mental and physical causes. He goes on to argue that 
the principles are unsupported, due to the weirdness of quantum mechanics. But 
without causal competition, there is no causal argument, as our diagram of 3.4 
suggests. In this chapter, we will first see why Sturgeon thinks the causal argument 
needs transmission principles, and formulate the principles needed. In 4.2, I examine 
Sturgeon’s argument against transmission principles, and show that it fails. I find the 
argument obscure, and so am unconvinced that I have Sturgeon right. In 4.3, I give 
my own reasons for doubting causal transmission. My reasons are not conclusive, but 
they are good reasons for thinking that whether the principles are true or not, 
proponents of the causal argument would be well advised not to rely on them. And 
finally, in 4.4, we will see why, despite all this, the causal argument does not need the 
principles (or anything like them) in the first place. 
 
4.1. Equivocation and transmission principles 
Refer back to the causal diagram in 3.4. It depicts a mental and physical cause, 
competing for efficacy with respect to a single physical event. This is because OD is 
explicitly stated in terms of multiple distinct causes of a single effect. In 3.3, we 
motivated OD by reference to double assassination cases – without some form of 
collusion between the assassins, the fact that both assassins cause the death would be 
a coincidence. The way we have set up the argument, then, seems to require that the 
mental and physical causes are both efficacious with respect to the same effect.116 But 
now, as Sturgeon notes, there is a problem. EM claims that mental events cause 
                                                 
115 Sturgeon [1998]. 
116 This is exactly what I will deny in 4.4. I will also, correspondingly, offer a reformulation of OD. 
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physical events, but the sense intended in here is that of ‘broadly physical’. Mental 
events cause things like arm-movements, muscle contractions, and so on. CP claims 
that all physical events with sufficient causes have complete, sufficient physical 
causes. However, if we read the sense of ‘physical’ in CP as ‘broadly physical’, then it 
is unsupported. The evidence for CP does not justify the claim that all broadly 
physical effects have broadly physical causes. Indeed, it seems clear that some 
broadly physical events lack broadly physical causes – think for example of a nuclear 
explosion caused by the radioactive decay of a Uranium atom. The ‘physics’ in ‘the 
completeness of physics’ is PHYSICS, not folk-physics. And if the arguments of 3.2 
are correct, and there is an inductive connection between current physics and 
PHYSICS, then it seems just as clear that future theory will not contain arm-
movements as it does that future theory will not contain mental forces. Sturgeon goes 
further, and claims that it is the basic physical level that is complete, equating this 
level with quantum mechanics. I disagree on both counts, First, quantum mechanics is 
not complete. Second, there is no reason to suppose that PHYSICS will occupy a 
single level in the micro-macro hierarchy. The claim that PHYSICS won’t involve 
macro events like bodily movements and earthquakes is one thing; the claim that it 
will involve only the entities of a ‘fundamental micro level’ goes well beyond 
anything the evidence might support.117 No matter; the appeal to fundamentalism is 
not needed to motivate the problem Sturgeon raises. The central point is that if we 
read the sense of ‘physical’ in EM as PHYSICAL, then it too is unsupported by the 
phenomena: we observe constant conjunction between mental events and arm-
movements, not accelerations of basic physical particulars, or fluctuations in 
electromagnetic fields. It is no part of either folk-psychology or folk-physics that the 
mind can influence the quantum world. 
 
Whence a problem. There is no apparent causal competition, if mental events have 
broadly physical effects, but the domain of the broadly physical is incomplete; and if 
PHYSICS is causally complete, but the mind does not have PHYSICAL effects. An 
                                                 
117 See Schaffer [2003] for convincing arguments to the effect that there is no current evidence in 
support of the view that a fundamental level even exists, let alone that a causally complete one does. 
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obvious response (the one Sturgeon wants us to give) is that the macrophysical and 
microphysical domains are metaphysically related to each other. There is a variety of 
relations to choose from. Big events like earthquakes are certainly composed of 
smaller events; and the small events taken together as aggregates are sufficient for the 
big events.118 Now let C be the mental cause of some ordinary physical event E; and 
let m(E) be the microphysical cause of the microphysical events m(E) that compose E. 
We may depict the situation thus: 
 
C E 
m(C) m(E) 
Physicalism? Composition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We want to establish the physicalism about C via causal competition between C and 
m(C) for some effect. But C causes a behaviour E, while m(C) causes not E but the 
microphysical events m(E) that compose E. This is what we need transmission 
principles for – they fill in the dotted causal arrows, generating the required 
competition. Sturgeon considers composition as a candidate relation. 
 
1. Causal transmission under upward composition 
If an event m(C) causes an event m(E), and m(E) composes E, then m(C) 
causes E.  Under this principle, if behaviours are composed of quantum 
events, and these latter have quantum causes, then so too do behaviours. This 
generates conflict with the efficacy of the mental with respect to behaviours. 
 
                                                 
118 I omit supervenience in what follows for the reasons detailed in 1.4. I do not think that 
supervenience is appropriate to characterise noncausal relationships between particulars – rather, as I 
explained, I prefer to think of the matter in terms of sufficiency, which is of course intimately related to 
supervenience. 
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2. Causal transmission under downward composition 
If an event C causes an event E, and E is composed by E*, then C causes E*. 
This principle has the consequence, again if behaviours are composed by 
quantum events, that some quantum events have mental events as causes. 
Once again we have the required competition. 
 
Principle (1) fills in the dotted causal arrow from m(C) to E, in which case C and 
m(C) are in competition for E; principle (2) fills in the downwards arrow from C to 
m(E), bringing C and m(C) into competition for m(E). Sturgeon’s strategy is to create 
problems for the principles, by arguing that (i) there are certain composition relations 
between m(E) and E such that the principles fail, and (ii) because there is a conceptual 
gap between basic microphysical (quantum) reality and macro (broadly physical) 
reality (largely due to the strangeness of quantum physical stuff compared to broadly 
physical stuff), we don’t know whether the relation that holds between basic physics 
and behaviour is of the right sort. Therefore, we don’t know whether the principles are 
true in the required cases, and so we shouldn’t endorse the causal argument. 
 
Notice at this point that this argument need not trouble proponents of non-mentalism. 
This is because there is a range of uncontroversially non-mental effects that can take 
the place of E in the above diagram. For instance, it is part of our common-sense 
world view that mental events cause houses to be built. But houses are clearly non-
mental events. So if you think that the non-mental is complete (as you ought to if you 
accept the non-triviality argument of section 3.2) then the non-mental cause of E will 
be non-causally sufficient for C.119 And from this we can infer non-mentalism about 
the mind, without having to worry about what goes on in any micro domain. As I 
argued in 3.2, however, non-mentalism is a poor substitute for physicalism proper. If 
this much is granted, then a reply to Sturgeon is clearly preferable to abandoning 
physicalism in favour of non-mentalism. In the next section, we will consider what I 
                                                 
119 As such, nothing in Sturgeon [1998] will cause problems for Spurrett and Papineau [1999]. 
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take to be Sturgeon’s argument against the transmission principles, and find that it 
fails. 
 
4.2. Sturgeon’s argument against transmission 
Sturgeon points out that certain constraints must be placed on the so far undefined 
notion of ‘composition’ if the transmission principles are to come out true. For the 
sake of argument, Sturgeon says, let the composition relation in question be that of 
partial mereological constitution – some parts of the behaviour are quantum events. 
Imagine someone becomes hungry and so grasps an apple; at the same time, a random 
chemical reaction occurs in their brain that causes their little finger to twitch. The 
twitch by the present definition composes the grasp, and yet the chemical reaction 
does not cause the grasp, hunger does. Hence a counterexample to (1). And according 
to the present definition, the grasp is composed by the twitch, and yet hunger does not 
cause the twitch, the chemical reaction does. Hence a counterexample to (2). Partial 
mereological constitution won’t do, but why not? Intuitively, the answer seems to be 
that the twitch is somehow inessential to the grasp, and Sturgeon follows this intuition 
to the ‘Cause and Essence Principle’, which states that: 
 
C causes E iff C is sufficient to bring about what is essential to E. 
 
This principle will clearly place constraints on the kind of composition relations that 
will satisfy the transmission principles. It rules out partial mereological constitution 
for obvious reasons – in the upwards case, for instance, the chemical reaction fails to 
cause the grasp just because it is not sufficient to bring about what is essential to the 
grasp. The only candidate it causes is a twitch, which is ‘inessential’. 
 
It is unclear to me exactly what work the appeal to essentialism is supposed to be 
doing in Sturgeon’s argument; what follows is at best a reconstruction, one that I hope 
comes close to what Sturgeon intends. In general, let us grant that token events whose 
parts are other events possess some of those parts essentially, others inessentially. 
What is essential to an arm-movement, say? Sturgeon claims we know a priori that 
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‘[t]he essence of hand movements consists in sub-hand movements.’120 This is true, 
strictly speaking, only under the assumption that everyday things are composed of 
parts, and that’s an empirical matter. Still, that arm movements are composed of arm-
part movements is somehow less empirical than that that they are composed of 
muscle-and-bone movements, say. That represents a theory about what arm parts 
actually are. There’s a conceptual gap between muscle-talk and arm-talk, which is 
closed by a combination of (relatively-conceptual) analysis and empirical theory. 
Now this is very close to the functional reduction procedure we examined in chapter 
2. What matters here – what closes the conceptual gap – is a theory that explains how 
it is that muscles and bones get to play the causal roles that characterise arm parts. So: 
(i) it’s essential to an arm movement that the parts of an arm move; (ii) in the actual 
world, these parts are muscles and bones and other stuff that I don’t know about. Now 
Sturgeon seems to want to infer from (i) and (ii) that token muscle and bone 
movements are essential to (actual) token arm movements. This seems right – if it is 
true that all actual arm-parts are muscles and bones, then it will be true of actual token 
arm movements that they could not have occurred without muscle and bone 
movements. In the case of the grasp described above, I think we may say with some 
confidence that the very same token grasp could have occurred without the twitch. 
But the grasp is also composed of muscle and bone movements, and however robust it 
is, it will presumably not be so robust that it (this very same token grasp) could have 
occurred without any of the token muscle and bone movements that actually compose 
it. The central point is this: the reduction of arm-movements to physiology tells us the 
essence of arm-movements. And this in turn means we can be confident about 
pushing causation around between muscle movements and arm-movements. However, 
Sturgeon claims, the same is not true in the case of the relationship between quantum 
events and macro events in general. Why not? 
 
Sturgeon’s argument, in a nutshell, is this: since there is a “yawning conceptual gap” 
between quantum reality and macro reality, we do not know whether or not the 
                                                 
120 Sturgeon [1998] p.422 
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composition relation that obtains between these domains is such as to satisfy the cause 
and essence principle. But it is unclear what particular gap in our knowledge of the 
quantum world is driving the doubt. Presumably we have already finished the a priori 
part that Sturgeon envisages for conceptual gap-closing; let’s say that macro object 
parts are essential to macro objects. What we lack in the case of quantum mechanics, I 
suggest, is the empirical bit that explains how it is that quantum events compose 
macro events. Sturgeon seems to be worrying about the ‘measurement problem’ here. 
In a (very small) nutshell, here is how it goes. Quantum theory has two elements, 
which seem to be in conflict with each other. They are: (i) equations that describe the 
dynamic evolution of quantum systems, and (ii) the ‘collapse postulate’ according to 
which some of the properties ascribed in (i) disappear when a measurement is made. 
Now (i) has enjoyed huge predictive success, and (ii) is ad hoc. But (ii) is needed 
precisely because the properties ascribed in (i) are not the sort of properties we ever 
observe. For instance, (i) ascribes ‘superposition states’ to quantum particles, in which 
– to a degree specified in the theory – they have both of two incompatible properties, 
such as ‘spin-up’ and ‘spin-down’. When we measure them, however, we find that 
they have – determinately – one property or the other. What is really odd is that the 
degrees assigned in (i) turn out to be highly accurate predictive indicators of the 
frequency with which we observe each property. If we take the mathematical 
formalism of quantum mechanics at face value, it entails that when you measure 
whether a superposed particle is spin-up or spin-down, the measurement system, 
including experimenter and apparatus, become ‘entangled’ with the quantum state. 
That is, we get a new quantum system – an ‘experimenter-apparatus-particle’ system 
– which is a superposition state of the two classical systems ‘experimenter-observing-
spin-up’ and ‘experimenter-observing-spin-down’. Needless to say, this theory does 
not sit well with what experience tells us about such situations. The collapse postulate 
says that something happens when a measurement is made that forces the quantum 
world to give up its inherent oddness and fit in with the macro stuff, according to 
which the particle has one spin or the other, and to no degree both. The trouble is that 
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there is no explanation of what is so special about measurement, compared to the 
other interactions that quantum particles take part in.121 Why on earth should quantum 
particles behave like classical particles just when they are being measured, if quantum 
theory is right that they behave non-classically at all other times? Suffice it to say that 
there is no agreed solution to this problem. This, I take it, is pretty much what 
Sturgeon has in mind when he speaks of ‘yawning conceptual gaps’ between quantum 
and macro reality. 
 
Why is any of this a problem for causal transmission? Sturgeon’s reply to Noordhof is 
illuminating.122 Here’s an example: 
 
It’s a fact of life that macro movements are composed of quantum phenomena. 
The conceptual gap precludes knowing whether the latter are essential to the 
former. By the Cause and Essence principle, we should resist [the upwards 
transmission of causation from quantum to macro events]. Since it’s unclear 
quantum phenomena are essential to macro movements, it’s unclear causes of 
the former thereby cause the latter. [Italics mine.] 
 
This is an epistemic point: the lack of a theory that explains how quantum events 
compose macro events (given the apparently inconsistent properties of quantum and 
macro phenomena, or so I assume) leaves open the possibility that quantum 
phenomena are to macro phenomena as twitches are to arm-movements. I am happy 
to grant Sturgeon his essentialist claims; if I seem to do so too freely, then it is only 
because there are completely irrelevant to his conclusion. A brief argument is in order 
to explain why. Suppose for the sake of argument that all members of a certain class 
of events – the class of bodily movements, say, for consistency of exposition – are 
maximally robust. By maximal robustness, I intend that such events do not have any 
                                                 
121 Some authors claim (as seems to me to be right) that there is nothing special about measurement, 
and that the collapse postulate is false. The burden of such a view is to explain away the apparent truth 
that the macro world does not contain superpositions of live and dead cats. See Papineau [1996] for 
such an explanation. Others, such as Wigner [1962] claim that interaction with conscious minds has an 
effect on quantum states that no quantum state can have – quantum physics, on such a view, is causally 
incomplete with respect to phenomenology. This view has few adherents. See Hughes [1992] 
(especially chapters 9 and 10) for discussion of how the measurement problem relates to the problem of 
reconciling the macro image with the odd properties of the quantum world. 
122 The passage below is quoted from Sturgeon’s [1999] response to Noordhof’s [1999a] reply to 
Sturgeon [1998]. 
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of their proper parts essentially. The token events that constitute my typing this paper, 
we will say, occur just the same at a world where my finger movements are composed 
not by muscles, bones and suchlike, but by jelly. It follows that at this world, muscles 
and bones ought to fail the test supplied by the cause and essence principle, as by 
hypothesis muscle and bone movements are not essential to arm movements. But in 
fact they pass the test. Why? Because causing an m(E) that is not essential to E is 
“sufficient to bring about what is essential to E”, provided m(E) is synchronically 
sufficient for E. If, at the actual world, muscle and bone movements are 
synchronically sufficient for arm-movements, then causing muscle and bone 
movements is sufficient to bring it about that arms move. It does not matter whether 
they are essential. Upshot: if you want to cause a composite event by causing the 
events that compose it, don’t waste your time worrying whether the events you cause 
are essential; worry instead whether they are sufficient. Consider the following 
transmission principle: 
 
3. Causal transmission under synchronic sufficiency 
If an event m(C) causes an event m(E), and m(E) is synchronically sufficient 
for E, then m(C) causes E. 
 
Now the cause and essence principle, far from generating problems for (3), actually 
entails it! For m(C) is causally sufficient for m(E), and m(E) is non-causally sufficient 
for E; E could hardly occur without “what is essential to it” and so m(C) is sufficient 
to bring about what is essential to E. But from this it follows, given the cause and 
essence principle, that the cause of m(E), in causing it, thereby causes E. 
 
The question remains, are quantum events sufficient for macro physical events? If 
they are, then it looks as though we can generate causal competition via something 
like (3). Witmer responds to Sturgeon along very similar lines. Here is the core of 
Witmer’s argument.123 Witmer argues that the downwards transmission principle (2) 
                                                 
123 See his [2000]. 
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is true under supervenience relations strong enough to license the ‘nothing over and 
above’-ness of the supervenient on the subvenient. His argument is that there is no 
way to cause dependent events like E other than by causing the events on which they 
depend, in our diagram, m(E). In other words, if E is nothing over and above m(E), 
how else could you cause E but by causing m(E)? Let us call this the ‘downwards 
transmission argument’, and let us grant Witmer the downwards transmission 
principle for the sake of argument.124 Let us also recast the matter in terms of 
sufficiency, rather than supervenience – this is a terminological matter, for 
sufficiency, as I have argued, is a form of ‘nothing-over-and-aboveness’. How are we 
to establish that m(E) is sufficient for E? Witmer appeals to our ability to intervene in 
the quantum world. He claims, in particular, that 
 
[O]ur knowledge of the theoretical-physical depends on experimentation. 
Passive observation is not enough; the sorts of hypotheses we test...are not 
liable to confirmed by [merely] observing the natural environment. Our 
knowledge...depends on an ability to manipulate the environment, 
including...the way the world is theoretical-physically.125 [Italics mine.] 
 
Put simply, we could not gain knowledge of the quantum world if we were not able to 
test hypotheses about the way the quantum world works, and in order to do that we 
need, inter alia, to set up initial quantum conditions and see if they evolve according 
to theory. Only the second part of this process is ‘mere observation’; the first, by its 
nature, involves manipulation. This seems correct, and if it is, then at least some 
ordinary physical events have quantum effects. Of course, we can’t manipulate the 
quantum world directly, but we can build machines to act as go-betweens. The clever 
thing about these machines is that they have buttons on them, which, when pressed, 
initiate causal chains that result in events like subatomic particles crashing into one 
another. Let such an event be ‘Pow!’. We can depict the situation like this:  
 
                                                 
124 In the next section we shall see that there are good reasons to resist transmission principles even if E 
is nothing over and above m(E). We return to the downwards transmission argument in our discussion 
of Kim’s ‘supervenience argument’ in 5.1. Kim appeals to downwards transmission to show that the 
causal efficacy of supervenient properties is inconsistent with the completeness of physics. The burden 
of chapter 5 is to show that his argument rests on a theory of causation that is demonstrably false. 
125 Witmer [2000] p.284. 
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 Pow! 
C E 
m(E) m(C) 
 
 
 
 
 
Causal competition for Pow! establishes (as in 3.4, on pain of coincidence) that m(E) 
is sufficient for (E). But if Witmer is right that the only way to cause a dependent 
event is to cause the events on which it depends, then we have further causal 
competition for m(E), which establishes, mutatis mutandis, that m(C) is sufficient for 
C. In the next section we shall see that there are good general grounds for avoiding 
the use of transmission principles if at all possible. In 4.4, we will see that there are 
two equally good reasons why the causal argument does not need them. 
 
4.3. Counterfactual theories of causation 
The upshot of 4.2 is that if our transmission principles fail, then it is thoroughly 
unclear what their failure has to do with conceptual gaps or the peculiarity of things 
quantum mechanical. At the end of his [1998], however, Sturgeon makes some 
remarks on causation and counterfactual dependency that are much more to the 
point.126 There he says that microphysical events and ordinary physical events may 
exhibit different patterns of “counterfactual activity”. Although actual microphysical 
events compose actual behaviours, they might come apart across possible worlds. 
Perhaps there are worlds at which this very same token behaviour occurs without the 
particular physical events that compose it at the actual world. But if causation depends 
on such patterns, then perhaps we do need to be careful about inter-level causal 
claims. The argument of this section turns Sturgeon’s ‘Cause and Essence’ argument 
on its head: Sturgeon’s problem for the transmission principles (as I understand it) is 
that we do not know whether quantum events are essential to macro events; the 
problem I raise will be that there is good reason to believe that at least some of them 
                                                 
126 pp.428-30. 
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are not. I will then argue that if certain counterfactual theories of causation are true, 
then differences in the essential properties of metaphysically related effects entails the 
falsity of the transmission principles. I do not endorse the counterfactual theories 
discussed. 
 
In what follows, we will consider the strongest form of non-identity we have to hand, 
viz. metaphysically necessary synchronic sufficiency. If the transmission principles 
fail on so strong a relation as that, then they are plausibly in some trouble. For surely, 
if there is to be any transmission of causal efficacy at all, it will occur in cases where 
m(C) causes an event m(E) which is, by hypothesis fully sufficient for E, thereby 
causing E? As I suggested in 1.4, aggregate events such as m(E) have different modal 
properties to the events they are sufficient for. If you object to aggregates then, as 
before, think in terms of pluralities – the same points will apply. It seems scarcely 
deniable that m(E) will be more modally fragile than E. If m(E) is the sort of 
aggregate I defined in 1.4, then it is as fragile as events get; perhaps there are 
aggregates that are more robust than that. However, I maintain that if you start 
changing the components of m(E) around (perhaps while keeping the same 
components, and simply changing their relations to each other), you lose m(E) before 
you lose E. Or in terms of plural quantification: not all of those events (which are the 
components of m(E)) are necessary for the occurrence of E. But all of those events are 
necessary for the occurrence of those events! This is just to repeat the familiar point 
that events like behaviours are relatively robust, in the sense that they could have 
occurred in a different manner and yet remained the same event. Grant this relative 
robustness and fragility for the sake of argument. Notice that nothing in this picture 
depends on any conceptual gap between m(E) and E, nor on anything specific to the 
nature of either. All we have assumed so far is a difference in modal properties across 
a sufficiency relation, which I take it is not particularly groundbreaking. 
 
But now suppose further that some variant of Lewis’ counterfactual theory of 
causation is true. Lewis defines ‘causal dependency’ as follows: 
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An event y causally depends on an event x iff: 
1. if x had occurred, then y would have occurred; 
2. if x had not occurred, then y would not have occurred. 
 
Causal dependency, for Lewis, is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for 
causation. A causal chain is defined as a sequence of events in which each event 
causally depends on the previous one; events c and e are related as cause and effect 
just in case there is a causal chain from c to e. Let us refer to condition (1) as 
expressing the ‘positive dependency’, and condition (2) the ‘negative dependency’ of 
effect on cause. Now this theory, as is well known, is not without its problems; 
indeed, Lewis himself eventually gave up on this particular version of the analysis.127 
My purpose, however, is not to defend the theory, but to show that if it is true, then 
the transmission principles are not.128 Lewis holds that the counterfactuals must be 
evaluated in the following way: they are true just in case it takes a greater departure 
from actuality to make the antecedents true and the consequents false than it does to 
make the antecedents true and the consequents true. It is often said that the first 
condition is vacuous, as the closest world to actuality at which its antecedent is true 
just is the actual world. It is for this reason that I diverge slightly from Lewis in the 
way I prefer to evaluate the truth of such counterfactuals. I think not in terms of a 
closest world, but in terms of a neighbourhood of closest worlds.129 Suppose I water 
my grass, causing the grass to grow. If (1) is vacuous, then the relationship between 
me watering the grass is causal provided the closest world in which I do not water the 
grass is one in which the grass does not grow. But this pattern of dependency is, by 
my reckoning, insufficient. Surely we also want it to be the case that if my watering 
the grass is the cause of its growing, then it would have grown in worlds where I used 
                                                 
127 See Lewis [1973] for the original theory, and [2000] for the theory he adopted in its place. In the 
latter paper, he treats causation as a relation that holds between robust events just in case an influencing 
relation holds between the (definitionally) fragile alterations of those events consistent with their still 
occurring, but in a different manner. I will say more about this theory in 5.5. 
128 I will not attempt to defend counterfactual analyses against the many objections that have been 
raised, although I will return to the matter, in the context of evaluating the relative merits of probability 
and process accounts of causation, in 5.5. 
129 A similar suggestion as to the evaluation of counterfactuals is to be found in Nozick’s analysis of 
knowledge as ‘truth-tracking’. See his [1981] pp.167-96. 
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hard water instead of soft water, or a different colour watering can, or whistled while I 
worked. Condition (1) can incorporate such cases, provided (i) its truth is indexed to a 
neighbourhood of not-too-distant worlds, and (ii) x is relatively robust, and occurs just 
the same in a neighbourhood of worlds at which the manner of its occurrence is 
different. With this in mind, let us evaluate the causes in the diagram to see if 
counterfactual dependency holds diagonally, assuming that it holds horizontally. 
 
Do the transmission principles hold on the theory of causation outlined above? In 
order to show that they do not, I will suppose, for reasons of simplicity, that the 
causes and effects in our diagram are proximal – in this case, causal dependency is 
necessary (as well as sufficient) for causation.130 If causal dependency fails for 
diagonally related proximal events, so then does causation. Consider first the 
downwards case – let us see whether, on the counterfactual theory, M causes m(E). 
Clearly m(E) negatively depends on M for in the closest worlds at which M does not 
occur, neither does m(C). But m(E) by hypothesis both positively and negatively 
depends on m(C), and so it negatively depends on M as well. So far so good, but m(E) 
does not positively depend on M. For the set of closest worlds at which M occurs will 
contain worlds where it occurs with a supervenience base other than m(C). This is due 
to the (assumed) differential robustness of M and m(C), and our agreed method of 
evaluating positive dependency against neighbourhoods of closest worlds. But since 
m(E) negatively depends on m(C), it follows that m(E) does not positively depend on 
M. Among the set of closest worlds we use to evaluate the truth of (1) with respect to 
M and m(E) will be worlds at which M occurs but m(E) does not. Similar arguments 
show, mutatis mutandis, that upwards transmission fails – m(C) does not cause E, 
according to the counterfactual theory. The set of closest worlds at which m(C) occurs 
are, on reasonable assumption, worlds at which m(E) occurs as well. Again if 
aggregates are fragile, then all worlds at which m(C) occurs will be worlds at which it 
occurs in the same way. But m(E) is by hypothesis metaphysically sufficient for E, 
                                                 
130 This is because a chain of stepwise depdenceny between temporally contiguous events x and y will 
only obtain if y causally depends on x. I think it clear that the arguments to follow could be 
reformulated without the proximality assumption, to apply in the general case. I will not attempt to do 
so here, however, for nothing in my present purpose requires such a detailed analysis. 
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and so at all the relevant worlds E occurs as well. So E positively depends on m(C). 
However, negative dependency this time fails. For the closest worlds at which m(C) 
fails to occur will be worlds at which it fails to occur in virtue of a very similar 
aggregate occurring instead, call it m(C)’. To see this, recall that aggregates are 
artificial, and m(C) is really many events. Worlds at which most of those events occur 
are ipso facto closer to actuality than worlds at which none of them occurs. And the 
closest of these worlds to actuality will be worlds at which m(C)’ causes m(E)’, 
another realizer of E. If such worlds are possible (and it seems difficult to deny) then 
they are closer to actuality than any at which E fails to occur. So E does not 
negatively depend on m(C). 
 
Apart from objections directed against counterfactual theories of causation generally 
(which, as I have said, are irrelevant to my present purpose), I anticipate the following 
objection to this account. Proponents of the counterfactual theory will object to my 
somewhat loose method of evaluating the truth of (1). I reply that (1) is vacuous 
unless evaluated against neighbourhoods of worlds, and so plays no role in a 
counterfactual theory of causation operating on such strict criteria concerning which 
worlds are relevant to the truth of counterfactual claims. The response may now be 
that (1) is otiose, and (2) is the essence of the counterfactual theory; I reply that I have 
already given my reasons for thinking (1) is important. Even if I am not granted this 
much, upwards transmission will still fail, for its failure depends only on (2). I will 
not dwell on these matters here, for there are other theories of causation according to 
which transmission principles fail. In the remainder of this section, we will look at 
one of them; we consider others in 5.4. 
 
Yablo endorses a counterfactual theory of causation according to which it is a 
necessary condition on causation between events that cause and effect are 
proportional to each other.131 Proportionality of cause and effect, for Yablo, is a 
matter of satisfying the counterfactuals (1) and (2) above, and in addition the cause 
                                                 
131 See his [1992] for details. 
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must be both enough and required for the effect.132 Yablo gives the following 
counterfactual definition of causal requirement for properties related as determinate 
and determinable: 
 
A property P of an event x is causally required for an event y iff for all PP- < P, 
if x had been P-P  without being P, then y would not have occurred. 
 
Where PP- is determined by P. Correspondingly, Yablo says that a property P is 
enough for some effect y if, given that x has P, some P+P
                                                
 > P is not required, where ‘<’ 
and ‘>’ mean, respectively, less and more determinate than. Now consider properties 
in a determination relationship, such as redness and colouredness. Redness will be 
causally required for a given effect just in case the cause would not have had the 
effect if it had been coloured without being red; and conversely, colouredness will be 
enough just in case no property of greater determinacy (no specific colour) is 
required. I do not wish to endorse the thesis that mental and physical properties are 
related as determinate and determinable, but I do think that Yablo’s central idea can 
be generalised to cover sufficiency. I think this because what is central is that the 
determinable events can occur in a different way, and not that the explanation of this 
fact is that they are determinable. Now provided events that stand in sufficiency 
relations differ in their relative robustness and fragility, it follows that he events that 
are ‘sufficed for’ can occur without the sufficient events. Refer back to the diagram in 
4.1, and assume that C and E are modally more robust than m(C) and m(E) 
respectively. From this difference in their modal properties, it follows that C can 
occur without m(C), and E without m(E). Let us say that m(C) is required for an effect 
x just in case if C had happened without m(C), then x would not have occurred. And 
 
132 It should be noted that Yablo in fact rejects (1) in favour of the following, which he terms 
‘adequacy’: ‘if x had not occurred, then if it had, y would have occurred as well’. He does so 
specifically to avoid the alleged triviality of (1). For my part, I think that despite Yablo’s protestations 
to the contrary (see n.57 Yablo [1992] p.), if (1) is trivial then so is his adequacy criterion. Yablo 
rightly says that a cause x will be adequate for its effect y “just in case y occurs in the nearest x-
containing world w to the nearest x-omitting world v to actuality”. But if the only difference between v 
and actuality is that x does not occur, then the nearest x-containing world to v will be the actual world, 
at which both x and y occur by hypothesis. Much better, in my view, is to avoid the alleged triviality of 
(1) by relaxing the criteria by which the truths of counterfactual claims are evaluated, and allowing a 
few extra worlds in. 
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let us say that C is enough for an effect x just in case if C had happened without m(C), 
then x would have occurred anyway. Now clearly, on these definitions, m(C) is not 
required for E, and C is not enough for m(E).133
 
So, Yablo claims, mental properties are sometimes better candidate causes for given 
effects than their more determinate physical realizers, since there are effects (like 
behaviours, which are robust relative to the precise manner of their occurrence) that 
require the mental cause but not the physical realizer. And mental events, 
correspondingly, won’t be enough for certain effects (such as the precise manner of a 
behaviour), as more determinate, physical, events are required. Now it seems clear 
that commensurability of this kind will obtain primarily between events at the same 
level. Causation, for Yablo, is not “pushed around” at all – not surprising, as we have 
already seen that modal properties do not happily travel up and down interlevel 
relations like sufficiency.134 My point in this section has not been to defend the 
theories of causation I have outlined. Rather, I outline them simply as theories 
according to which causal transmission principles come out false. There are 
undoubtedly other such theories. In fact, I am prepared to guess that any theory 
according to which the obtaining of causal relations between events involves their 
modal properties, is likely to be a theory that has trouble transmitting causation. 
Whether or not any such theory is true is, it goes without saying, a matter of 
considerable controversy. But that isn’t the point. The point is that the causal 
argument loses much of its force if relativised to a specific theory of causation, or 
                                                 
133 Notice that a similar moral can be drawn from the subset theory of realization discussed in 2.4, 
which, as I mentioned there, is similar in many ways to Yablo’s theory. If the causal powers of C are 
only a proper subset of the causal powers of m(C), then the powers of C will be a subset of those 
required to cause m(E), in which case downwards transmission fails. I return briefly to this point in my 
evaluation of Kim’s redundancy argument in 6.2, which relies on downwards transmission. I do not 
claim that the subset theory entails too that upwards transmission fails – the causal powers of m(C) will 
be a superset of the powers required to cause E. Without an extra condition such as Yablo’s stipulation 
that causes must be required for their effects, on the subset account m(C) causes E a fortiori, so to 
speak. 
134 Yablo is not alone in thinking that causation is intra-level rather than inter-level; Horgan thinks so 
too. In his [2001] he argues that causal claims have an implicit ‘level-parameter’. Menzies [2003] 
argues, in a similar vein, that causal relations are relative to causal models, which he thinks of as 
particular systems of explanatory laws. Views such as these may be broadly categorised as 
‘compatibilist’ and allow that there can be many non-exclusive (and perhaps complementary) levels of 
causation. We return to these issues in our discussion of the causal exclusion argument in chapter 5. 
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family of such theories. If the causal argument is to be resisted, then resisting it 
should be harder than simply adopting a counterfactual theory of causation. 
 
Before proceeding, it is worth mentioning that I do recognise that the transmission 
principles have significant intuitive plausibility. There are several examples in the 
literature (most notably in Kim’s work) of arguments similar to Witmer’s to the effect 
that causing instances of supervenient properties just has to involve causing instances 
of the properties they supervene on. And if you manage to do that, then how (given 
sufficiency) could you thereby fail to cause the supervenient property-instance? My 
point in this section, as I said, has not been to endorse any theory of causation, but to 
show that the truth of certain such theories would entail that these causal intuitions 
just can’t be right. In chapter 5 I will argue (inter alia) that the division between 
theories of causation that are, and are not, consistent with causal transmission, broadly 
tracks the familiar division of theories into process and probability accounts. The 
remainder of this chapter shows that the causal argument properly conceived is 
orthogonal to these issues, and requires no particular causal commitments. If I am 
right, then clearly that is a virtue of the argument. 
 
4.4. The causal argument does not need transmission 
The first reason that the causal argument does not need to appeal to dubious principles 
of transmission is implicit in Witmer’s reply to Sturgeon. Recall that Witmer claims 
that unless at least some broadly physical events had quantum effects, we could not 
intervene in the quantum world, and so would not have epistemic access to it. In 
essence, Witmer thinks (and I agree) that certain events like button-pushings must 
have quantum effects. But he ignores the fact that the very same events must also 
have mental causes – it would hardly do us any good as interveners in the quantum 
world if the events that had quantum effects were events over which we had no 
rational control! If we are to test quantum theory by setting up quantum systems with 
certain initial conditions and observing how they evolve, then we must be able 
(indirectly, of course) to decide on the quantum properties of certain parts of the 
world. But if this is so, then we can draw the following diagram: 
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 Pow! 
C E 
m(E) m(C) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this diagram, my decision C to intervene in the quantum world causes my pushing 
of the button, E, which in turn causes Pow! Now if C is capable of initiating a causal 
chain that ends in a quantum event which, by CP, has a sufficient physical cause, it 
follows that m(C) must have occurred at the same time as C and initiated the same 
causal chain. Were this not the case, it would be possible to trace the causal ancestry 
of Pow! back to a point (the point where I decide to push the button) at which it had a 
mental cause but no physical cause. Transitivity fills in the arrows from C and m(C) 
straight to Pow! without having to worry about transmission or the relationship 
between E and m(E). The argument thus far is ad hominem: transitivity is implicit in 
the story Witmer tells about intervention, but if you have transitivity, then you don’t 
need transmission. It is another question whether causation really is transitive. 
 
Counterexamples to transitivity have been stacking up lately. Here are two of them. 
 
Counterexample 1 
A and B each have a switch in front of them, which they can switch up or down. If 
both switches are in the same position, person C receives a shock. A and B differ in 
that A does not want to shock C, whereas B does. Now suppose B’s switch is up. 
Since A does not want to shock C, A will move his switch down. But when B observes 
that A’s switch is down, she moves her switch down, and C receives a shock. It seems 
clear that A moving his switch down caused B to move her switch down, which in 
turn caused C to receive a shock. But did A’s moving his switch down cause C to 
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receive a shock? I have no clear intuition regarding this matter, but if you answer 
‘no’, then for you this situation represents a failure of transitivity.135
 
Counterexample 2 
A man walking in the mountains ducks to avoid a falling boulder. The man’s ducking 
causes the continuation of his walk, by ‘double prevention’: the ducking prevents an 
event (the boulder striking him) that would have prevented the continuation of his 
walk. But the boulder caused him to duck. And yet it makes little sense to say the 
boulder caused the continuation of his walk – after all, it nearly killed him! My 
intuitions are clearer in this case, and I take it to be a failure of transitivity.136
 
Lewis claims that counterexamples such as these have a common structure. We are to: 
 
 [i]magine a conflict between Black and Red…Black makes a move that, if not 
countered, would have advanced his cause. Red responds with an effective 
countermove, which gives Red the victory. Black’s move causes Red’s 
countermove, Red’s countermove causes the victory. But does Black’s move 
cause Red’s victory? Sometimes, it seems not.137
 
Lewis defends transitivity via the claim that reluctance to accept Black’s move as a 
cause of Red’s victory stems from a conflation of what causes what with what is 
generally conducive to what. Moves like Black’s are not generally conducive to the 
opponent’s victory, but it does not follow that in this case, Black’s move does not 
cause Red’s victory. I am not sure what to say, and Lewis too admits to “feeling some 
ambivalence”. Let us accept, then, that transitivity sometimes fails. However, it most 
definitely does not always fail. If it always fails, then not only do mental events not 
cause behaviours, barely anything that we think of as the cause of a given effect really 
causes it and almost everything we think about causation is false. The ways in which 
we identify certain events and properties as efficacious seldom picks out proximal 
causes, which is to say that there are almost always intermediaries between causes and 
                                                 
135 This is due to Michael McDermott, see his [1995] for details. 
136 Hall [2000]. 
137 Lewis [2000] p196. 
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effects. If it is not the scientist’s decision to intervene in the quantum world that 
causes Pow!, then neither is it my decision to type this sentence that causes my fingers 
to move. And that is just false. 
 
For those who do not wish to rely on transitivity, or indeed Witmer’s points about 
intervention, there is another, to my knowledge universally overlooked, reason why 
transmission principles are not needed in the causal argument. Sufficiency, you will 
recall, is needed to render the co-occurrence of mental and physical causes non-
coincidental. What is overlooked is that nothing in the way we think about 
coincidences entails that such co-occurrences are unacceptably spooky only if the two 
causes are causes of the same effect. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that m(E) 
above is sufficient for E. Given CP, we know that m(E) has a physical cause. Given 
EM, we know that C causes E. But that is all we need, for we now know this much: 
that whenever a mental event causes a behaviour, there is a physical event such that it 
causes those physical events that are sufficient for the behaviour. Now this strikes me 
as just the sort of coincidence that we need sufficiency to rule out. Notice also that the 
relationship between m(E) and E does not have to be as strong as sufficiency. Again 
for the sake of argument, let m(E) partially compose E. Now we are faced with the 
coincidental prospect that whenever a mental events causes a behaviour, there just 
happens to be a physical event that causes part of that behaviour. And the question, as 
before, is this: how are we to explain the co-occurrence of the mental and physical 
events without appealing to a sufficiency relationship between them?138
 
It is tempting to suppose that we can go still further, and generate the required 
coincidences without any mention of the effects of the mental and physical causes. 
We might appeal to the simple fact that we have a mental and a physical cause 
occurring at the same time with a greater probability than if they were unrelated. But 
it is not clear to me that this suggestion can work. The reason is that there is no 
particular physical event that has to occur at the same time as, say, my decision to 
                                                 
138 See section 2.3 for discussion of this issue. 
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make some tea. But then we are faced with the prospect of assigning a probability to 
the joint occurrence of my decision and...what? Some physical event or other? The 
only thing physical events that occur at the same time as mental events of this type 
have in common is that they all cause events that are synchronically sufficient for tea-
making behaviour. Our coincidence consists not merely in the co-occurrence of a 
mental and some physical event, but in the fact that they are co-occurring causes of 
two synchronically related events. We can depict the coincidence like this: 
 
C E 
m(C) m(E) 
Coincidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another way of putting the point is this: the failure of causal transmission principles 
(if they are indeed false) means that m(C) does not cause E. But it does not mean that 
m(C) and E are unrelated. Indeed, I think it clear that they are quite intimately related; 
m(C), as cause of m(E), is nomically related to E given the sufficiency of m(E) for E. 
It is a matter for us to choose what to call the relationship between m(C) and E – if we 
endorse counterfactual theories of causation, then we must find another name for it. 
Sturgeon calls it ‘inducing’; I can’t think of a better name, so let’s say that m(C) 
induces E. Define ‘sufficient induction’ as follows: 
 
x sufficiently induces z iff: (i) x is causally sufficient for y; 
(ii) y is synchronically sufficient for z. 
 
Now it is surely just the kind of coincidence that intuition cannot tolerate that, 
whenever I cause my arm to move by deciding to move it, there is a physical event 
simultaneous with my decision that induces the very same movement. Unless, of 
course, the physical inducer is sufficient for the mental cause. This suggests an 
obvious reformulation of OD to accommodate coincidental inducers as well as causes: 
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OD3: if an event y has a sufficient cause or inducer x at t, then no event x’ is 
also a cause or inducer of y at t unless (i) x is sufficient for x’, or (ii) x’ 
is sufficient for x. 
 
The central conclusions of this chapter are as follows: (i) an argument that relies on 
causal transmission principles is open to easy rebuttal by those who endorse any one 
of a number of theories of causation, so it is better not to rely on such principles; and 
(ii) the causal argument does not have to rely on such principles, and so can retain its 
neutrality as to the choice of a theory of causation. In the next chapter we will see that 
the familiar ‘causal exclusion argument’ relies on a particular conception of the 
causation. As such, it is bound to be weaker than the causal argument, as a defence of 
the exclusion argument will depend on a defence of the relevant theory. I will argue, 
however, that things are much worse than that for the exclusion argument, as in fact 
the theory of causation upon which it relies is demonstrably false. 
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5. Against the Causal Exclusion Argument 
This argument, if successful, will show that only the identity of mental and physical 
events enables us to make sense of mental causation. It is a highly controversial 
argument, not least because (on reasonable assumption) it entails a metaphysic of 
mind – type identity – that many regard as sufficiently problematic to license a 
reductio of the argument. In particular, as we have already seen in 2.3, the 
identification of mental and physical property-instances, when combined with 
multiple realization, entails eliminativism. I will not, however, rely on the reductio 
that might be so constructed in order to defeat the exclusion argument. My own 
counter argument will instead be directed at the theory of causation that I take to be 
essential to the exclusion argument. That the exclusion argument does depend on a 
theory of causation is hinted at by certain authors, though not, to my knowledge, 
treated with any great rigour. As we saw in chapter 4, it is a virtue of the causal 
argument that it need not rely on any particular theory of causation. My argument in 
this chapter will be that not only does the exclusion argument lack this virtue, it also 
has the added vice of relying on a theory of causation that is just plain wrong. 
 
I will argue as follows. First, I will examine Kim’s ‘supervenience argument’, and 
through this introduce the role of the concept of ‘causal work’ in exclusionary 
reasoning. In 5.2 I argue that given the theoretical work those who appeal to the 
concept expect it to do, the most plausible understanding of causal work is as physical 
work of some kind. I give an account of causation in terms of physical work by 
formulating general principles based on the properties of physical work. I show how a 
stronger form of the no-overdetermination premise (which Kim relies on in the 
supervenience argument discussed in 5.1) can be derived from these principles. 
Correspondingly, I formulate the causal exclusion argument as a version of the causal 
argument based on this stronger no-overdetermination rule. In 5.3, I give a general 
account of the causal exclusion problem in terms of the theory of causation outlined in 
5.2, and give a brief taxonomy in 5.4 of possible responses to the problem so 
formulated. I show that several authors respond to the problem by implicitly rejecting 
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the causal work theory of 5.2. In 5.5, I argue that there are clear counterexamples to 
the principle they reject, and argue that since the problem of causal exclusion (and the 
corresponding causal exclusion argument) relies on this principle, there is no problem 
of causal exclusion. 
 
5.1. The supervenience argument 
Let’s begin by taking a closer look at Kim’s argument against supervenient causation, 
which I introduced in 3.3. In a series of papers, Kim argues that supervenience, the 
initial introduction of which can be seen as an attempt to bring the mind into the 
causal structure of a physical world, in fact renders mental causation utterly 
mysterious. This poses a dilemma, which Kim states in the following way: 
 
If mind-body supervenience fails, mental causation is unintelligible; if it holds, 
mental causation is again unintelligible. Hence mental causation is 
unintelligible.139
 
Failure of supervenience means that the mental isn’t ‘anchored’ to the physical in any 
way that would make intelligible the fact that mental events have physical effects. 
Understood in this way, the first horn of the dilemma is not importantly different to 
the coincidence worries that motivate OD in our causal argument of 3.4. We need not 
concern ourselves with arguing this point, however – even if this is not what Kim has 
in mind, we know that if physical events are not sufficient for mental events, then the 
world is full of coincidences, and this in itself is unintelligible. We concern ourselves 
with the second horn of Kim’s dilemma. Why does Kim think that if supervenience 
holds, then mental causation is unintelligible? In what follows, I will refer sometimes 
to supervenience relations between token events, sometimes to sufficiency relations. 
For my part, as I argued in 1.4, I think that non-causal relationships between token 
events are not best characterised in terms of supervenience. When I speak, somewhat 
loosely, of the ‘supervenience base property’ of a particular property instantiation, I 
                                                 
139 Kim [1998] p.46. 
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do so only for consistency with Kim’s terminology, and do not intend by such talk to 
backtrack on any of what I said in 1.4. 
 
Kim presents us with two distinct arguments for the conclusion that supervenient 
properties are causally inefficacious; each is a two-stage argument, and they have 
their first part in common.140 The first part in each case is in essence the ‘downwards 
transmission argument’ we saw Witmer running in 4.2. The purpose of this part is to 
show that same-level causation presupposes what Kim calls ‘downwards causation’. 
There is no causing the instantiation of, say, a supervenient property, without causing 
the instantiation of its base property. The second parts of each argument are designed 
to show that downwards causation gives rise to an unacceptable causal competition 
between mental and physical properties, and to show in addition that this is a 
competition that the mental property must lose. Each second half relies on the 
completeness of physics, and a ‘causal exclusion principle’. The first of the two 
second halves is a somewhat curious argument, which I term the ‘upwards-
downwards transmission argument’. Its curiosity consists in the fact that it is 
unnecessarily circuitous on the assumption that CP is true; I include it here as Kim 
sometimes runs it without assuming CP, to show that emergentism is untenable. We 
return to this version of the upwards-downwards argument in 7.3. The other second 
half is a much simpler, and far more powerful argument. Although both of Kim’s 
second halves could properly be termed ‘causal exclusion arguments’, for expository 
reasons I reserve this term for the second of them. 
 
Part 1: The downwards transmission argument 
Kim actually gives two arguments for the conclusion that same-level (supervenient) 
causation presupposes downwards causation, but I think that they can both be 
properly termed ‘downwards transmission arguments’. Only the second, however, is 
equivalent to what we termed the downwards transmission argument in 4.2; I present 
both here for completeness. Firstly, Kim feels that there is a tension between the 
                                                 
140 The argument occurs, in various forms, in his [1992b], [1993b], [1998] pp.40-7, [1999a] pp.32-4, 
and in its clearest form in his [2003] pp.155-9. I will rely on this latter in my exegesis. 
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causation of one supervenient property-instance M* by another such property-
instance M, and the synchronic sufficiency of M*’s base property P* for M*. We 
seem, in this case, to have determination from two directions: M* is causally 
determined by M, and non-causally determined by P*. Kim argues that the only way 
to make sense of this ‘double-determination’ is to suppose that M causes M* by 
causing its base property. We can use the diagram below to depict what is going on.  
 
 M M* 
P* 
 
 
 
 
 
Kim argues that there is no way to reconcile the non-causal determination of M* by 
P* with the causal determination of M* by M, unless we suppose that M causes M* 
by causing P*, hence the downward arrow. Now as I have already argued, causal 
transmission is dubious. Why does Kim think it is the only way to explain how M* 
can have distinct diachronic and synchronic determinants, M and P* respectively? 
Frankly, I’m not sure, although I think it may be due to the fact that Kim does not at 
this stage appeal to any causal relationship between M’s supervenience base, P, and 
P*. If M either has no supervenience base, or has a physical base property P which 
does not cause P*, then I agree it would very strange indeed that M managed to cause 
M*, which depends on P*, without also causing P*; after all, something has to cause 
P* in order for M* to be instantiated. The situation depicted above would look 
decidedly odd without the dotted downwards causation arrow. However, suppose we 
draw in P, and accept that P causes P*; then there is nothing obviously mysterious in 
the thought that M causes M* without causing P*. For instance we might maintain, as 
Yablo does, that causation is an intra-, not an inter-level relation. On this account, P 
causes P*, and M causes M*, but there is no diagonal causation. Why does Kim not 
appeal to P as cause of P*, and resolve the tension that way? I must confess I don’t 
know, although I think it may just be that Kim is looking for a general argument form 
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that tells equally against supervenience physicalism and emergentism. And as we 
shall see in chapter 6, there are forms of emergentism according to which CP is false, 
so that no arrow can be drawn from P to P*.141 Kim goes on to give a second 
argument to the effect that M must cause P*. Whereas the first argument claims that 
downwards causation is the only way to understand simultaneous causal and non-
causal determination; the second claims that the only way to cause the instantiation of 
a supervenient property like M* is to cause its base property. He says this: 
 
To relieve a headache, you take aspirin: that is, you causally intervene in the 
brain process on which the headache supervenes. That’s the only way we can 
do anything about our headaches.142
 
Now this has nothing to do with resolving any purported tension between the 
synchronic and diachronic determination of M*; indeed, Kim intends this argument to 
appeal to those who don’t see the tension. And this, of course, is just the same 
argument that we saw Witmer running in 4.2 to generate causal competition as a reply 
to Sturgeon’s charge of equivocation. Now it should be clear that I do not think 
reliance causal on transmission is a virtue. Still, let us grant for the sake of argument 
that if M causes M*, then M causes P*. This concludes the first part of the 
supervenience argument; each of the alternative second parts is designed to show that 
M’s supervenience base P also causes P*, and to argue that as a result, given CP, P 
displaces M as the true cause of P*. 
 
Part 2(a): The upwards-downwards transmission argument 
This is what Kim [2003] terms ‘Completion 1’. The argument to follow also relies on 
causal transmission, this time in order to establish that P causes P*. Once this much 
established, Kim proceeds to argue that P excludes M as cause of P*. The argument to 
this conclusion rests on the assumption that M supervenes on P, and holds (not 
implausibly) that this entails that M≠P; a cause cannot exclude itself as cause of its 
effect. The argument also rests on CP, and a ‘principle of exclusion’, which I will state 
                                                 
141 We will examine the application of the argument to these forms of emergentism in 7.3. 
142 [1998] pp.42-3. 
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below. Kim argues that since P is sufficient for M as its supervenience base, and M 
causes P*, it follows that P causes P*. The argument can be depicted like this: 
 
M M* 
P P* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now Kim seems to think that P’s synchronic sufficiency for M qua M’s 
supervenience base, plus M’s causal sufficiency for P* as established in part (1), is 
sufficient for P’s causal sufficiency for P*. If this is true, then we can draw in the 
curved dotted arrow. Kim seems to have two primary reasons for thinking this arrow 
can be drawn in.143 First, Kim holds that if nomological sufficiency is sufficient for 
causation, then since P is sufficient for M, and M is sufficient for P*, by transitivity of 
sufficiency it follows that P is sufficient for P*, and so qualifies as its cause. I grant 
Kim that if causation is understood in these terms, then P qualifies as P*’s cause. 
Whether or not causation should be so understood is, however, a highly contentious 
matter. Second, Kim holds that if counterfactual dependency is sufficient for 
causation, then since (Kim claims) the closest possible worlds in which P does not 
occur will be worlds at which M does not occur, then given that P* counterfactually 
depends on M, P* counterfactually depends on P. It is unclear to me that Kim is right 
that the closest ¬P worlds are ¬M worlds; I argued in 4.3 that if P is relatively fragile, 
then a world where an alternative realizer P’ of M will be closer to actuality than a 
world at which no realizer of M occurs. No matter, I will grant Kim that P* 
counterfactually depends on P, for the sake of argument. From this it follows that if 
counterfactual dependency is sufficient for causation, then P qualifies as cause of P*. 
                                                 
143 See Kim [1998] pp43-5 for the most complete statement of his reasons (at least that I am aware of) 
of the argument described here. I will not address these arguments in the present chapter. I will return 
to a version of it, directed against the cogency of emergentism, in 7.3. 
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Once again, whether causation is to be understood in these terms is highly 
contentious. 
 
Now the above argument is a highly circuitous route to the conclusion that P causes 
P* – in effect, Kim thinks that P must cause P* because it (P) is non-causally 
sufficient for something (M) that causes something (M*) for which P* is non-causally 
sufficient. Talk about pushing causation around! Still, let us grant Kim that on the 
assumption that M≠P, there is a ‘causal competition’ between M and P as cause of P*. 
And it is this ‘causal competition’ that matters to Kim: we have two putative causes 
(P and M) of the same effect P*. The next stage of the supervenience argument is to 
appeal to a version of the causal exclusion principle, and apply it to our two 
competing causes. Here is the version to which Kim appeals: 
 
EX No single event can have more than one sufficient cause occurring at 
any given time—unless it is a genuine case of causal 
overdetermination.144
 
Given this principle, we can conclude that at most one of M and P is a cause of P*. 
But which one are we to choose? This is where the completeness of physics comes 
in.145 We can neither treat M and P as jointly causally sufficient for P*, nor treat M as 
the cause of P* and deny that P causes it. In the former case, we are faced with a 
physical event, P*, for which there is no sufficient physical cause – it is P and M 
together that are sufficient, and this violates CP. In the latter case, either P* has no 
physical cause at all – which clearly violates CP – or else there is some P’ that causes 
P*, in which case the same problematic causal competition obtains between M and P’. 
                                                 
144 Kim [2003] p.157. This principle is clearly much stronger than the exclusion principle we discussed 
in 3.3; I comment further on this below. In passing, I note the following ad hominem: EX does not fit 
well with the premise, which Kim appeals to in the upwards-downwards argument, that either nomic 
sufficiency or counterfactual dependency are sufficient for causation. In fact, such accounts of 
causation are normally appealed to by ‘causal compatibilists’ seeking to show that principles such as 
EX are false, and that events can have more than one cause! I return to the connection between 
compatibilism and theories of causation in section 5.4, when I discuss possible solutions to the 
exclusion problem. 
145 See Kim [1998] p.44-5, and [2003] p.158 for explicit appeals to CP in the upwards-downwards 
transmission argument. 
 - 142 - 
We can now conclude this version of the supervenience argument as follows: P 
excludes M as cause of P*. We are forced, given CP, to choose between either (i) 
retaining M as a property distinct from P and giving up on EM; or (ii) maintaining EM 
and identifying M and P. This is the causal exclusion problem. The choice seems to 
be epiphenomenalism or identity, and neither is appealing. Epiphenomenalism flies in 
the face of all the prima facie evidence for EM suggested in 3.1. Given the 
overwhelming plausibility of multiple realization, identity leads to eliminativism, as 
we saw in 2.3. I find it strange that Kim appeals to CP to justify choosing P rather than 
M as the cause of P* in the present form of the supervenience argument – for if CP is 
true, then we do not need the (arguably) somewhat spurious upwards-downwards 
transmission argument in order to conclude that P* has a physical cause. Nor, as we 
shall see, do we need to rely on the supervenience of M on P. 
 
Part 2(b): The causal exclusion argument
This argument, like 2(a), depends on the downwards transmission argument, but 
appeals neither to the supervenience of M on P nor the contentious claim that either 
counterfactual dependency or nomological sufficiency is sufficient for causation. We 
can depict this argument as follows: 
 
M M* 
P’ P* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this argument, we appeal to CP to show that P* has a sufficient physical cause P’. 
In the above diagram, P’ must occur at the same time as M. This is because CP tells us 
that any physical event that has a sufficient cause at t, has a complete sufficient 
physical cause at t. Since the downwards transmission argument tells us that P* has a 
cause occurring at the same time as M (viz. M), we can infer only that it also has a 
complete sufficient physical cause occurring at the same time as M. Nothing in this 
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formulation of the argument requires as a premise that P’ is M’s supervenience base. 
It plausibly will be, on the assumption that M has a physical supervenience base; but 
the nice thing about this version of the argument is that we do not have to worry about 
whether this is so. Now once again, given that M≠P, we have causal competition for 
P*. Once again we can just appeal to CP to conclude that, given EX, M can not be a 
cause of P*. To conclude otherwise would be to violate CP. And if M is not a cause of 
P*, then neither, by the argument of part (1), M a cause of M*. The only option open 
to us if we want to retain CP, EM and EX is to identify M and P. This concludes the 
supervenience argument. 
 
An obvious response at this point is, why believe EX? Notice first how much stronger 
EX is than the principle of causal exclusion we discussed in 3.3. The principle we 
discussed there made explicit reference to the independence of the two causes, and as 
we saw, this fact exempted the principle from application to causes standing in 
dependency relations such as supervenience or sufficiency. There are plenty of 
dependency relations other than identity. The principle invoked here has no mention 
of the independence of the causes – rather, EX claims that if both A and B are 
sufficient causes of C, then except for (rare) cases of overdetermination, A=B. We can 
of course agree that there is no way we can treat all cases of mental causation as 
genuine overdetermination, for that is to invoke the possibility of widespread 
overdetermination. However, it is unclear why we should endorse the stronger 
principle that denies that any numerically non-identical events (dependent or not) can 
have the same effect. For that an event has two causes, one of which depends on the 
other, is clearly not overdetermination of the problematic kind. But now recall the 
three overdetermination worries we briefly discussed in 3.3, of which the coincidence 
worry was just one. Recall that Kim thinks that there are the following problems with 
the view that P* might have two causes: (i) that P* is overdetermined, which is 
absurd; (ii) that M is redundant as a cause of P*, and so can be dispensed with, and 
(iii) that there is no causal work left for M to do, given P*. 
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The first of Kim’s problems, we can dismiss: there is nothing absurd in the 
supposition that P and M both cause P*, for given that P and M both cause P*, we can 
infer by OD3 that P is sufficient for M, hence that this is not a case of genuine 
overdetermination. Sufficiency, as I have argued, is all that is required to render the 
co-occurrence of M and P non-coincidental. The second of Kim’s problems we return 
to in 6.2, where I will argue that only if we endorse a very weak criterion for 
redundancy (in the form of a very strong criterion for novelty) does M count as 
redundant. And the third problem, we will now examine in detail. First, it may be 
asked why I do not simply deny the problem, as relying on the kind of transmission 
principles whose truth I spent most of chapter 4 questioning. If I thought that the 
downwards transmission argument discussed above were the only route to the 
conclusion that there is no causal work for mental events to do, then I might well 
reject it on those very grounds. However, as I will show in the next section, we do not 
need to assume any transmission principles in order to leave the mental shorn of any 
“causal work”. In what follows, I will show that given certain plausible further 
assumptions about the nature of causal work, supervenient properties do not do any of 
it. I will not rely on any form of causal  transmission argument. In 5.2 I will attempt to 
outline some general truths about causal work, and formulate them as principles. I 
formulate these principles based (inter alia) on certain things that Kim (and others) 
have said. I take it to count in support of my having got Kim right on causal work that 
the principles I formulate will enable us to derive an exclusion principle equivalent to 
EX. Through this, I will proceed in 5.3 to show how these principles, when combined 
with CP and EM, give rise to a highly general causal exclusion problem. 
 
5.2. Some principles of ‘causal work’ 
What is causal work? I will not attempt to give a definition; instead, I will describe 
roughly the sort of thing it is supposed to be. I will then briefly summarise several 
extant theories according to which, in broad outline, causation involves doing some 
causal work. Finally, I will formulate what I take to be three central theses describing 
causal work, as a preamble to the causal exclusion problem of 5.3 (referred to below 
as PL, CW, and TCW). Suppose first that a certain amount of causal work is required in 
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order for an event to happen. If you want to build a wall, then you need to move 
bricks about, mix cement, and so on. In general, let’s say, if you want to make it so 
that a substance has a property at a time (which is exactly what you do when you 
build a wall), then you will have your work to do. I will refer to this work, in what 
follows, as the causal work required for the occurrence of an event. Physicists 
understand ‘work’ in terms of energy transfer. In particular, if a force is required to 
move a body, then the action of the force transfers energy to it, and the energy 
transferred is equal to the work done.146 This accords well with a certain intuitive way 
of thinking about causation – if you want to move something around, or restructure 
the configuration of a group of things, then you will need to supply some energy. 
Intuitively, we might reason as follows: causation involves making changes to the 
world; but change takes work, and work is the transfer of energy. So causation 
involves the transfer of energy. Understanding causal work as physical work has the 
advantage of giving us a ready-made account of an otherwise ill-understood notion. 
However, caution is necessary: in particular, the view that causal work is physical 
work does not entail that doing the causal work required for an effect is either 
necessary or sufficient for being its cause. This is an important point, as it enables us 
to maintain the (in my view plausible) connection between causal and physical work, 
without endorsing the view that causes must do physical work on their effects. I will 
argue in 5.5 that doing the causal work required for the occurrence of an event is not a 
necessary condition for causing it. For the moment, we turn to accounts of causation 
that do hold that it can be reduced to work. Through this, we will derive principles 
that enable us to set up the causal exclusion problem in 5.3. 
 
The intuitive conception of causation as physical work finds voice in Fair, who 
maintains that the relata of causation are objects, and that causation can be identified 
with a flow of energy or momentum from cause to effect.147 Kistler, on the other 
                                                 
146 Specifically, physicists define the work done on a body along a path as the integral of the scalar 
product of the force with the infinitessimal of the distance through which the force acts. What is 
important about this definition for my purpose is that physicists define work in terms of energy 
transfer. 
147 Fair [1979]. 
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hand, takes Fair’s reliance on specific quantities to be arbitrary (and problematic on 
other grounds, which I will not go into here), preferring to account for causation in 
terms of the transfer of whatever quantities obey physical conservation laws.148 Thus 
Kistler defends the thesis that 
 
“[t]wo events c and e are connected by a causal relation if and only if there 
exists a conserved quantity Q which is exemplified by both c and e and of 
which a particular amount A is transmitted between c and e.”149
 
Dowe has developed a similar account, but takes the notion of causal process to be 
prior to that of causation. Dowe construes a causal process as the worldline of an 
object that possesses a conserved quantity, and a causal interaction as an intersection 
of world lines involving the exchange of such a quantity.150 Put simply, a causal 
interaction occurs at the intersection of two (or more) causal processes, in which the 
processes concerned undergo changes in the values of whatever quantities. Current 
science is our best guide to which quantities are conserved, so there is good reason to 
think that causal interactions involve exchanges of mass-energy, charge, and so on. I 
will not attempt to determine which of the above theories is the most plausible. 
Instead, I will follow Kistler in assuming, for present purposes, that ‘causal work’ is 
the transfer of some conserved quantity from cause to effect. It should be clear that 
the central arguments of the remainder of this chapter will go through mutatis 
mutandis on any of the alternative accounts mentioned. 
 
Clearly, all the theories described above construe causation, broadly, in terms of a 
process that connects cause and effect – correspondingly, they (and other variants) are 
commonly known as process accounts of causation. The important point is that such 
accounts all maintain that there is an intrinsic, physical connection of some kind 
between causes and effects.151 There is clear evidence in Kim’s work that he thinks of 
                                                 
 
148 Kistler [1998]. 
149 Kistler [2001] p.115. 
150 Dowe [2000]. 
151 An ‘intrinsic relation’ can be understood as a relation holding between the members of an n-tuple 
solely in virtue of the intrinsic properties of the objects involved, construed according to the account of 
‘intrinsic’ I endorsed in 1.1. Counterfactual dependency, by way of contrast, can be made to hold or fail 
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causation in a similar way to the authors mentioned above. For instance, in one 
discussion of the supervenience argument, Kim says this: 
 
[T]he observed regularities between M-instances and M*-instances….are by 
no means accidental….However, if we understand the difference between 
genuine, productive and generative causal processes…and the noncausal 
regularities…that are parasitic on real processes, then we are in a position to 
understand [that] [i]n the case of supposed M-M* causation, the situation is 
rather like a series of shadows cast by a moving car: there is no causal 
connection between the shadow of the car at one instant and its shadow an 
instant later….152
 
This passage clearly indicates Kim’s reliance on a process account of causation, as he 
explicitly equates genuine causation with ‘production’ and ‘generation’. But why, on 
such an account, does the relationship between M and M* turn out to be a pseudo-
process? In what follows, we will see how, given a few reasonable assumptions, 
Kim’s position is virtually mandatory given a process account of causation. In the 
remainder of this section, I will outline general constraints on causal work, and 
formulate principles accordingly. 
 
Effects, on a process account, are literally generated, or produced by their causes via 
transference of some sort, which we will take in what follows to be transference of a 
conserved quantity from cause to effect.153 Problematically, such transfer will not 
necessarily occur where a cause has its effect via transitivity; x might transfer a 
quantity to y and y to z, without the transfer of any particular quantity at all from x to 
                                                                                                                                            
by adding or removing objects to the world of a pair of events related as cause and effect – you can add 
in a backup or ‘redundant’ cause such that it is only active if the actual cause fails to have its effect. 
But then despite no change in the intrinsic properties of cause or effect, the effect will fail to 
counterfactually depend on the cause. In general, causation construed as counterfactual dependency 
will not be an intrinsic relation. 
152 Kim [1998] p.45. In fn.28, Kim makes clear he endorses Salmon’s distinction between causal 
processes and pseudo-processes. Salmon maintains that only a causal process is capable of transmitting 
a mark. Mark transmission is analyzed in terms of the preservation, without intervention, between A 
and B, of changes in the characteristics of the process due to a local interaction at point A. See Salmon 
[1984] pp.450-2. 
153 Talk of cause transferring a quantity to its effect is, problematic and ought not to be interpreted 
literally. Such talk would seem to suggest that the effect already exists, in which case that something 
else already caused it. Transference “to the effect” is better understood to take place between property-
instances, where the first of which gives up a certain quantity of a physical property, and the second the 
receives the property, becoming the effect in question in virtue of the property gained. 
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z. You make a phone call asking someone to build you a shed, thereby transferring a 
quantity to them down the phone line, and they proceed to transfer quantities to the 
pile of wood in your garden. We know a priori (relative to empirical investigation of 
the nature of the underlying process, and assuming transitivity) that your phone call 
causes the shed to be built; but it is not likely (although I suppose it is possible) that 
any amount of any particular quantity survives the journey down the phone line and 
into the shed. In order to explain transitivity, then, we must distinguish two types of 
cause. Following Kistler [2001] let us say that ‘direct’ causes produce or generate 
their effects proximally by transfer of a conserved quantity; while ‘indirect’ causes are 
related to their effects via chains of direct cause-effect pairs. The causal work required 
for the occurrence of a given effect, on the present understanding of ‘causal work’, 
will only be done by its direct cause. Our first principle concerns direct causation, and 
reflects the claim that proximal causes generate, or produce their effects. 
Correspondingly, we may refer to it as the ‘generativity of direct causation’, and 
define it thus: 
 
GC An event x is a direct sufficient cause of an event y iff x does all the 
causal work required for the occurrence of y. 
 
Direct sufficient causes, according to this principle, have their effects by transferring 
certain conserved quantities, and so doing the causal work required to bring about the 
effect. We will also need a weaker principle, for full generality, to cover cases of 
insufficient direct causation. We can formulate the weaker principle like this: 
 
GC’ An event x is a direct cause of y iff x does some of the causal work 
required for the occurrence of y. 
 
We can now proceed to give a principle of both sufficient and insufficient causation in 
general, based on our two generativity principles. This is the business of our third 
principle. Define a causal process as a temporally ordered sequence of events each of 
which is a direct cause (as defined in GC’) of the next. A natural progression is to 
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define a sufficient causal process as a causal process in which each event is a direct 
sufficient cause (as defined in GC) of the next. For instance, you throw a brick through 
a window, your throw is a sufficient cause of the brick’s motion, the motion is 
sufficient for the impact, and the impact is sufficient for the shattering. It is this chain 
of sufficient causes that makes your throw a sufficient cause of the shattering, rather 
than a partial or contributory cause. We can now give the following necessary and 
sufficient condition for causation, covering both the sufficient and insufficient 
varieties. Following Schaffer [2001] let’s call this the process-linkage theory:154
 
PL An event x is a (sufficient) cause of an event y iff x and y are parts of a 
(sufficient) causal process in which x occurs prior to y. 
 
This principle tells us that x sufficiently causes y just in case x and y are part of a 
temporally ordered series of events, each one of which does all of the causal work 
required for the next. For insufficient causation, simply delete the parenthesised 
occurrences of ‘sufficient’. Direct causation will be a limiting case of causation as 
defined by PL, where x and y are adjacent events in the series. A further constraint on 
causal work is evident: it is not the sort of thing that gets done twice. If the causal 
work required involves the exchange of a conserved quantity, for example, then once 
this quantity has been exchanged, it doesn’t get re-exchanged. Any more quantities 
that are exchanged will be parts of different causal processes. Put more simply, once 
you have done the causal work required to build a wall, there just isn’t anything left to 
do. Two people can certainly build the same wall, but they do not replicate causal 
work, they share it. Let us call this view the ‘causal work principle’, CW, and define 
it as follows: 
 
CW The causal work required for a given effect is done at most once. 
 
                                                 
154 I borrow Schaffer’s terminology only; I do not intend by this to imply that Schaffer would accept 
the version of the process-linkage theory I am describing here. 
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The final thesis about causal work I would like to endorse concerns how causal work 
is related to sufficiency as detailed in 1.4. Consider again the process of building a 
wall. You partake in this process by cementing individual bricks in place, causing a 
specific aggregate configuration of bricks to exist. The aggregate is plausibly not 
identical to the wall, due to their (plausibly) different modal properties; it is, however, 
sufficient for it, and the wall is clearly “nothing over and above” the aggregate. Once 
you have finished assembling the aggregate, then, your causal work is done. It isn’t as 
though you assemble the bricks, take a couple of days off, then come back to finish 
the job. What goes for walls goes for synchronic sufficiency generally.155 The lack of 
any more causal work to be done, at least on the present understanding of causation, is 
necessary if the sufficiency is to be noncausal. Call this view ‘the transmission of 
causal work’, and define it thus: 
 
TCW If x is a direct sufficient cause of y and y is synchronically sufficient 
for z, then x does all the causal work required for the occurrence of z. 
 
Now from these principles of causal work, we can make some interesting derivations. 
First, note that we can derive the upwards causal transmission principle of 4.1 from 
GC and TCW. According to the first principle, doing the causal work required for an 
effect is a sufficient condition for directly causing it. But now from TCW it follows 
that the direct cause of y directly causes z. Thinking of causation in terms of pushing, 
pulling and ‘oomph’ makes it wholly unmysterious why Kim is so ready and willing 
to ‘push causation around’. I will not take the time to do so, but I am sure a similar 
principle could be formulated to enable us to derive the downwards transmission 
principle as well. After all, the causal work required for y and z is the same. If 
causation is thought of in terms of process and transference, then it seems that causal 
transmission principles are virtually unavoidable. Still, I will not assume them in 
anything to follow, for I have no need of such principles. More importantly than the 
derivation of transmission principles, however, is that we can derive from our causal 
                                                 
155 At least the noncausal variety. I briefly discuss the complications posed for TCW by simultaneous 
causation when I consider rejection of TCW as a solution to the exclusion problem in 5.4. 
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work principles the very strong principle of causal exclusion often (at least tacitly) 
appealed to in formulations of the causal exclusion problem. We can derive this 
principle from PL, CW, and TCW; here is how the derivation goes. 
 
Suppose that y has a sufficient cause x at t. Then by PL, there is a sufficient causal 
process linking x and y. From this, it follows by definition of ‘sufficient causal 
process’ as a chain of direct sufficient causes, and the definition of direct sufficient 
causation in GC, that x does all the causal work required for the event x+ that follows it 
in the series. Now consider some event M that also occurs at t such that x≠M, and let 
us ask whether or not M can also be a cause of y at t. If it is, then by PL we know that 
there must be a causal process linking M and y. By CW we know that the causal work 
required for x+ gets done one time only, and all of it gets done by x. And the same 
follows, mutatis mutandis, for the causal work required for x++, and so on until we 
reach y. But from this it follows that there is no causal process whatever (sufficient or 
otherwise) linking M to any of the events in the process leading from x to y – for if 
there were, then at least some of the causal work required for one of these events 
would be done twice. And so by PL, since there is no causal process linking M to y, M 
is not a cause of y. Might M be a cause of some event for which one of the events in 
the process from x to y is noncausally sufficient? No. By TCW, all this causal work is 
also taken care of by the events in lower-level process. Notice that the inefficacy of M 
follows, given the process account, on the assumption of its non-identity with x. It 
follows that PL, CW and TCW entail the following variant of our principle OD3 of 4.4, 
got by replacing sufficiency with identity: 
 
OD4: if an event y has a sufficient cause or inducer x at t, then no event x’ is 
also a cause or inducer of y at t unless x=x’. 
 
Notice that this derivation depends only on PL as a necessary condition for causation 
– no inference drawn here requires the sufficiency conditional ‘if events are linked by 
a process, then they are causally related.’ Rather it is the other way around: the appeal 
to PL is of the form, if A causes B then there is a causal process linking A to B. That 
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PL could be a necessary condition for causation is precisely what we will deny in 5.5, 
for PL’s putative necessity, as we shall see, raises what I consider to be an 
insurmountable stack of counterexamples to the process-linkage view. 
 
OD4 is, I think, much more plausibly termed an ‘exclusion principle’ than the version 
due to Kim, which we examined in 3.3. Given that x causes y, OD4 literally excludes 
any other putative causes of y. And OD4 is equivalent to EX, except that the former 
covers sufficient causal inducement as well as sufficient causation. A troublesome 
tendency in the literature on mental causation has been to treat principles such as OD4 
as if they were of a piece with coincidence-motivated principles such as OD3. Kim, for 
instance, in the passage I quoted in 3.3, equivocates between talking of a lack of 
causal work for M to do, and the absurdity of causal overdetermination. As I take it I 
have shown, however, the principles are anything but equivalent. Combined with EM 
and CP, OD4 entails that mental and physical events are identical, and so on the present 
conception of events entails that mental and physical properties are identical.156 Now 
as we saw in 2.3, type identity and multiple realization do not combine happily. As 
such, in the remainder of this chapter, we will look at ways of resisting OD4. The 
tendency to regard OD4 as really just another way of affirming the absurdity of causal 
overdetermination is a troublesome one not least because it encourages the view that 
anyone who denies OD4 is endorsing an absurd position! Since OD4 follows from the 
causal work principles given above, then denying it will clearly involve a denial of at 
least one of these principles. For this reason, in the interests of clarity, I will not 
formulate the exclusion problem in terms of OD4. Instead, I will formulate it in terms 
of causal work principles, and so facilitate a more complete taxonomy of responses to 
the problem. 
 
                                                 
156 It should be noted that we do not require Kim-events in order to deduce type identity from this new 
causal argument. We could run the argument with Davidson-events, for instance; but in that case, we 
would have to run it twice, once for events, then again for the properties in virtue of which they are 
related as cause and effect. An advantage of Kim-events is that we only need to run the argument once 
– if the events are identical, so then are their constitutive properties. See 2.3 for further discussion of 
this point. 
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5.3. The causal exclusion problem 
As I said in 5.1, Kim’s refusal to assume CP results in a lot of unnecessary ‘pushing 
around’ of causation. In order to avoid this, we will rely on CP to generate the 
problem. Let us once more consider a putative case of mental causation M-to-M*, 
where there is a physical event P* that is noncausally sufficient for (say) a behaviour 
M*.157 Suppose that M and P occur at the same time. Unlike Kim, we will not assume 
that P is sufficient for M. Instead, we will appeal to our principles to show that if M 
causes M*, then M=P. Kim’s argument assumes that M supervenes on P in order to 
generate a problem for supervenience; we will show that the only relationship 
between M and P that allows M any causal work to do is identity, which raises exactly 
the same problem for supervenience, a fortiori. Consider the causal diagram below: 
 
M M* 
P P* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By EM, we know that M causes M*. Now by CP, (assuming P* to have a sufficient 
cause) we know that P* has a sufficient physical cause, P. But then from PL it follows 
that a sufficient causal process connects P with P*. Applying PL to M’s causing M*, 
we know that there must be a causal process connecting M with M*. Again, by 
definition it follows that M does at least some of the causal work required for its 
proximal effect M+, M+ does the causal work required for M++, and so on forwards 
until we reach M*. By TCW, however, we know that all the causal work required for 
M* is done by the event that directly causes P*, let’s call it P*-. But all the causal 
                                                 
157 As we saw in 5.1, Kim sets up the situation in terms of ‘mental-to-mental’ causation, and it is 
unlikely that he would count the causation of behaviour as an instance of this. Nothing turns on this 
difference, for all the central arguments go through mutatis mutandis regardless of how M* is 
conceived. I appeal to behaviour here because I do not wish to assume the supervenience of mental 
properties on  physical properties. However, since we already have good functional reductions of those 
behaviours that involve bodily movements to physiology, I take to be fairly uncontroversial that the 
assumption of behavioural supervenience is less problematic. See chapter 2 for details for the 
relationship between functional reduction and supervenience. 
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work required for P*- is done by P*--, and so on backwards until we reach P. But it 
now follows from CW that unless M is identical to one of the events in the process 
from P to P*, M cannot be a cause of M*. For M to cause M*, by PL it must be part of 
a process consisting of direct cause-effect pairs, each of which does some of the 
causal work required for the next. But causal work is done only once, and all the 
causal work to be done here is done by the events in the process from P to P*. Put 
simply, there is no way for M to be process-linked to M* unless it just is one of the 
links in the process from P to P*. We can think of it in the following metaphoric 
terms: M is trying to find some work to do, but there are no gaps in the process from P 
to P* for M to fill. Whichever way M looks, all the work is already done by 
something else. And so if M causes M*, then (given that M and P are simultaneous) it 
follows that M=P. Again, notice that in the above derivation, PL figures as a necessary 
condition on causation. We may now write down the premises behind the causal 
exclusion problem. Following Crane [1995], I will write them as a mutually 
inconsistent set of propositions.158 Putting the matter this way has the advantage of 
making transparent the taxonomy of possible solutions to the problem. 
 
EM Mental events cause behaviours. 
CP Every physical event y that has a sufficient cause at t, has a complete, 
sufficient physical cause x at t. 
¬ID Mental events are not identical to physical events. 
PL An event x is a (sufficient) cause of an event y iff x and y are parts of a 
(sufficient) causal process in which x occurs prior to y. 
CW The causal work required for a given effect is done at most once. 
TCW If x is a direct sufficient cause of y and y is synchronically sufficient 
for z, then x does all the causal work required for the occurrence of z. 
                                                 
158 Crane formulates the problem for Davidson events causally related in virtue of their properties; my 
treatment, of course, is in terms of causally related property-instances. There are other significant 
differences to Crane’s version, and I do not attribute the version I give to him. In particular, Crane runs 
the exclusion argument in terms of a principle of non-overdetermination, which he understands (as I 
do) as a ban on massive coincidence. Crane accepts that the efficacy of supervenient causes would not 
represent such coincidence, but thinks it must involve denial of a principle he terms the homogeneity of 
mental and physical causation. I will return to the issue of homogeneity in 5.4. See Crane [1995] p.229 
for details. 
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I omit GC and GC’ from this formulation for simplicity – nothing turns on this 
omission as PL presupposes GC and GC’ This is because the generativity principles, 
along with the definition of a causal process, serve to define the terms of PL. The six 
principles above are jointly inconsistent. Replacing PL, CW and TCW with OD4 yields 
an argument of similar form to the causal argument, with OD4 replacing the more 
liberal coincidence-based principle of non-overdetermination we employed. So 
formulated, we would have four inconsistent and independent theses, any three of 
which can be taken as premises in an argument for the negation of the remaining one. 
Stating the connection between causal exclusion as a problem on the one hand, and an 
argument on the other, in this way, is not new. It is implicit in Crane [1995] and 
explicit in Sturgeon [1998]. Sturgeon lists four inconsistent theses, which are, in 
essence, my EM, CP and ¬ID above, along with a principle of non-
overdetermination.159 And correspondingly, Sturgeon is able to generate four 
exclusion arguments, which involve endorsing three of the inconsistent theses as 
premises, yielding the negation of the other as a conclusion.160 For the time being, 
then, I will consider that we have six arguments here, each formed by endorsing the 
other five propositions as premises in order to deny either (i) EM, (ii) CP, (iii) ¬ID, (iv) 
PL (v) CW, (vi) TCW. 
 
The causal exclusion problem, when formulated (for instance) in Sturgeon’s terms, 
has seemed to many to be intractable, because each of the possible arguments yields 
the denial of a well-supported or else intuitively highly plausible thesis. For my part, I 
think that a great deal of this intractability stems from the fact that the problem is 
consistently stated in terms of a ban on overdetermination, the denial of which has 
been standardly considered too implausible to countenance. However, it is the denial 
of OD3 that is absurd; denying OD4 patently is not, as ¬OD4 does not entail widespread 
                                                 
159 I do not know whether Sturgeon would endorse OD4; but it seems clear he would endorse a 
coincidence based principle such as OD3. See Sturgeon [1998] pp.413-4. 
160 Horgan [2001] endorses alternative versions of Sturgeon’s four theses, along with the premise that 
mental properties are ‘real’, and correspondingly is able to generate not four but five arguments, the 
extra argument being one in favour of eliminativism. I am not convinced that mental property realism 
is not already implicit in EM, for on the view of events I endorse, if there are no mental properties, it is 
unclear that there are any mental events either. 
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coincidence. Casting the problem in terms of the principles that underpin OD4 makes 
our task appear far more tractable. In what follows, we will consider which of the six 
arguments supported by our present formulation of the problem is most plausible. 
This task is easier than it seems, for it is a relatively straightforward matter to dismiss 
those that entail ¬CW and ¬TCW, leaving us the task of arbitrating between arguments 
for (i) ¬EM, (ii) ¬CP, (iii) ID, and (iv) ¬PL.161 My overall strategy for the remainder of 
this chapter is to show that argument (iv) is by some considerable distance the most 
plausible of the four. In the next section, I briefly consider some extant denials of EM, 
CP, ¬ID and PL. I will suggest that any one of (i)-(iv) can be made plausible by the 
severity of the exclusion problem – if, for instance, ¬EM is the only way to solve the 
problem, then ¬EM! My treatment will be brief because in 5.5, I argue that there are 
clear counterexamples to PL, and that we should be in no doubt whatever about the 
best way to solve the exclusion problem – all we need to do is reject the process-
linkage account, which is highly dubious on independent grounds. As such, the 
remainder of this chapter ought to be seen merely as setting out the logical geography 
of responses to the exclusion problem. 
 
5.4. A brief taxonomy of solutions 
1. Denying CW 
¬CW makes the problem of finding causal work for M to do goes away – it can 
simply do the same work as P does, over again. But denying CW is implausible on 
general metaphysical grounds. Causal work, on the present conception, involves the 
transfer of conserved quantities. This being the case, it is arguably not possible to do 
the causal work necessary for a given event to be done twice. This is because the 
conserved quantities in question are quantifiable – “doing the work twice” is really 
just doing twice the work. Suppose two builders need to move a large stone, and 
move it together to its new location. The causal work here is not done twice; rather, it 
                                                 
161 Arguments (i), (ii) and (iii) have been endorsed in the literature, in various forms, as solutions to the 
exclusion problem. Explicit discussion of the nature of ‘causal work’ is quite thin on the ground; as 
such, so are explicit denials of process view of causation as solutions to the causal exclusion problem. 
There are, however, authors who implicitly deny the process account, by showing that on their account 
of causation, the problem does not arise. More on such theories is to follow. 
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is done once by two builders, each of whom does half the work. On the assumption 
that causal work involves the transfer of conserved quantities, it is simply not possible 
to do the same work twice. 
 
2. Denying TCW
We follow up the dismissal of (v) with an equally summary dismissal of argument 
(vi). ¬TCW makes the problem of finding causal work for M to do go away – for now 
there is extra work to be done in causing M* that is not done by any of the causes of 
P*. However, if TCW is false, then when you build a wall by laying the bricks in 
appropriate places, your work is not yet done – for in addition to producing this 
particular aggregate of bricks, you have to do the work of making it so that there is a 
wall where the aggregate is! In short, denying TCW is inconsistent with the view that 
in doing the causal work necessary for the occurrence of an effect y, we thereby do 
the causal work necessary for all effects that are nothing over and above y. I note in 
passing that there may be relations of synchronic sufficiency according to which TCW 
comes out false – namely the sort of simultaneous causal relations that Lowe 
endorses.162 In those cases, clearly all the causal work isn’t done merely by causing 
the synchronically sufficient event. However, EM tells us that mental events cause 
behaviours, and these latter we know are not synchronically caused by physical 
events. As such, even if TCW is not true for all synchronic sufficiency relations, it is 
clearly true in the cases that matter to us. 
 
3. Denying EM
Denying EM solves the problem of causal exclusion by biting the bullet, and accepting 
that mental events are inefficacious on the grounds that they do no causal work. I will 
mention two theories that can plausibly, although not uncontroversially, be grouped 
together as denying EM. The controversy stems from the fact that they can also be 
seen as denying what Crane terms the ‘homogeneity of mental and physical 
causation’.163 I will return to this point presently; what we can all agree upon is that 
                                                 
162 Lowe [2000]. See 1.4, 3.2 and 3.3 of this work for brief discussion. 
163 See Crane [1995] pp.229-33. 
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the theories to be described deny EM on the assumption that the process account of 
causation is true. Into this category, we can place Kim [1984]. Kim once believed in a 
thing called ‘Supervenient Causation’ which obtains between supervenient properties 
whose supervenience bases cause each other.164 Supervenient causation enables us to 
hold on to CP, ⌐ID, and the process account via the thought that only subvenient 
causation is causation proper. Physical properties do all the causal work; supervenient 
mental properties ‘cause’ solely in virtue of the causal relationship between their 
subvening properties, for as we have seen there is no causal work left over for them to 
do. Supervenient “causation”, at least for Kim [1998], is, as we saw in 5.2, a pseudo-
process “like the series of shadows cast by a moving car….” Given the process view 
of causation, then, supervenient causation is perhaps best seen as a form of 
epiphenomenalism.  
 
Jackson and Pettit [1990] offer a broadly similar account. They accept that the 
exclusion problem entails ¬EM, and present a phenomena-saving account of how it is 
possible to give causal explanations in terms of inefficacious properties. Jackson and 
Pettit distinguish process from program explanations. Program explanations work 
because instances of the properties they cite ensure (or at least make it significantly 
probable) that a process of a certain kind occurs. For instance, the fragility of a vase 
causally explains its breaking despite the fact that dispositional properties do not do 
any causal work. This fact is then explained via the thought that fragility programs for 
its categorical base properties, instances of which do figure in the causal process that 
causes the breakage. Mental properties, according to Jackson and Pettit, are causally 
relevant without being causally efficacious. The central burden of such a theory is that 
if the process account is true for physical causation, and mental causal relevance 
supervenes on it, then an explanation is needed as to what distinguishes the genuine 
relevance of mental properties from the correlations between supervenient but 
causally irrelevant properties, like ‘shadows cast by a moving car’. The relevance of 
mental events cannot, of course, be distinguished from the irrelevance of shadows by 
                                                 
164 See Kim [1984] for details of this theory, which Kim no longer endorses. 
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dint of an appeal to causal work – rather, we have to rely on things like explanation, 
counterfactual dependency, and laws.  
 
Giving such an account has not proved an easy task. On Jackson and Pettit’s view, for 
instance, it is not sufficient for causal relevance that a property ensures that a process 
occurs. The programming property must also figure in an explanation that carries 
modal information not carried by the process explanation. In order to do this, 
programming causes must exhibit “invariance of effect under variation of realization,” 
([1990b] p.202). Call this ‘realizer-invariance’ for short. All instances of a property 
such as temperature instantiate the same thermodynamic laws whatever their 
microphysical realizations, and so temperature is a genuinely relevant property. But 
now suppose that all and only things at temperature T emit a characteristic red glow. 
It looks as though explanations citing the glow will be just as realizer-invariant as 
those citing T, for the glow by hypothesis will not depend on how temperature T is 
realized in any particular case; and the glow will clearly program for the efficacious 
microphysical properties that figure in the corresponding process explanation. But 
problematically, the glow seems a clear cut example of a causally irrelevant property. 
I should note in passing that I agree with Jackson and Pettit that realizer-invariance is 
an important feature of causal explanations involving realized (or more generally, 
supervenient) properties – indeed, in 6.2, I appeal to this very fact to explain why 
supervenient properties are explanatorily non-redundant. My point here is simply that 
it is less than clear that realizer-invariance provides a sufficient condition for causal 
relevance. 
 
I reiterate at this point what I said in 3.1, that given the weight of prima facie 
evidence in favour of EM, anyone wishing to deny it had better have run out of 
plausible alternatives. Since the evidence is only prima facie, however, it is defeasible 
by (inter alia) the absence of any alternative solutions to the exclusion problem. If, in 
the end, there is no way to solve the problem other than giving up on mental 
causation, then so be it. Now as I mentioned, the accounts described above can also be 
taken to be denying (not EM, but) a further assumption, namely that mental and 
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physical causation are ‘homogeneous’. As will I point out presently, this assumption 
is implicit in PL, so I group those who deny homogeneity together as endorsing ¬PL, 
of which more below. 
 
4. Denying CP
Denying CP solves the problem by allowing us to consider the mental and physical 
causes of a behaviour as jointly causally sufficient for it. This is probably the least 
popular of all the responses to the causal exclusion problem, probably because 
denying CP is typically associated with positions such as emergentism and dualism. 
These positions are unpopular for two reasons. First, although, for instance, 
emergentism is coherent, there is arguably no reason to think that it is true.165 If 
particles were accelerated without the need for particle accelerators, or muscles 
contracted without any preceding brain activity, then we would have reason to 
actively doubt CP. The phenomena seemingly aren’t like that though, and the second 
reason ¬CP is unpopular is that as we saw in 3.2, it is possible to argue for CP on that 
very basis. Set aside for the moment the question whether the argument is any good; 
what I take to be relatively uncontroversial is that there is no evidence against CP.  
 
Cartwright is often interpreted as denying CP (and she may well deny it) but in fact 
her arguments only support the weaker claim that we have no reason to believe it is 
true. It is worth taking a moment to see why this is so. Cartwright argues that there is 
no reason to suppose the motion of a leaf on the wind is governed by physical laws.166 
The reason, roughly, is that physical laws are tested against very specific and 
carefully controlled background conditions. Experimenters testing a force law for two 
charged particles will take great care to screen off any external forces that may affect 
the way the particles move. The result is that the law in question is confirmed (or 
disconfirmed) only relative to the model in which it was tested, and so we are 
epistemically justified in generalising it only to relevantly similar situations. Surely, 
                                                 
165 In chapter 7 I will agree with this, but claim that given the currently available evidence, the mere 
possibility of emergence, as detailed in chapter 6, is enough to render CP empirically unsupported. 
166 Cartwright [1994] pp.234-5 
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one might object, the air molecules whose motion composes the wind act on the leaf 
by exerting forces on it? Cartwright denies there is any reason to believe this either, as 
forces, she claims, also belong to the specific models within which force laws are 
tested. 
 
I will make only two very brief points in response. First, Cartwright’s argument is an 
epistemic one against the justification for CP, and as such provides no reason to think 
that CP is false. The fact that we test laws against specific models does not entail that 
the laws are not universal. Loewer makes a similar point, claiming that all Cartwright 
has done to undermine CP is point to the possibility that regularities that hold under 
laboratory conditions might fail under less carefully controlled conditions.167 It is, as 
Loewer points out, quite another thing to have a reason for thinking that regularities 
that hold in the laboratory do not hold outside of it. Second, I would tentatively ask: 
surely one of the central marks of a good scientific theory is that it generates novel 
predictions that turn out to be true; but what is a novel prediction if not one that goes 
beyond the model against which the predicting laws have been tested? If that is true, 
then we have reason to believe that there are some regularities that hold both inside 
and outside of the laboratory. Denying CP is consistent, but there is no independent 
reason to do so. Still, if denying CP proved to be the only way of solving the exclusion 
problem, then that in itself would count as just the sort of reason we lack. 
 
5. Denying ¬ID 
This solution is the one favoured by Kim, and (obviously) solves the exclusion 
problem by ‘allowing’ mental events to do exactly the same causal work as physical 
events. As we saw in 2.3, on the assumption that mental properties are multiply 
realized, identifying mental property-instances with physical property-instances 
results in eliminativism. Now I am considerably in sympathy with those tempted to 
object at this point that the conjunction of multiple realization and ¬eliminativism is 
at least as plausible as any of the other premises of the exclusion argument. If that is 
                                                 
167 In his [2001a] pp.52-3. 
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true, then ¬ID really ought to be the last premise we reject, for if we have independent 
reason for endorsing any of the premises, it is surely this one. In addition, it seems 
that the exclusion argument for ID will generalize to show that all efficacious 
properties are identical to properties of basic physics; after all, nothing in the present 
formulation depends on any particular relation of non-identity between mental and 
physical events.168 The problem is that anything that isn’t identical to the physical 
will be deprived of causal work by the sufficient physical causes, unless it is identical 
to those causes. But now anything that is multiply realized by the physical will be 
eliminated, and that makes the elimination everyone’s problem. 
 
Worse than that, though, what if it turns out that it’s multiple realization all the way 
down without end? As Schaffer [2003] points out, that there is no fundamental level is 
an open empirical possibility, given current evidence. But if the efficacy of every 
property is excluded by the efficacy of another, then there is no efficacy at all – this is 
the problem of causal drainage.169 And if every property-instance must be identified 
with an instance of one of its realizers, then it’s elimination all the way down too – 
call this the problem of property-drainage. The drainage problems suggest an obvious 
reductio: “it’s an open empirical possibility whether or not there is a fundamental 
level; it’s not an open empirical possibility that there are neither any properties nor 
any causation; therefore the existence of properties and causation does not depend on 
the existence of a fundamental level. But if the exclusion argument for ID is sound, 
the existence of properties and causation depends on the existence of a fundamental 
level. Therefore the argument is not sound.” Of course, Kim must agree with the 
objector that the very existence of causation and properties can’t depend on there 
being a fundamental level; what he denies is the conditional, if the exclusion argument 
                                                 
168 I am calling this relation ‘realization’ here, but I intend this in the broad sense described in our 
discussion of the multiple realizability of temperature in 2.3, according to which the specifications that 
define the second-order realized properties need not be causal. 
169 See Block [2003] for an account of the problem, and an attempt at reconstructing Kim’s solution, to 
be found in Kim [1998] pp.84-7, pp.116-8, and Kim [2003]. I understood little of Kim’s solution until I 
read Block; my summary treatment here is attributable to his [2003], except where I support Kim 
below in denying the causal drainage problem. I follow Block in taking Kim’s remarks of [1998] 
pp.84-7 concerning the distinction between levels and orders to be irrelevant to the problem at hand, 
and describe instead only the much more plausible response Kim (arguably) gives at pp.116-8, and 
which Kim explicitly endorses in his [2003] reply to Block. 
 - 163 - 
in sound, then the existence of causation and properties depends on there being such a 
level. It is worth taking a moment to see how Kim’s denial of this conditional works. 
 
Kim has two related reasons for denying that the exclusion argument makes the 
existence of causation and properties dependent on the existence of a fundamental 
level. Both strategies have a certain plausibility, and can be found in Kim [2003]. The 
first strategy, in very rough outline, consists in the claim that although there may not 
be a fundamental level in the sense of there existing any non-composite particulars, 
there is no multiple realization between ‘levels’ understood as ordered by 
microphysical mereology. An instance of the property of being H2O is identical to a 
specific mereological configuration of atoms; the atoms in turn are identical to 
specific mereological configurations of subatomic particles, and so on indefinitely if 
there are no mereological atoms. The situation is importantly different to that of 
thermodynamics, where no particular structural property is necessary in an aggregate 
of molecules for it to be at a given temperature.170 However, Kim claims, the property 
of being H2O is identical to a structural property of atoms, which in turn are identical 
to structural properties of quarks, and so on all the way down. If there is endless 
mereological decomposition, then that merely reflects the fact that certain 
microphysical properties are infinitely structural, and not that every such property is 
realized by a distinct and even more microphysical property. Thus the efficacy of 
instances of microphysical properties is not excluded by the efficacy of the property-
instances at the next mereological level down, for these ‘two’ instances are in fact 
one. 
 
A response to the first strategy will lead us nicely into the second. Response: isn’t it 
also an open empirical question whether microphysical properties are multiply 
realized at the next mereological level down? Might not the property of being a quark, 
say, be like temperature in this respect? I suppose it might be argued that even a given 
                                                 
170 I do not intend by this comparison to attribute my views on thermodynamics to Kim. As we saw in 
2.3, Kim would maintain that thermodynamic properties are eliminated by functional reduction and the 
causal inheritance principle. 
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chemical element will, on different occasions, be realized by different quantum states 
of the subatomic particles that compose it. The second strategy is, to my mind, a 
knock-down argument of the drainage problem, and it relies on the fact that the 
exclusion argument depends on the completeness of physics. If the quantum level is 
multiply realized at the next mereological level down Q-, then arguably quantum 
physics will be causally incomplete due to the possibility of quantum events having 
Q- causes but no quantum causes. If Q- is causally complete, then causal efficacy and 
properties will drain down to the Q- level; but the crucial thing is that the drainage 
will not go down any further, for there will be no level with respect to which Q- is 
causally incomplete to exclude the efficacy of Q- causes. This is closely related to the 
first strategy, in the following way: if Q- is causally complete, then it will not be 
multiply realized. But then Q- properties will be identical to structural properties of 
Q--, and so on all the way down. If, on the other hand, it really is multiple realization 
all the way down, then no level will be causally complete, and so the causal exclusion 
problem cannot get off the ground. Either way, there is no problem of property or 
causal drainage. Neither strategy, of course, prevents the efficacy of all other 
properties (and so too their reality, given the eliminative consequences of combining 
instance-identity with multiple realization) draining down to the first properties that 
are not multiply realized. Physiological and thermodynamic properties, for instance, 
will not survive; certain basic chemical properties (such as the property of being H2O) 
plausibly will. I take it that Kim is more likely to see this parsimonious consequence 
as a virtue of his theory than a vice. 
 
One can, of course, be an identity theorist without being an eliminativist, by endorsing 
alternative metaphysics of the things being identified. One such position, we have 
already encountered in 2.3. If Shoemaker is right that properties are sets of 
conditional powers, then we can identify mental property-instances with parts of 
physical property instances. Correspondingly, this partial endorsement of ID solves 
the exclusion problem via the claim that mental events do part of the causal work 
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required for their behavioural effects.171 Notice that the strong Shoemakerian 
metaphysic, according to which properties are sets of causal powers, is required for 
this identification to go through – on the weaker (and correspondingly, far less 
controversial) view that properties confer sets of causal powers on their bearers but 
are not identical to such sets, the efficacy of mental properties will once again be 
excluded. For if the powers conferred by mental properties are subsets of those 
conferred by physical properties, then the causal powers of a mental property-instance 
will be identical to a subset of the powers of a distinct physical property-instance. 
Which, if anything, makes it even more transparent that mental property-instances are 
shorn of causal work by their physical realizers. The trouble now is that identifying 
properties with sets of causal powers brings with it some heavy-duty metaphysical 
baggage. For instance, it entails that the laws of nature are necessarily true – for 
properties could not behave in a different way and yet remain the same properties. 
And relatedly, it entails that all causes metaphysically necessitate their effects – a 
position many would consider untenable, given the views (i) that cause and effect are 
distinct existences, and (ii) that there are no metaphysically necessary connections 
between distinct existences.172
 
A second brand of identity that avoids eliminativism is trope theory.173 According to 
this view, the relata of causation are not property-instances conceived as structured 
particulars comprising individuals, properties and times, but particularised properties, 
thought of as, for instance, as something like ‘this yellowness’. Properties, on this 
account, are classes of tropes related by relations of resemblance or similarity. Now 
this metaphysic invites the view, endorsed in Robb [1997], that EM and CP are claims 
                                                 
171 Or alternatively, and perhaps better, they do those parts of the causal work that are required for their 
behavioural effects. The extra bits of work that physical events do, although required for particular 
realizations of behaviour, and not required for the behaviours themselves. See 2.3 for discussion of the 
related subset account of realization. 
172 The problem mentioned here (to the extent that it is a problem at all) is a problem for functionalism 
about any domain of properties. Any property whose individuation involves having an effect will be 
one whose instances are metaphysically connected to instances of the effect. On the Shoemaker 
account, this is a problem not just for functionalists, but for all properties, since in effect, Shoemaker 
holds that all properties are functional (though not necessarily second-order). These matters are beyond 
the scope of the present work. 
173 See Robb [1997]; Ehring [1999] for discussion of the application of trope theory to the problem of 
causal exclusion. 
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about mental tropes, while ¬ID is a claim about mental and physical properties. And 
identifying tropes does not force us to identify the similarity classes of which they are 
members, for a single individual can be a member of many such classes. Trope theory 
promises an elegant solution to the exclusion problem.174 However, it too has quite a 
lot of baggage, most of which concerns its appeal to relations between tropes to give 
an account of properties. How is resemblance to be understood, if not in terms of 
resemblance in respect of a shared property? Trope theorists must avail themselves of 
primitive resemblance relations to unify the tropes into classes. But how then are 
resemblance relations to be distinguished from other (i.e. causal) relations? We seem 
to need another resemblance relation that takes relations as relata. It is not clear to me 
whether this regress is either infinite or vicious, but either way it makes trope theory 
look anything but elegant as a general metaphysic of properties. Still, if ID is the only 
way to solve the exclusion problem, then trope theory, like Shoemaker’s causal 
powers account, might recommend itself as among the most plausible ways to 
preserve realism about nonphysical properties. 
 
6. Denying PL
This strategy is implicit in several distinct responses to the exclusion problem. These 
approaches can be thought of as falling into two broad categories: those that deny 
‘homogeneity’, and those that endorse an alternative theory of causation. The two 
approaches are intimately related – the first involves accepting that something like a 
process-linkage account is correct for physical causation, but denying that it provides 
the correct model for mental causation. The second involves endorsing a general 
theory of causation and showing that given the theory, there is no problem of causal 
exclusion; such a theory must be inconsistent with PL and so (by implication) this 
approach involves denying the process-linkage account. For Crane, the ‘homogeneity 
of mental and physical causation’ means homogeneity of the concept of causation 
                                                 
174 Noordhof [1998] argues that tropes in fact only relocate the problem, for there are clear cases where 
x’s being a trope of P seems less causally relevant than x’s being a trope of Q. For instance, Yablo’s 
pigeon, conditioned to peck at red things, fails to peck at coloured things unless they are coloured red 
(Yablo [1992]). The redness of an apple seems clearly more relevant to a particular peck than does its 
colouredness. Trope theory, however, struggles to accommodate such distinctions, for it seems that 
nothing has the effects it does in virtue of being a member of a similarity class. 
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employed in EM and CP.175 Notice that this assumption is implicit in our principles of 
causal work – PL is taken as a necessary and sufficient condition for causation 
simpliciter, not any particular variety thereof. It might be suggested, however, that 
since we have conceived causal work in terms of physical work, the theory of 5.2 is 
most suitable as a theory of physical causation. Following this line of thought, we 
ought then to reformulate PL in terms of physical causation. Given the further 
assumption of homogeneity, this new principle will then apply to the causes premised 
by EM, and the argument goes through exactly as before. 
 
Crane takes homogeneity to be an essential part of any causal argument for 
physicalism, for such arguments have it in common, he claims, that they all motivate 
physicalism via “conflict between mental causation and the completeness of physics 
[my italics].”176 I am unable to agree, as I take the argument I presented in 3.4 to 
motivate physicalism by appeal to coincidences. As I argued in 3.3, and again in 4.4, 
generating the required coincidences does not require that mental and physical causes 
are related in the same way to any particular effect. For instance, in 4.4, we saw that 
the fact that the behavioural effects of a mental cause always have sufficient physical 
inducers stands in need of explanation just as much as if the mental and physical 
causes were related to behavioural effects in exactly the same way. Homogeneity is 
certainly required in the exclusion argument, however, and the reason is simple. If 
mental causes do not cause their effects by doing causal work, then quite plainly it 
does not count against EM if the conjunction of CP, ¬ID and PL leaves no causal work 
left for mental events to do. 
 
Of course, denying homogeneity leaves room for supervenient properties and 
programmers to be genuine causes after all. Once it is granted that mental causation is 
of a different kind to physical causation, we are free to maintain that program 
explanations do cite genuine causes, but that these causes aren’t the same kind of 
causes cited in process explanations; or that supervenient causation is genuine 
                                                 
175 See his [1995] p.219 and pp.232-5. 
176 Crane [1995] p.235. 
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causation, of a different kind to subvenient causation. Such accounts will still face the 
problem outlined in (3) above, viz. that it is not easy to articulate a counterfactual or 
law-based criterion that adequately distinguishes genuine causes from epiphenomena. 
An appeal to causal work would solve this problem, but of course no such appeal is 
available. It is difficult to see how to arbitrate between the view that denying 
homogeneity describe mental properties as epiphenomena, and the view that they 
describe them as causes of a different kind. Notice, however, that inhomogeneity 
accounts provide an obvious rejoinder to proponents of PL – for they might simply 
insist that process-linkage is causation proper, and that merely calling a relation other 
than process-linkage ‘type-X causation’ doesn’t make it a genuinely causal relation. 
This, I take it, is one of the central reasons why Kim no longer endorses supervenient 
causation. I am in agreement with Crane that an “exchange of intuitions about what 
exactly ‘epiphenomenon’ means” would be fruitless.177 We should keep the 
possibility of the inhomogeneity of mental and physical causation in mind – indeed, 
as I mention in 5.5, there are those who take certain difficulties in the analysis of 
causation to suggest that the concept of causation itself (regardless of domain) is 
multifarious. If this is true, then indeed mental and physical causation may be 
inhomogeneous, not because different concepts of causation apply in the mental and 
physical case, but because the concept that does apply itself picks out different 
relations depending on context. 
 
The process account can be endorsed as a theory of physical causation and denied as a 
theory of mental causation; it can also be denied as a theory of any kind of causation, 
which is how I read Yablo [1992].178 Crane, however, attributes a denial of 
homogeneity to Yablo.179 Given Yablo’s reliance on counterfactuals, this is 
understandable, for appealing to counterfactuals is a common way to try to account 
for the causal relevance or efficacy of states that are not causes in the same way as 
physical causes. Now I do not know whether Yablo would agree that his theory makes 
                                                 
177 Crane [1995] p.234. 
178 See 4.3 for an account of Yablo’s theory of causation. 
179 In his [1995] p.234. 
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physical and mental causation inhomogeneous; but the reason I do not know this is 
that I do not know whether or not Yablo holds that the process account (or anything 
like it) is true for physical causation. What I do know is that if the process-linkage 
account is rejected, then pace Crane, accounts such as Yablo’s do not have to deny 
homogeneity. Refer back to the causal diagram at the beginning of 5.3. It is perfectly 
consistent to maintain that M causes M*, P causes P*, but that neither M nor P does 
the causal work necessary for M* or P* respectively. How so? M’s causing M* 
consists, for Yablo, in counterfactual dependence plus proportionality; but nothing 
prevents us from holding the same about P’s causing P*. It is only if we insist in 
addition that P causes P* by virtue of a causal process that we have to accept that M’s 
relation to M* can’t be the same as P’s relation to P*. But why insist on that? It seems 
quite natural for Yablo to maintain that causation consists in counterfactual 
dependency plus proportionality, and nothing else. It is of course open to Yablo to 
maintain that in addition to the other requirements, physical causes must also be 
process-linked to their effects. My point, though, is that an additional subscription to 
the process account for physical causation is independent of the counterfactual and 
proportionality elements of Yablo’s theory. 
 
Once the process account is denied even for physical causation, nothing stands in the 
way of the relation that holds between M and M* being just the same relation as the 
relation that holds between P and P*. On this view it is the relata that differ between 
mental and physical causation; the relation itself is the same. Notice that this makes 
the task of distinguishing real causes from epiphenomena without appealing to causal 
work everyone’s problem, and not just a problem for those wishing to give an account 
of mental causation. It is of course an open question whether any such account can be 
given; however if Yablo’s account is successful (and I will not here attempt to address 
the question whether or not it is) then the exclusion problem is solved without the 
need to deny homogeneity. Counterfactual dependency plus proportionality between 
physical causes and their effects, clearly does not exclude the very same relations 
holding between the mental causes and their effects. 
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Horgan has recently advocated a theory of causation not dissimilar to Yablo’s.180 
According to Horgan, the concepts of causation and causal explanation have implicit 
‘level-parameters’. He seems to argue as follows. First, he claims that causal 
explanation involves subsumption of events under appropriate counterfactual-
supporting generalizations. Second, he argues that different ontological levels are 
characterised by different such generalizations – the appropriate generalizations for 
explaining a behaviour will be psychological in character, whereas those appropriate 
for explaining a physical event will be physical. Third, he appears to endorse the 
view, shared by Baker [1993], that the concept of causation is not separable from the 
concept of causal explanation. But from these theses it follows that there will be many 
levels of causation, which complement, but do not compete with, each other. There is 
no exclusion problem because mental and physical causal explanations have different 
explananda. Since the level-parameters are not explicit in claims of causal efficacy, 
we are apt to treat efficacy as efficacy simpliciter. This, Horgan claims, is a mistake – 
the exclusion problem is a ‘cognitive illusion’ that occurs when we fail to fully 
understand what it is that causal claims claim. The precise details are unimportant for 
my present purposes. What matters is that in indexing the truth of causal claims to 
causal explanatory claims, and these latter to counterfactuals, Horgan denies PL, for as 
I take it is by now familiar, process-linkage between events x and y is by no means a 
necessary condition for x and y to instantiate a counterfactual-supporting 
generalization. In addition, I can discern nothing in Horgan’s views that might count 
as a denial of homogeneity – for he endorses just the same criteria for the causal-
explanatory relevance of both mental and physical properties, relative to their proper 
levels. 
 
Finally, Menzies [2003] endorses a theory of causation that is similar to those of 
Horgan and Yablo in maintaining that causation is an intra-level relation. Menzies 
goes further, however, in explicitly arguing that his account is consistent with 
                                                 
180 See his [2001], which develops themes introduced in his [1997]. 
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homogeneity. The account he gives is as follows. First, he defines a process as a 
temporally ordered sequence of events, and holds that: 
 
The counterfactual dependence of E on C relative to the model X picks out a 
process…if and only if the process is present in all the most similar C-worlds 
generated by the model that are E-worlds and is absent in all the most similar 
¬C-worlds generated by the model that are ¬E-worlds. 
 
Causation is then defined by Menzies as follows: 
 
C is a cause of the distinct state E relative to the model X of an actual situation 
if and only if 
 
1. E counterfactually depends on C relative to the model; 
2. this counterfactual dependency picks out a process; 
3. this process connects C and E in the actual situation.181 
 
The idea here is that relative to a physiological explanatory model, a behaviour will 
depend counterfactually on physiological causes; similarly mutatis mutandis for a 
psychological model. Crucially, for Menzies, the counterfactual dependency of 
behaviour on mental causes will pick out a psychological process, and its dependency 
on physiological causes will pick out a different, physiological process.182 Call the 
behaviour B, and let it depend counterfactually on mental cause M. On the 
psychological model, given multiple realization, the set of closest M-worlds that are 
B-worlds will include worlds at which the physiological process that actually realizes 
M does not occur. There is no exclusion problem, on this view, because CP and EM are 
indexed to different models, and so the relevant counterfactual dependencies will pick 
out different processes. Although Menzies appeals to the notion of a process, he 
detaches this from any account of how the events in the process are linked. In 
particular, there is no mention of causal work – distinct processes can coexist within 
different models, as there is no supposition that the events in the process do the causal 
work necessary for the events that follow them. Thus Menzies too (implicitly) denies 
                                                 
181 See Menzies [2003] p.212 for the definitions quoted here. Care must be taken not to confuse 
Menzies’ talk of process with the process-linkage account. No flow of conserved quantities is 
necessary, for Menzies, for a sequence of events to count as a process. 
182 See his [2003] pp.215-23 for the detailed application of his theory to the exclusion problem. 
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PL. He endorses homogeneity, as the concept of causation defined above is applied 
equally to both mental and physical causes. That is, his theory contains no admission 
that physical processes are somehow different, or that the events that form a physical 
process are linked in a stronger way than those of a process defined by a non-physical 
model. 
 
The accounts I have grouped together as denying PL all have a common feature, 
which is that they all seek to define causation in terms of extrinsic relations between 
events. On Yablo’s account, for instance, causation between actual events involves 
facts about what goes on at other worlds; on Horgan’s account, it involves the events 
instantiating counterfactual-supporting generalizations. These accounts, as I will 
explain in the next section, can be further grouped together as probability accounts of 
causation; we turn now to the question whether causation is most plausibly analysed 
in terms of probability or process. It is widely accepted that no extant theory of 
causation accommodates all the relevant causal phenomena. However, I will argue in 
what follows that process accounts are doomed to failure in a way that probability 
accounts are not. For while probability accounts at least offer the promise of being 
able to accommodate problem cases, process accounts are forced to deny that certain 
problem cases are cases of causation at all. 
 
5.5. Causation: probability or process? 
My argument in this section will be brief. Much of what I have to say more or less 
reiterates Schaffer [2000], and especially [2001]. Following Schaffer I distinguish two 
broad categories of theories of causation, viz. probability and process accounts. The 
process account we have already examined (at least in one form) in 5.2-5.4 above, and 
it is PL to which I will refer when, in what follows, I speak of process accounts. 
Among probability accounts are the various regularity and counterfactual theories 
according to which causation is a matter of the right dependency relationships 
between events, regardless of how, if at all, the events are physically connected. The 
reason these accounts can be grouped under the heading of probability accounts is that 
they are more-or-less convergent for indeterministic causation. In this case, law-based 
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accounts, for instance, will hold that causation involves a lawful regularity between 
the occurrence of the cause and an increased probability of occurrence of the effect; 
counterfactual theories will hold that if the cause had not occurred, then the 
probability of the effect’s occurrence would have been less. I will first briefly discuss 
problems for each style of account, and point to the manner in which each can be seen 
as feeding off the weaknesses of the other. I suggest, also following Schaffer, that if 
there is to be an account of causation that accommodates all the relevant phenomena, 
then it must include an appeal to probability – no “pure” process-linkage account such 
as PL will suffice, for there are just too many clear-cut cases of causation that such 
accounts are in principle unable to cover. My own contribution will be to suggest that 
once this much is admitted, the exclusion problem disappears, for it is only on a 
“pure” process account that the problem arises. The exclusion problem depends on 
process-linkage as a necessary condition for causation; but this is precisely the claim 
that renders the account subject to counterexamples, and requires the incorporation of 
elements of the probability view. 
 
Now in 5.4, we saw that there are several probability accounts according to which the 
exclusion problem does not arise. For instance, Yablo’s proportionality account, 
Menzies’ counterfactual account, and Horgan’s causal explanatory account. In 
general, there just isn’t anything peculiar in the thought that, for instance, both M and 
P raise the probability of M*, perhaps to differing degrees; or that M* depends 
counterfactually on both M and P. Construing causation in probabilistic terms invites 
what Horgan terms ‘causal compatibilism’ – the view that mental and physical 
causation do not exclude each other, and maybe (as Yablo thinks) even complement 
each other.183 Conserved quantities such as energy and momentum, however, are 
importantly different. If two causes transfer the same amount of energy to an effect, 
then it receives double the amount transferred by each cause. Two billiard balls can 
not transfer the very same energy to a single ball with which they both collide. 
                                                 
183 Horgan [1998], [2001]; Yablo [1992]. Similar themes are to be found in Jackson and Pettit [1992] 
and Sober [1999], who argue that mental and physical explanations complement rather then exclude 
each other. We return to this matter in our discussion of novelty and redundancy in 6.2. 
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Process accounts of causation, it seems, entail that “real” causation is only done once. 
For the purposes of the argument to follow, I will consider only specific elements of 
probability and process accounts. In particular, the claims with which I want to take 
issue are (i) that raising the probability of an effect is a necessary condition for 
causing it; and (ii) that process-linkage is a necessary condition for causation. As we 
shall see, there are clear counterexamples to each of these claims. I will mention in 
passing similar counterexamples to the corresponding sufficiency claims. 
 
The relationship between probability and process accounts is interesting – there is a 
sense in which each can be seen to thrive off the failings of the other. It is widely 
accepted, for instance, that “late pre-emption” is a serious problem for probability 
accounts.184 Late pre-emption is a species of redundant causation in which the actual 
(pre-empting) cause of an effect cuts off another event that would have caused it in 
the absence of the actual cause. In cases of late pre-emption, the pre-empted cause is 
typically prevented from causing the effect by the fact that the process linking the 
actual cause to its effect has gone to completion. By way of illustration, consider the 
following case, described in Lewis [2000]. Billy and Suzy both throw rocks at a 
bottle. Suzy’s rock arrives fractionally before Billy’s rock, shattering the bottle, and 
Billy’s rock, we may suppose, makes no difference at all to the shattering, passing 
through the empty space where the bottle used to be. Suzy’s throw is the pre-empting 
cause, Billy’s the pre-empted cause. The trouble this scenario raises for probability 
accounts is that Suzy’s throw does not now raise the probability of the bottle’s 
shattering. Billy’s pre-empted throw, we may suppose, guarantees that the shattering 
will occur anyway, even if Suzy’s throw misses. In addition, suppose for the sake of 
argument that Billy’s rock is twice the size of Suzy’s. Suppose further that the impact 
of Suzy’s rock is only just enough to break the bottle in the actual world; in very close 
possible worlds the impact of her rock suffices only to move the bottle out of the way 
of Billy rock. Billy’s rock, on the other hand – had it impacted – would have been 
more than enough to cause the shattering. In the situation described, Suzy’s throw 
                                                 
184 See Lewis [1986d] for detailed discussion of various types of preemption. 
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actually lowers the probability of the shattering. Uncontroversially, however, Suzy’s 
throw causes the shattering, and so probability raising cannot be a necessary condition 
for causation. In passing, we may note that the situation described also provides a 
counterexample to the claim that probability-raising is sufficient for causation. 
Suppose Suzy is a bad throw, so that there is a significant probability that her rock 
will miss the bottle altogether. Billy never misses, so that if Suzy’s rock had missed, 
the bottle would certainly have shattered. Billy’s throw raises the probability of the 
shattering, but does not cause it. Therefore probability-raising is not sufficient for 
causation either. 
 
It is not clear whether late pre-emption is fatal for probability theories. The reason this 
isn’t clear is that it isn’t clear that no revision of the probability raising view will 
make the problem go away. What is needed is a revision to the theory that entails that 
Suzy’s rock is, while Billy’s rock is not, the cause of the shattering. I will mention 
two such revisions, viz. the view that events are fragile, and the revision to this latter 
approach – the theory of ‘causation as influence’ – endorsed by Lewis.185 The 
fragility approach holds that events are not modally robust, in the sense that they 
could not occur in a different manner to their actual manner of occurrence without 
being different events. According to this approach, Suzy’s throw, and not Billy’s, is 
the cause, because had Billy’s caused the bottle to shatter, it would have been a 
different shattering. Thought of in this way, Billy’s throw does not raise the 
probability of the particular shattering caused by Suzy’s rock to anywhere near the 
degree that Suzy’s throw does, if indeed it raises the probability of this shattering at 
all.186 There are two central difficulties with this approach. First, the view that events 
are fragile prevents makes a lot of our ordinary discourse about events come out false. 
We often talk of particular events being delayed, or altered, for instance, rather than 
of different events that might have occurred in place of the actual ones. More 
                                                 
185 See Lewis [2000] pp.185-9 for a discussion of the merits and drawbacks of fragility and the analysis 
of causation in terms of influence. 
186 I see no reason to assume that it is impossible for Billy’s rock to cause the bottle to shatter in exactly 
the same manner as Suzy’s, unless events have their causal histories, as well as their intrinsic 
properties, essentially. Either way, it will be extremely improbable that the shattering will have the 
same intrinsic properties if caused by Billy’s rock rather than Suzy’s. 
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seriously, fragility of the effect makes us count just about everything that occurs prior 
to it among its causes. The gravitational effect of Billy’s rock on the motion of the 
shards of glass produced by the impact of Suzy’s rock, for instance, will alter the 
manner of the shattering. If it had been raining at the time of impact, then the shards 
would have been wet, so the rain would have counted as a cause of the shattering. 
And so on. As a result of these problems, Lewis proposes the following revision to the 
fragility approach. Rather than treat events as fragile, he treats causation between 
robust events in terms of probability relation between fragile alterations of those 
events.187 An alteration of an event is taken to be a difference in the time and/or 
manner of its occurrence. Lewis thinks of causation in terms of influence, and says 
that: 
 
C influences E if and only if there is a substantial range C1, C2…of not-too-
distant alterations of C (including the actual alteration of C) and there is a 
range E1, E2…of not-too-distant alterations of E, at least some of which differ, 
such that if C1 had occurred, E1 would have occurred, and if C2 had occurred, 
E2 would have occurred, and so on.188
 
Lewis’s thought seems to be that if the manner of Suzy’s throw is varied (e.g. by 
using a heavier rock), then the manner of occurrence of the shattering varies 
correspondingly; on the other hand, varying the manner of Billy’s throw would make 
no difference to which alteration of the shattering occurs. So Suzy’s throw does, while 
Billy’s throw does not, influence the shattering. I am prepared to accept this, but only 
on the proviso that the times of Suzy’s and Billy’s throws are invariant. The reason is 
simple: if temporal alterations are allowed, then Billy’s throw will influence the 
shattering as well. All you have to do is make it ever so slightly earlier. But if this is 
allowed, then there will be a range of alterations of Billy’s throw (all occurring at or 
before a given time very close to the actual time of occurrence) that are related to a 
range of alterations of the shattering. But now it looks as though influence is far too 
cheap to do justice to the intuition that Billy’s throw does not cause the shattering. 
The trouble for Lewis’s theory, of course, is that prohibiting temporal alteration looks 
                                                 
187 Lewis [2000] pp.189-91. 
188 Lewis [2000] p.190. 
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terribly ad hoc. Why allow the ‘whether’ and ‘how’ of causes to be relevant to the 
influencing relation, but not the ‘when’? The influence theory hands out far too much 
influence to be able to distinguish pre-empting from pre-empted causes. 
 
The intuitively obvious answer to these problems is, of course, the process account. 
Billy’s throw fails to qualify as a cause of the shattering because process-linkage is 
necessary for cassation, and the process that would link Billy’s throw to the shattering 
is cut off by the impact of Suzy’s rock. No conserved quantity is transferred from 
Billy’s rock to the bottle; however a causal process links Suzy supplying energy to her 
rock with the bottle’s demise. Process accounts get pre-emption cases right, for they 
allow us to distinguish pre-empted from pre-empting cause. As I said, it is unclear 
whether probability accounts can be modified in order o accommodate the problem 
cases or not; but why bother, when the process account is to hand? Unfortunately, 
process accounts are faced with problems as well, which – or so I am prepared to 
argue – are much more serious than the problems for probability accounts. The central 
problem I want to draw attention to here is what Schaffer terms causation by 
disconnection.189 Schaffer gives many examples of disconnection, all of which, as 
Schaffer admits, have a common structure. Causation by disconnection is a species of 
double-prevention, which is causation of an effect by preventing something that 
would have prevented the effect. Disconnection cases are specially designed to cause 
problems for the process account, for causing by disconnection involves cutting off a 
process that would prevent the effect if left to run to completion. As all the examples 
Schaffer gives have this structure, I will focus on just one. 
 
A ship is sailing into bad weather, and will almost certainly sink unless a radio 
message from the local weather centre, warning the captain to turn back, gets through. 
The captain’s wife, fed up with being married to a ship’s captain, decides to cash in 
on her husband’s life insurance policy, and sabotages the radio transmitter. This is a 
case of causation by double prevention – the captain’s wife causes the ship to sink by 
                                                 
189 See Schaffer [2000] for detailed discussion. 
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preventing the arrival of a message that would have prevented the sinking. However, 
there is no process linking her sabotage to the sinking of the ship. In fact, this kind of 
causation is characterised by the very absence of such a process – it relies on the fact 
that no information gets through to the ship. Intuition is clear that the captain’s wife 
causes her husband’s death, but she does so by disconnecting a process – there is no 
process-linkage connecting her action to the sinking of the ship. There is no option 
here other than for process theorists to deny that the captain’s wife causes the ship to 
sink. But that is a hugely implausible denial; she is clearly morally responsible for the 
deaths of the crewmen, for she acted knowing that her action would cause the ship to 
sink. Further, had she not acted as she did, the ship would not have sunk. 
 
As Schaffer notes, causation by disconnection is not confined to thought-experiments; 
rather, it goes on all the time. For instance, people sometimes, sadly, die because their 
hearts stop. Heart attacks cause the death of the brain and other organs not by sending 
stop signals to them, but by interrupting the process that supplies these organs with 
oxygen. The breaking of a levee causes a flood by cutting off a process by which the 
water was prevented from flowing. You fire a gun (if you are that way inclined) by 
causing a catch to release the trigger.190 Process accounts give us spectacularly wrong 
results in such cases, for they must deny that the disconnecting causes are causes.191 
If process-linkage is necessary for causation, then we must find another way of 
talking about disconnection, for disconnecting causes are evidently not process-linked 
to the distal events that causal intuition clearly regards as their effects.192 Here, of 
course, is where probability accounts step in. Although there is no process linking the 
                                                 
190 See Schaffer [2000] for persuasive arguments that disconnection is ubiquitous. 
191 I note in passing that cases of causation by disconnection are not the only kind of intuitively clear 
cases of causation that process accounts (at least those that maintain that there is a flow of causal work 
from cause to effect) must deny. For instance, suppose you cause your head to cool down by placing a 
block of ice on it. Intuition recognises two causal relations here – the block cooling your head, and 
your head heating the block. But process accounts must deny that the former of these is genuinely 
causal, as the flow in that case would be from effect to cause. I have not focussed on such cases 
because they strike me as far less problematic for process accounts than cases of causation by 
disconnection. 
192 If a counterexample to the sufficiency of process-linkage for causation is wanted, then we have 
cases of what Schaffer terms misconnection, where a process links events that are not causally related. 
For instance, it’s raining when Suzy throws her rock, and the rock gets wet on the way to the bottle. 
The rock’s being wet is process-linked to the shattering, but is not a cause of it. See Schaffer [2001] for 
full discussion. 
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actions of the captain’s wife to the sinking of the ship, her action is a probability-
raiser of the sinking, and qualifies as its cause that way.  
 
Thus far we have considered counterexamples to the claim that probability raising is 
necessary for causation, and counterexamples to the claim that a causal process is 
necessary for causation. Why is any of this important to the causal exclusion 
argument? The exclusion argument, as I argued in 5.2 and 5.3, depends on process-
linkage being a necessary condition for causation. Without this condition, for 
instance, the exclusion principle OD4 defined n 5.2 cannot be derived. And the 
exclusion argument of 5.3 does not go through, for it is only if the causation of M* by 
M requires process-linkage that the sufficient physical process from P to P* excludes 
M’s efficacy. If causal work in understood in terms of physical work – and it is 
difficult to see how else to understand it – then “doing the causal work” required or an 
effect simply cannot be necessary for causing it, on pain of having to deny that a great 
many apparently (I am tempted to say self-evidently) causal relations are causal. Now 
unless we understand causal work in terms of something like the transmission of 
conserved quantities, then it isn’t clear that there is any causal exclusion problem – 
there’s no reason why the ‘causal work’ of raising the probability of an effect should 
not be done many times over. For my part, I find this a compelling reason for thinking 
of causal work in terms of physical work. But understood in this way, disconnection 
cases give us clear counterexamples to PL – there are sufficient causes (like the 
sabotage by the captain’s wife) of certain effects (like the sinking of the ship) that 
don’t do any of the causal work necessary for the occurrence of those effects. What 
causal work the wife does consists in preventing the radio signal from preventing the 
rocks from doing their causal work, of making a big hole in the ship. Notice that 
where there is causal work to be done, there is something that does it, in this case the 
rocks that the ship bumps into. But that does not alter the fact that there is a cause of 
the sinking that does no causal work at all on the ship. 
 
I anticipate an objection at this stage. A proponent of PL might consider weakening it 
so that rather than claiming that causes must be process-linked to their effects, PL 
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claims that in order to cause anything, a cause must be process-linked to something. 
Even disconnecting causes, after all, do some causal work, even if this is not the 
causal work necessary for the occurrence of their effects. This weakened version of PL 
accepts that the captain’s wife causes the ship to sink, and holds that she does this by 
doing causal work on the radio transmitter rather than the ship itself. Now this sketch 
of a theory has the promise of once again giving rise to the exclusion problem, for as 
we saw in 5.3, given the sufficient causal process from P to P*, there isn’t anything 
left over for M to do any causal work on. I will not go into any great detail as to how 
the revised theory might work, for it fares no better with disconnection cases than the 
original. To see this, consider how it is that the action of the captain’s wife causes the 
ship to sink. As we saw, her action causes the transmitter to stop working, but it is this 
event in turn – the transmitter’s being broken – that causes the ship to sink. If an 
argument for this point is needed, then simply reflect on the fact that if the transmitter 
had malfunctioned of its own accord, this too would have been a sufficient cause of 
the sinking. But now we have a cause – the broken transmitter – that causes its effect 
without doing any causal work at all; this is not surprising, for it causes the ship to 
sink precisely because it stopped working! The central rebuttal to the revised process-
linkage theory is that disconnection involves, at some stage, causation by the non-
occurrence of certain events. Disconnection, as I said, is a special cause of causation 
by double prevention, and as such is bound to involve the non-occurrence of the 
prevented preventer as a cause.193 In the case of the transmitter, the captain’s wife 
causes it to malfunction and its failure to send out the signal causes the ship to sink. 
The ship sinks because of something that failed to happen, and something that does 
not happen can do no causal work. If disconnection cases are counterexamples to the 
original PL – and they clearly are – then they will also be counterexamples to the 
weakened version. 
                                                 
193 Causation by absences is one of the main reasons why Mellor [1995] endorses the view that the 
relata of causation are facts rather than immanent particulars such as events or states of affairs. If I am 
right that double prevention always involves causation by an absence, then there will be a great many 
cases of causation where one of the relata is missing. I am not sure whether this difficulty can be 
overcome within a Kimian metaphysic of events; my intuition tells me it cannot. These matters are 
beyond the scope of the present work. For now, note that causation by absences is a counterexample to 
the claim that causes must do some causal work, for absences by their very nature can not. 
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Now if these remarks are correct, then PL is straightforwardly false: process-linkage is 
not necessary for causation. Of course it may be that PL is not what Kim and others 
have in mind when they worry that there is no causal work left for M to do in causing 
M*, given that P is causally sufficient for P*. Perhaps there is some other way of 
conceiving causal work such that mental events are not, while disconnecting causes 
are, able to do it. I am unable to see what this alternative might be. The theory of 
causal work as process-linkage that I detailed in 5.2 recommends itself as a correct 
interpretation of those who think there is a causal exclusion problem not least because 
it enables us to derive the otherwise unsupported strong principle of causal exclusion, 
EX, which we saw Kim explicitly appealing to in the supervenience argument of 5.1. 
Further, understanding causal work as physical work has significant scientific 
respectability. The causal exclusion argument as I understand it gets causal work 
right, but gets causation wrong. For causal work, construed as physical work, simply 
isn’t necessary for causation. As such, it does not matter whether or not there is any 
causal work left for mental properties to do, for they don’t have to do any in order to 
qualify as causes of behaviour. Notice that it seems as though process-linkage 
accounts are considerably worse off than probability accounts when it comes to 
accommodating intuitively clear cases of causation. This is because it is not clear that 
the pre-emption problem for probability accounts cannot be remedied without 
appealing to process; by contrast, it is extremely difficult to see how to solve the 
disconnection problem for process accounts without appealing to probability. Causes 
that have their effects by disconnection do not seem to be connected to their effects by 
any process at all, so it is unlikely that tweaking the way in which ‘causal process’ is 
defined in PL will enable it to accommodate disconnection. Unless, of course, the 
definition involves an appeal to a kind of process that is really just probability-raising 
in disguise. 
 
I do not claim that there is nothing that is right about the process account – quite the 
contrary, for it is possible that probability accounts cannot be patched up internally, 
and that the only way to properly distinguish causes from non-causes in certain cases 
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(for instance pre-emption) is to introduce an element of process into the mix.194 Many 
– perhaps even all – causal relations involve causal work in some way. However, if 
causal work is understood in terms of physical process, then it is simply false that all 
sufficient causes do the causal work necessary for their effects. And this is all we 
require in order to solve the causal exclusion problem. Recall our six possible 
arguments of 5.3, whereby any five of the following propositions can be endorsed to 
show that the other is false: (i) EM, (ii) CP, (iii) ¬ID, (iv) PL (v) CW, (vi) TCW. Well, 
now we see that there are independent reasons for rejecting PL, and so given the 
plausibility of the other five premises, we have a very strong case for against PL. That 
is, we have an argument for ⌐PL whose premises are independently justified, and a 
stock of very plausible counterexamples to PL that are not dependent on endorsing any 
of the premises of that argument. 
 
Before proceeding, I will pause to clear up an understandable confusion, based on the 
arguments I have given in chapters 4 and 5: “haven’t you been endorsing Yablo’s 
proportionality theory, and other probability accounts, up to this point? But now you 
have given reasons not only for rejecting process accounts of causation, but also 
probability accounts such as Yablo’s”. I agree that the pre-emption cases discussed 
above provide good reasons to reject the necessity of probability-raising for causation. 
However, nothing in the causal argument of 3.4 depends on any particular theory of 
causation – we can now see just how considerable a virtue this is. And when I 
appealed to probability accounts in chapter 4, I did so merely to show that 
transmission principles are dependent on theories of causation in a way that the causal 
argument should not be. Similarly, my appeal to probability accounts in 5.4 was 
intended merely to show how endorsing such accounts (and hence denying PL) 
enables us to avoid the exclusion problem. Notice that the conjunction of the five 
theses that I endorse as premises against PL is perfectly consistent with the falsity of 
                                                 
194 Schaffer [2001] takes this to suggest that a hybrid account is needed, and according to the account 
he gives, causes raise the probabilities of processes connected to their effects. This is not the place for a 
discussion of this interesting theory. Note that the manner in which process and probability accounts 
seem to get each others’ problem cases right may well be indicative of an inherent inhomogeneity in 
the very concept of causation. Perhaps the concept is multifarious, so that causal relations sometimes 
involve process, sometimes probability, and maybe sometimes neither. See Hall [2001] for discussion. 
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probability accounts. True, two of the other premises concern causal work (CW and 
TCW), but they make no claims about the relationship between causal work and 
causation. CW claims that the work is only done once, which it is difficult to deny; 
TCW says that the work necessary for a dependent effect is the same as the work 
necessary for the effect it depends on, which is also difficult to deny. Rejecting PL 
therefore, neither requires nor entails any other particular theory concerning the 
nature of causation. 
 
The causal exclusion argument, if it were sound, would provide us with an argument 
for type identities; we could endorse EM, CP, PL, CW, and TCW in order to prove ID. 
But PL is false, and so this argument isn’t sound. In conclusion to the present chapter, 
then, we are back where we were at the end of chapter 3: the causal argument proper 
(based on a general principle of non-overdetermination not parasitic on any theory of 
causation, let alone one as dubious as PL) establishes that physical events are 
synchronically sufficient for mental events. This in turn licenses a form of 
supervenience that will be physicalist provided the sufficiency between the events 
holds across all physically possible worlds. In the next chapter, we will see that there 
are weaker forms of sufficiency consistent with the premises of the argument, and that 
as a result, the argument is invalid. 
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6. Emergence, Novelty and Redundancy 
My purpose here is to give a general characterisation of emergence, and show that 
there is room for a weaker version of emergence than is usually acknowledged. I 
diverge slightly from received wisdom in that my conception of emergence avoids 
epistemological notions like reduction and prediction. It should be noted that my 
purpose here is not to defend any form of emergence; rather, I aim only to defend its 
possibility. I do not claim that the form of emergence I describe is endorsed by any of 
the main proponents of emergentism, although it seems to me to encapsulate many of 
their central ideas. As I will conceive it, emergence is the conjunction of a 
metaphysical claim concerning the nature of the relationship between physical and 
emergent properties, and a claim about the novel causal powers introduced by 
emergent properties. In 6.1, I will outline the metaphysical commitments that I take to 
distinguish emergence from physicalism. In 6.2, I argue for a distinction between two 
kinds of novelty, and show how this distinction enables us to resist redundancy 
arguments such as the one due to Kim, which I introduced in 3.3. In 6.3, I explain 
how, on the basis of the theories of 6.1 and 6.2, three kinds of emergence can be 
distinguished, one of which – ‘weak’ emergence – is consistent with the premises of 
the causal argument. I conclude on this basis that the causal argument is not valid, and 
that further arguments must be supplied if the argument is to establish physicalism. I 
suggest two such arguments, which, when taken together, provide a compelling case 
against weakly emergent mental properties: an epistemic argument in 6.4, and a 
teleological argument in 6.5. 
 
6.1. Metaphysics of emergence 
I take Broad’s [1925] brand of emergentism to be fairly close to what I have in mind, 
but nothing of import for my purposes turns on whether or not this is so. Provided the 
position I outline is consistent, then the central arguments of chapters 6 and 7 will go 
through regardless of how similar my emergence is to anyone else’s. Emergentism 
conceived as a metaphysic of mind has much in common with physicalism. It is 
mental properties that are emergent; there is no emergent ‘mental substance’. 
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Emergentism thus shares with physicalism the thesis of physical monism. Further, 
emergentism also shares with physicalism the view that the emergent mental 
properties are determined by, and supervenient upon, physical properties. The central 
metaphysical distinction between physicalism and emergentism is that the former 
affirms, whereas the latter denies, that mental properties are nothing over and above 
the physical. I follow Broad in supposing that if there are emergent properties, then 
they are properties of aggregates of physical particulars, synchronically determined 
according to what Broad terms ‘trans-ordinal laws’ that take the structural properties 
of these aggregates in the antecedents and have emergent properties in their 
consequents.195 The laws in question hold independently of the laws of physics – they 
are ‘unique and ultimate’ laws true in some physically possible worlds, not in others. 
 
Now the supervenience of emergent properties on the physical means that great care 
must be taken to distinguish emergentism from physicalism. Because emergent 
properties and properties for which physicalism is true both supervene (as we shall 
see, in very similar ways), it is quite common in the literature to find emergentism 
defined by way of epistemological claims, for instance that emergent properties 
cannot be predicted from, or functionally reduced to, physical properties.196 However, 
there is a metaphysical difference that makes all the difference – trans-ordinal laws 
are not physically necessary. From this it follows that if there are emergent properties, 
then they will not be instantiated at minimal physical duplicates of the actual world. 
Similarly, although physical properties will be sufficient for the emergent properties, 
the sufficiency relation will be nomologically, but not physically, necessary. And this 
is precisely what makes emergent properties something over and above the physical. 
For my part, I take this modal difference to be the defining metaphysical characteristic 
                                                 
195 See Broad [1925] pp.77-80 for discussion of trans-ordinal laws. 
196 See for instance Stephan [1997], Beckermann [1992] and Kim [1999a] for endorsement of the view 
that the metaphysical component of emergentism is to be interpreted epistemologically. All three 
essentially hold that what distinguishes emergence from physicalism is (inter alia in Kim’s case, as he 
combines the epistemic claim with a claim about downwards causation – of which more presently) that 
physical properties are, while emergent properties are not, functionally reducible to the physical. 
Stephan talks in terms of superdupervenience rather than functional reduction, but as I argued in 2.1, 
much of what Horgan has to say about superdupervenience suggests that functional reducibility is what 
he has in mind. 
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of emergence; the irreducibility of a property is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for its emergence. 
 
By way of illustration, consider once again Kim’s strong supervenience of the Ms on 
the Ps: 
 
□∀x∀M∈M{M(x)→∃P∈P[P(x)&□∀y(P(y)→M(y))]} 
 
If mental properties are emergent in the sense described above, then they will satisfy 
strong supervenience provided the strength of the second operator is no greater than 
nomological. This is precisely why the second operator must express at least physical 
necessity if the definition is to be considered as a definition of physicalism. For as I 
have argued, nothing forces the view that all laws of nature are, or are determined by, 
laws of physics. And if Broad is right that there are emergent properties, then some 
laws of nature are neither laws of physics, nor physically necessary. A law fails to be 
physically necessary just in case there are physically possible worlds at which the law 
does not hold. Alternatively (and equivalently) if there are laws that are not physically 
necessary, then minimal physical duplicates of the actual world will be worlds at 
which some of the actual laws of nature do not hold. Failure to properly distinguish 
the different supervenience theses resulting from alternative modalities can, I think, 
lead to confusion regarding the difference between non-reductive, supervenience 
physicalism, and emergence. Crane, for instance, argues that strong supervenience is 
unable to distinguish emergentism from physicalism, by arguing that both satisfy 
strong supervenience. This claim is true as far as it goes, but it seems clear to me that 
it does not go far enough: emergentism and physicalism differ as to the strength of the 
second modal operator. How does Crane interpret this operator? He doesn’t say. 
Consider the following passage: 
 
The notion of supervenience [of a set A of properties on a set B of properties] 
does not say anything about whether the A-properties are “something over and 
above” the B-properties: [strong supervenience] is consistent with the 
distinctness of the of the A- and B-properties, and also consistent with the 
identification of each A-property with a B-property. In addition, it is 
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consistent with the A-properties having independent causal powers. So, the 
strong supervenience of the mental on the physical is consistent with 
emergentism.197
 
I agree that the mere notion of strong supervenience is consistent with emergence, and 
also with the B-properties having independent causal powers, but I think Crane gives 
far too little importance to the interpretation of the modal operators: whether or not 
the mental is something over and above the physical is determined (or so I argued in 
chapter 1) by the strength of the second (sufficiency) operator. If it is interpreted as 
physical necessity, then physical properties alone, together with the laws of physics, 
will be sufficient for the mental properties. But that means that minimal physical 
duplicates of the actual world preserve the actual distribution of mental properties – 
and if this much is true then, as I have argued, there is a clear sense in which the 
mental is nothing over and above the physical. If, however, the strength is merely 
nomological, and if, in addition, the set of natural laws contain laws not determined 
by physical laws and properties, then the definition is consistent with emergence, and 
with the mental being something ‘over and above’ the physical. If the mental emerges 
in this way, then minimal physical duplicates of the actual world are not duplicates 
simpliciter, as the extra ‘trans-ordinal laws’ by definition will not obtain at minimal 
physical duplicate worlds. Thus I hold that the distinction between nomologically and 
physically necessary supervenience conditionals is a difference that makes a crucial 
difference when it comes to distinguishing physicalist from non-physicalist positions. 
Crane’s purpose is to argue that (i) if non-reductive physicalism and emergentism 
share all the same metaphysical commitments, any problems for emergentism 
consequent upon its particular metaphysical commitments must also be problems for 
non-reductive physicalism, and (ii) they do share all the same metaphysical 
commitments.198 It is difficult to deny (i); for my part, however, I find it equally 
                                                 
 
197 In his [2001]. 
198 In particular, Crane [2001] argues that both non-reductive physicalism and emergentism hold that 
mental properties are supervenient upon, and distinct from, physical properties. Further, he agrees with 
Kim [1992b] that the only way to give content to the distinctness part is via the claim that the 
supervenient properties are novel, which in turn means they exert a downwards causal influence on the 
physical domain. This is the crux of Kim’s dilemma for supervenient causation: either the supervenient 
properties are redundant, or they violate the completeness of physics. I will consider and reject this 
argument in 6.2. I should note in passing that while I do not agree with Crane that emergentism and 
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difficult to endorse (ii), as supervenience formulations of non-reductive physicalism 
need physically necessary sufficiency at least, on pain of not being formulations of 
physicalism at all.199
 
Beckermann [1992] holds similar views to Crane on this matter, which I reckon is 
also due to a failure to properly interpret the relevant modal operator. Beckermann too 
argues that strong supervenience does not discriminate between emergentism and 
non-reductive physicalism. For Beckermann, though, emergentism is consistent with 
strong supervenience, even if the strength of necessity in the second operator is taken 
to be physical.200 If emergentism is consistent with strong supervenience so 
interpreted, then by my reckoning, emergent properties are not emergent at all. It 
seems that Beckermann is tacitly assuming that physical and nomological necessity 
are the same – but this, as I understand it, is one of the claims emergentism denies. 
Noordhof’s position on these matters is very close to my own.201 He argues that 
physicalists employing strong supervenience to define their position must interpret the 
strength of the second operator as metaphysical, “otherwise there really would be no 
way of distinguishing materialism from British emergentism”. But for Noordhof, 
metaphysical necessity is not importantly different from physical necessity as I have 
conceived it. This is because Noordhof allows that laws of physics into the 
supervenience base. But the claim that a physical property P together with the laws of 
physics metaphysically necessitates a mental property M just means ‘it is 
metaphysically necessary that if the laws of physics hold, then if anything is P then it 
is Q’. But this can be re-written as ‘in every metaphysically possible world, it is true 
that in every physically possible world that if anything is P then it is Q.’ The wide-
scope quantification seems otiose here: why not just appeal to physical necessity 
                                                                                                                                            
non-reductive physicalism share the same metaphysical commitments, I do not think that the 
metaphysical distinctions I have drawn need trouble Crane’s overall argument. The crucial similarities 
between emergentism and non-reductive physicalism, for Crane’s purposes, are a common 
commitment to (i) distinctness, and (ii) novelty, of mental properties. These commitments, I agree, are 
common to both positions, despite their metaphysical differences. 
199 In 6.4 I will show that the different modalities of emergence and supervenience physicalism leaves a 
version of the former (weak emergence, to be defined in 6.3) open to a redundancy argument that does 
not affect the latter. 
200 Beckermann [1992] p.103, fn.11. 
201 See Noordhof [2003] pp.85-93. 
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instead? This matter is terminological. What is important here is that Noordhof, like 
me, thinks that depending on the strength of the second modal operator, strong 
supervenience can define either physicalism or emergentism. But no fully interpreted 
strong supervenience thesis will define both. 
 
It remains for me to comment on the relationship between functional reducibility and 
emergence. Beckermann defines emergentism like this: 
 
Let S be a system having the microstructure [C1,…,Cn; R], then F is an 
emergent property of S iff (a) there is a law to the effect that all systems with 
this microstructure have F, but (b) F cannot, even in theory, be deduced from 
the basic properties of the components C1,…,Cn and a general theory of 
components of this kind which contains no unique and ultimate laws which 
apply only to systems which have the same microstructure as S.202
 
For Beckermann, deducing a property is very similar to functionally reducing it, and 
for present purposes I will take it that functional reduction is what he has in mind – 
we first construe F in terms of its causes and effects, and show how C1,…,Cn plays 
the role of F by reference to the laws that govern the components of S, regardless of 
whether or not they are combined according to the ‘system-defining’ relation R. The 
stipulation that the laws of the realizer theory contain no unique and ultimate laws that 
apply only to R-systems serves to rule out the trans-ordinal emergence laws from 
counting among the premises from which F is deduced. Beckermann’s thought is that 
without these special laws, there is no way to deduce an emergent property. I am in 
agreement that (a) and (b) above are necessary conditions for emergence. This much 
ought to be clear from the account of functional reduction I gave in chapter 2 – if F 
can be functionally reduced to basic (let’s say physical) properties and laws, then F is 
nothing over and above the physical. However, I am unable to agree that (a) and (b) 
are sufficient for emergence; I will briefly explain why. 
 
                                                 
202 Beckermann [1992] p.106. This definition says nothing about the causal novelty of emergents, and 
in fact Beckermann has nothing to say about this element of emergentism. It may be simply that he 
takes the novelty of a property to be built into its very existence condition: a property that has no 
novelty is no property at all. We return to this matter in 6.2 when we discuss redundancy arguments. 
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The central reason why I wish to resist the equivalence of emergence and non-
deducibility proposed by Beckermann is that it is possible that physicalism is true for 
all actual world properties (so that they are nothing over and above the physical, in the 
sense that all minimal physical duplicates of the actual world are duplicates 
simpliciter), and yet certain properties not be functionally reducible to the physical. 
The point I wish to make here has nothing to do with the difficulty or length of the 
relevant deductions. As soon as any such appeal is made, those who like to do 
metaphysics with epistemological notions will appeal to ‘deducibility-in-principle’, 
which is the sort of thing a superbeing could pull off in practice, given enough time 
and coffee. Rather, I wish to point out that some properties, by their very natures, may 
well fail to be functionally reducible. Suppose physicalism is true. Given physicalism, 
then on reasonable further assumption, it is plausible that properties for which step (1) 
– functionalization – of the functional reduction process can be completed, can be 
deduced.203 A functionally defined property F that has a physical realizer P will be 
deducible from P, provided it follows from physical laws that P plays the appropriate 
causal role R. I am prepared to grant that this point for the sake of argument – let’s 
agree that given physicalism, the causal roles of all physical properties are determined 
by physical laws, and as a result it will be possible to deduce F from P for any 
functionalizable F.204
 
The crucial thing to realize, however, is this: there is no law of physics that states that 
all properties are functionalizable. The assumption that any property that is nothing 
but the physical, is also a property that can be accurately reconstrued as a second 
order functional property, is substantive and to my mind wholly unjustified. Far 
                                                 
203 See 2.2 for discussion of the functional reduction process. 
204 I stress ‘given physicalism’ for two reasons. First, it might be argued that certain kinds of emergent 
property confer causal powers in addition to those of their base properties that enable these latter to 
play causal roles that go beyond those determined by the physical laws in which they figure. (Wilson’s 
argument of 1.3 depends on just this sort of view.) Myself, I do not agree – as I will argue in 7.3, this 
situation is best described as one in which emergence base and emergent property together play the 
role in question. Second, I think it plausible that some emergent properties are functionalizable, at least 
in the sense of its being possible to reconstrue them as causally individuated. Such a property will fail 
to be functionally reducible, however, on the grounds of not being physically realized – the reduction 
will fail at step 3. See section 2.2 for details of the steps involved. I will comment briefly on the second 
issue below. 
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better, in my opinion, is for a metaphysical definition of emergence to leave open the 
possibility that there are properties for which physicalism is true and yet about which 
we could not (even in principle) establish physicalism by reduction. Despite my 
allergy to epistemic metaphysics, I do of course think that metaphysical notions are 
intimately related to epistemic ones. Here are some propositions that partially 
characterise the relationship in the case of physicalism, emergence and functional  
reduction: (1) a property reducible to the physical is nothing over and above the 
physical; (2) it is possible for there to be properties that are not reducible to the 
physical but which are, nonetheless, nothing over and above the physical; (3) if a 
property is emergent, it is not reducible to the physical. 
 
Before proceeding, I want to elaborate a little on proposition (3) above. Irreducibility 
is uncontroversially necessary for emergence, but where does the reduction fail in the 
case of, say, emergent beliefs? Psychological properties are plausibly (at least 
partially) individuated by their causes and effects; as interpreters, we rely on this fact 
to facilitate belief ascription. But isn’t that all we need in order for functional 
reconstrual to get off the ground? What room does that leave for emergent 
psychology? The answer lies in recognising that there is a crucial difference between 
the following two claims (i) F is individuated by causal role R; and (ii) F is the 
property of having some property that plays causal role R. We cannot infer (ii) from 
(i), as there may well be properties that have their causal roles essentially, but that are 
not realized by any other properties. Basic physical properties such as charge might 
be a case in point: for instance, charge is arguably partially individuated by its causal 
role as specified by physical laws. But qua (putatively) basic, then the ‘charge role’ is 
played by charge, and not some distinct role-filler property. Of course if charge has 
its causal role essentially, then we can reconstrue it as a second-order functional 
property. But such a reconstrual will be incorrect, as there is, by hypothesis, no lower-
order realizer of charge. 
 
What then of causally individuated but emergent psychological properties? I think it 
clear that we can complete step (1) of the reduction process for such properties. There 
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is nothing in the nature of our hypothesised emergent mental properties that prevents 
their being (incorrectly) reconstrued as second-order functional properties. Step (2) 
can also be completed, for the emergence bases of our emergent mental properties 
will provide excellent putative realizers. Now it follows that for causally individuated 
emergent properties, step (3) must fail, on pain of the properties in question not being 
emergent at all. There are two reasons why step (3) might fail for emergent properties, 
corresponding to my distinction (to follow in 6.3) between weak and strong 
emergence. In the former case, step (3) fails because the individuative causal role R is 
specified in terms of other emergent properties; in the latter case, it fails because R 
involves physical effects that the putative physical realizers do not have. Either way, 
step (3) fails because the putative realizers do not play causal role R, so that F cannot 
be deduced from P. I will clarify and defend this position during the course of the next 
two sections. 
 
The central point I hope to have made in the preceding paragraphs is that emergence 
can be distinguished from physicalism at a purely ontological level, without recourse 
to epistemological notions. It is very much like physicalism, except that emergent 
properties supervene on physical properties and trans-ordinal laws, which latter are 
not determined by the laws of physics. Emergent properties, though, are also novel, in 
a sense I have been promising to define. Let us turn, then, to the crucial issue of the 
sense in which emergent properties are novel. Before proceeding with this task, I will 
describe two ways in which properties in general can be novel. Through this, I will 
explain under what conditions I take a property to be redundant, and so explain why 
the redundancy argument suggested in 3.3 is easily resisted. Following brief 
consideration of novelty and redundancy in general, we return to the issue of the 
sense(s) in which emergent properties are supposed to be novel. 
 
6.2. Two kinds of novelty – why the redundancy argument fails 
My aims in this section are (i) to convince you that there are (at least) two ways for a 
property to be novel (i.e. non-redundant); and (ii) to show how recognising two kinds 
of novelty enables us to resist the redundancy argument suggested in 3.3. Before 
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proceeding, we need to clarify how the redundancy argument works. The redundancy 
arguments to follow will be directed against all supervenient properties, on the 
assumption that the completeness of physics is true. I will first give a redundancy 
argument that combines two elements of Kim’s thinking on these matters.205 I will 
then give an improved argument, and show how it can be resisted. The first argument 
places general constraints on what it is for a property to be novel, then proceeds to 
show that given CP, supervenient properties are unable to meet those constraints. The 
following diagram will suffice to illustrate both Kim’s version and mine: 
 
 M M* 
P P* 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram is no doubt familiar by now. The fundamental things apply: M 
supervenes on P, M* on P*; M and M* are instances of novel properties, non-
identical to P and P* respectively; M causes M*, and P causes P*. It should be noted 
that nothing in what follows depends on the relationship between M and P being 
supervenience (although I will speak of P as M’s base property) – what is important is 
that M≠P. Further, nothing in the argument depends on the supervenience of M* on 
P* being of any particular strength – as we shall see, it is consistent with M* being an 
emergent property. Now, ‘redundant’ – at least as I understand it – means ‘not 
required’. We will be concerned with causal (and causal-explanatory) redundancy. To 
say that something is causally (or causal-explanatorily) redundant is to say that it isn’t 
required to cause (or causally explain) anything. Which, in turn, is to say that its 
                                                 
205 It will be clear to anyone familiar with Kim’s work that the premises upon which the argument 
depends are endorsed at various places throughout his work; equally clear, I think, is that Kim would 
endorse the argument that I give. Still, I should point out that I am not aware of any explicit 
presentation by Kim of the argument to follow, in its entirety, in exactly the same form as that in which 
it occurs here. The elements I combine are Kim’s claims concerning novelty in his [1992b] pp.134-7, 
and a version of the causal exclusion argument we discussed in 5.1, to be found, inter alia, in Kim 
[1993b] p.354, [1998] pp.44-5. 
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putative effect (or explanandum) already has a cause (or explanans). The conclusion 
of a redundancy argument is that ontological commitment to the redundant entity buys 
us nothing, and that as a result, we should not be so committed. This much is of 
course uncontroversial; if mental property instances aren’t required as causes of 
anything, then why believe in mental properties? The controversy surrounds whether 
or not there is any purpose for which mental properties are required. Bearing these 
points in mind, we proceed to argue that M is causally redundant. 
 
Kim’s problem be thought of in the following way: how are we to reconcile the 
supposed novelty of M qua non-identical to P with the supervenience of M* on P*?206 
The argument is a simple one, and proceeds as follows. First, Kim endorses a 
principle he terms ‘Alexander’s Dictum’, which he expresses thus: to be real is to 
have causal powers. I need not take issue with this claim here, for Kim only uses it to 
conclude that realism about the mental entails that mental properties have causal 
powers, and I do not dispute the latter proposition. Second, Kim claims that if M is 
non-identical (in Kim’s terminology irreducible) to P, then M must have causal 
powers that are non-identical (irreducible) to the causal powers of P. As we saw in 
chapter 5, Kim thinks of causal powers in terms of causal work; correspondingly, he 
goes on to say that if M is novel, we must “find for it causal work not done by the 
physical and biological properties” it supervenes upon.207 This approach is not 
mandatory, though; I will say that whatever properties do, and however they do it, if 
M≠P, then M must do something that P does not. For instance, if we think of the 
causal powers of a property in terms of the typical effects of its instances, then M≠P 
demands that M causes something that P does not; or if causal explanatory relevance 
is paramount, then M≠P demands that M causally explains something that P does not. 
The general point is that if M≠P, then instances of M must cause (or causally explain) 
things that instances of P do not. This is a crucial claim, and justification is easier if 
                                                 
206 Kim states the problem not in terms of non-identity, but in terms of irreducibility. For Kim, these 
two amount to the same thing, for as we saw in 2.3, Kim takes functional reduction to yield identity. 
Since I take functional reductions to yield supervenience, I substitute non-identity for irreducibility in 
my exegesis. 
207 Kim [1992b] p.135. 
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we look to its contrapositive: if a property P has all the same causal powers as Q, then 
P=Q. We need not endorse a Shoemakerian metaphysic of properties in order to 
support this latter claim; for present purposes, we can be content with epistemological 
grounds. In particular, note that we could never have any epistemological grounds to 
doubt it – no detector will tell two properties apart if they have all their causal powers 
in common.208 What could possibly justify the view that ‘they’ are two, rather than 
one? 
 
We can now cause problems for supervenient properties, given CP. Consider first the 
following argument, which we may reasonably attribute to Kim. M’s putatively novel 
causal contribution is that it causes M*. For present purposes, we may consider M* to 
be either a mental property-instance, or a behaviour. Now given the downwards 
transmission argument, the only way for M to make its novel contribution is through 
causing P*. As we saw in 5.1, for Kim the same level causal relationship between M 
and M* presupposes the downwards causation indicated by the diagonal arrow above. 
Now assuming that CP is true, P is causally sufficient for P*. If all this is true, then 
M’s putative causal novelty consists in causing an event P* for which there will 
always be a physical cause P. This is a violation of our novelty principle above – if 
every M-instance has just the same causal powers as some P-instance, then why not 
just identify the instances? As we saw in 2.3, instance identity entails property 
identity, which in turn – given multiple realization – leads to eliminativism. But if M 
is redundant, then this is as it should be. The downwards transmission argument and 
CP, make it look as though mental properties confer whatever causal powers are 
‘already’ conferred by their physical supervenience base properties. Together, 
downwards transmission and CP entail that the causal inheritance principle (CIP) that 
we examined in chapter 2 is true for all supervenient properties, not just the 
functionally individuated ones. For whatever M’s putatively novel causal role is, 
                                                 
208 See Armstrong [1978] pp.43-4 for discussion of the association between properties and causal 
powers. Armstrong endorses claims such as the present one for epistemological reasons, and treats 
them as methodological principles guiding a theory of universals. I note in passing that the principle 
stated above is intended to apply only to properties that have causal powers – otherwise it would entail 
that all abstract properties are identical, an unwelcome result. 
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given downwards transmission it will involve the power to cause a physical event P*, 
which, given CP, will be caused by M’s base property P. The powers of M-instances 
have to be identical to the powers of P-instances, on pain of the M-instances being 
unable to cause instances of M*. But in that case, commitment to mental properties 
adds nothing – M is not required as a cause of P*, for P* has a physical cause P. 
 
For my part, I reject both CIP and downwards transmission. I reject CIP because, as I 
said in 2.4, the causal powers of instances of realized properties are just not identical 
to those of their realizer-instances. Much more reasonable is the supposition that the 
powers of M are a subset of the powers of P, which is why I tentatively endorsed CIP’ 
instead. In 4.3, we saw how certain counterfactual theories of causation entail that 
downwards transmission fails. Now we can see how the subset theory of realization 
must deny downwards transmission as well. The reason is simple. If the powers of M 
are a subset of the powers of P, then they will be a subset too of the powers required 
to cause P*. M cannot cause P*, for put simply, it does not have the power to do so! 
And of course if this is so, then we require an account of causation that allows intra-
level causation without inter-level causation; we have already seen that such accounts 
are available, and I will not repeat them here. Rather, I will simply note that reliance 
on downwards transmission makes the above redundancy argument very easy to 
resist. However, just as we did for the causal exclusion argument in 5.2, we can recast 
the redundancy argument so that it does not rely on transmission. In order to do so, we 
must focus on causal explanatory redundancy instead of causal redundancy. The new 
argument will not show that we do not need to invoke M as a cause of M*, but rather 
that we do not need M in order to explain M*. Things are much simpler this time 
around, and we need only one extra premise: that P explains the occurrence of M*. 
 
I maintain that there is a clear sense in which P* explains M*, and that this is true 
regardless of whether M* is something over and above P*. If P* is M*’s emergence 
base, for instance, then P* together with the trans-ordinal law that governs M* 
emergence, suffice to explain M*. But now P, as P*’s cause, will explain M* as 
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well.209 We can demonstrate this on the assumption that subsumption under a law is 
sufficient for explanation. Given P*’s occurrence, it is a non-causal law that M* is 
instantiated, and there is a causal law relating P to P*. Given the transitivity of nomic 
sufficiency, then, it seems clear that there will be a law – which, for terminological 
consistency, we may call a ‘law of inducement’ – relating the occurrence of P to the 
occurrence of M*. It follows that there is a sense in which P explains M*. Nothing 
forces the view that this sort of explanation is causal, but I think it can plausibly be 
considered as such. The explanation of M* by P combines a causal relationship with a 
non-causal one – in essence, we explain why M* occurs by causally explaining its 
supervenience base, and this strikes me as a perfectly good causal explanation. If 
these remarks are correct, then it follows immediately that there is a sense in which M 
is explanatorily redundant with respect to M*, for we already have an explanation of 
M* in the form of P. What is more, CP and the supervenience of M* on P* together 
guarantee that such an explanation will be available. Notice that we can frame the 
present problem in terms of causal redundancy as well as explanatory redundancy, 
thus: how can mental properties have novel causal powers if all their effects have 
sufficient physical inducers? Why is M required as a cause of M*, given that P 
induces it? This is not, of course, to say that instances of supervenient properties are 
caused by the causes of their base properties, for that would be to endorse upwards 
transmission. If we wish to avoid upwards transmission, we can put the point like this: 
given the causal determination of P* by P, and the synchronic determination of M* by 
P*, M* simply does not need a cause of its own.210
 
This redundancy problem is quite general, for given CP, it follows that any event for 
which a physical event is non-causally sufficient, can be causally explained by citing 
the cause of its physical base property. I am prepared to concede on this basis that 
                                                 
209 Similar arguments are to be found in Sober [1999] pp.548-9. 
210 This is one of the possibilities considered in Kim [2003] in response to the causal exclusion 
problem; see for instance the diagram on p.159. The price of distinctness for M and P is that there is no 
causal arrow from M to M*; the relationship between M and M* is “like a series of shadows cast by a 
moving car,” (Kim [1998] p.45). The exclusion argument concludes that there could not be an arrow 
from M to M*; the redundancy argument concludes that there need not be one. Of course, once this 
much is admitted, then given Alexander’s Dictum, we lose mental realism – inefficacious mental 
properties, we can do without. 
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there is a sense in which we do not need M in order to explain M*. What I am not 
prepared to concede is that there is no sense in which we do need M. The remainder 
of this section will argue that while M is not needed in order to explain M*, it is 
needed in order to explain M* in a certain way. Causally explaining M* by citing P, 
and explaining M* by citing M, are different kinds of explanation. In the absence of 
an independent reason to prefer one kind of explanation to the other, we ought to 
embrace both. In the remainder of this section, I will attempt to convince you that M 
is worth holding on to. The points I raise in support of M’s worth are not new, but 
they are commonly overlooked, quite interesting, and well worth repeating. 
 
The distinction between singular and general causation is familiar. It is clear that there 
is a relationship between singular causal statement like “David’s drinking wine 
caused him to be intoxicated” and the corresponding general claim that “Drinking 
wine causes intoxication”. Statements of the first kind express causal relations 
between token events; statements of the second kind express causal regularities 
between classes or types of events. However, the nature of the relationship has proved 
difficult to pin down. There seem to be three possibilities. First, we might maintain 
that there are two independent species of causation, that require different theories. 
Second, it might be that general causal claims are just generalisations of true singular 
statements. Or third, perhaps the truth of a singular causal statement depends on its 
instantiating a general regularity. I will not attempt to choose between these 
alternatives, however – provided the distinction between particular causal relations 
and causal regularities is accepted, my central claims here go through regardless of 
which, if any, is the fundamental kind. Those claims are: (i) that there are two ways in 
which properties can be novel, corresponding to singular and general causation, and 
(ii) a property can be novel in the general sense without being novel in the singular 
sense. The redundancy argument depends, I will argue, on recognising just one kind 
of novelty, viz. the singular variety, and showing that M lacks this kind of novelty. 
The position I will describe agrees that there is a sense in which M is redundant, for it 
agrees that M lacks singular novelty. However, once general novelty is admitted, it is 
clear that the redundancy argument fails, for M does have this kind of novelty. Before 
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defining singular and general novelty, and explaining why this distinction enables us 
to resist the redundancy argument, I will first attempt to convince you that the 
distinction is cogent. To this end, I will tell you a story about Bob the builder. 
 
On his days off, Bob the builder likes to keep in shape, and sometimes he does so by 
building things. Today he has decided to build a wall, out of the six bricks he had 
been keeping for just such an occasion. Here is a plan of the wall that Bob has decided 
to build – call this design plan ‘D’: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All that is important to Bob is that the wall he builds meets D. In order to build a wall 
according to D, Bob will first have to cut one of his bricks in half. Once he has done 
so, he can proceed to stick the remaining bricks together in any one of a large number 
of ways. Number the bricks from 1-6. The diagram below shows he might stick the 
bricks together in order to build his wall:  
 
 
6 
4 
1 2 
5 
3b 3a 
 
 
 
 
 
There are six bricks that Bob might choose to cut in half, and two ways to arrange the 
resulting half bricks. There are five further slots for his remaining bricks to occupy. 
Thus, with his six bricks, there are 6 x 2 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1 = 1440 permutations that 
will allow him to build his wall. (I will ignore additional permutations made possible 
by rotating the bricks in three dimensions.) This particular permutation has a unique 
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identifier, as does every other. This one is number 1 2 3a 4 3b 5 6, but Bob cannot tell 
the bricks apart, and so is unaware which permutation he is assembling. This is 
unimportant to Bob, because as I said, all that matters to him is that he manages to 
assemble some permutation or other that meets D. Since this is Bob’s day off, he had 
something of a late night last night, and so isn’t feeling his best. In particular, instead 
of his usual 99% success rate with regard to identifying and picking up bricks, today 
he is only 50% successful. He has a pounding headache, occasionally blurred vision, 
and a bad case of the shakes. Assume for the sake of argument that by making slight 
variations in these factors (e.g. the intensity of his headache, whether or not he is able 
to see brick 6, at some t), we can make it so that Bob builds any one of the 1440 
permutations. These variations define a set of 1440 close neighbouring worlds {wi}, 
each one of which contains a distinct permutation Di of Bob’s wall. 
 
The important point for my present purposes is that in each member of {wi}, Bob’s 
building the wall has the very same psychological cause. In each of the wi there will 
be a different physical explanation of why at that world Bob builds Di; but in each 
case his building a wall that meets D will be explained simply by the fact that this is 
the sort of thing he likes to do on his days off. Let M be Bob’s wish to build a wall 
that meets D, and M* the existence of such a wall; let P be the complete physical 
cause (including hangover) of the particular permutation Bob actually builds, and P* 
the existence of this particular permutation. The problem at hand is that P threatens to 
make M redundant with respect to causally explaining M*. I am prepared to accept 
that this is so – M is not required to explain the occurrence of M*. However, suppose 
for the sake of argument that at least some forms of causal explanation involve 
subsumption under a law. M’s constitutive mental property subsumes M under a 
particular set of explanatory laws relating it to events of type M*, which is invariant 
across all the {wi}. This is because by hypothesis, Bob has the same psychological 
properties at each of the 1440 worlds where he builds his wall. The very same 
particular psychological explanation of M* holds true in each case. By contrast, 
consider non-actual world w335, where Bob builds wall # 1 5 3a 4 3b 2 6. Here the 
constitutive properties of P will have to be different, for P* is different. For instance, 
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the realizers of Bob’s mental properties will have psychologically irrelevant effects, 
such as Bob suffering a twitch at t that caused him to pick up brick 5 second, instead 
of brick 2. The actual world physical explanation of the actual world permutation Da 
that Bob builds, will not explain why his counterpart builds D335 at w335. 
 
This defence of the causal relevance of mental properties appeals to what, following 
Jackson and Pettit, we may term  the ‘realizer-invariance’ of their causal powers.211 If 
another example is needed, we can look once again to thermodynamics. Consider a 
certain aggregate of molecules at a given temperature T. The aggregate in question, as 
we saw in 2.3, is one specific way to have a certain average molecular kinetic energy; 
there are many other ways. In other words, the structural property of the aggregate 
that defines the particular distribution of velocities across its components, is one of 
many possible realizers of T. Each of T’s realizer properties has the power to cause a 
specific rise in pressure, say, in some other aggregate. There will be laws relating 
these specific structural properties to equally specific pressure rises. Each law will 
relate a specific way of being at a given temperature to a specific way to be a rise in 
pressure. Temperature, one the other hand, will be sufficient for a rise in pressure 
regardless of how either the rise or the temperature are realized. It strikes me that 
this is a perfectly good case of novelty of causal role – for nothing else plays it! 
Another way of putting the point is to say that thermodynamic properties capture 
generalizations that are missed if we describe an ensemble of molecules in terms of 
their specific velocities, masses and other physical properties. The thermodynamic 
level, it would appear, contains certain patterns of activity and dependency between 
its properties that are not mirrored at the level of molecular physics.212
 
                                                 
211 See Jackson and Pettit [1992b] for discussion. A similar line is taken by Noordhof in his [1997]. 
There, he argues that a functional property introduces a novel causal role that is not introduced by any 
particular physical realizer, in virtue of having a power that particular realizers lack by definition: viz. 
the power to cause its constitutive effect however it is realized. 
212 This is not, of course, to say that the patterns are not mirrored by statistical mechanics; they are, and 
this is what enables the reduction of thermodynamics to go through. Statistical mechanical patterns will 
disappear too, if we move down to the (non-statistical) level of molecular aggregates and specific 
velocity distributions. Statistical mechanical properties such as mean molecular kinetic energy also (it 
goes without saying) have realizer invariant causal powers. 
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Things are not so straightforward, however, for it remains to explain why this kind of 
novelty is worth having. Consider the following rejoinder on behalf of the redundancy 
argument. M* is a particular, dated, unrepeatable token event, whose occurrence is 
explained by P. Any other actual instances of supervenient properties will also, 
mutatis mutandis, be explained by the causes of their supervenience bases. M’s 
putatively novel causal role seems to consist solely in providing a modally robust 
explanation of M* (or its counterparts) that holds at a neighbourhood of close worlds 
in which M (or its counterparts) is differently realized. But what use is that? Why 
should we care what goes on at other possible worlds? We can explain everything that 
happens here by reference to physical properties alone, so M is, after all, redundant. 
This argument is not without force, but there are (at least) two responses. First, why 
regard the explanation of M* provided by M as being in competition with that 
provided by P? As we have seen, they are distinct styles of explanation, involving 
appeals to distinct laws, licensing different counterfactual claims, and so on. For 
example, Sober suggests that a complete explanation of M* might involve “the 
macro-story, the micro-story, and an account of how these are connected.”213 Sober 
makes this point in response to Putnam’s celebrated [1975] ‘Peg’ argument, according 
to which the micro-properties of a peg are redundant in explaining whether or not it 
fits through a hole – what is important is the shape of the peg, a macro-property. The 
‘micro-story’ contains lots of irrelevant detail that is rightly left out by the 
(explanatory) macro-story. I am in agreement with Sober that this argument fails – 
that the micro-story explains too much does not entail that it explains nothing at all.214 
But it does suggest a rejoinder to the redundancy argument, in the form of a 
challenge: given that M and P offer different kinds of explanations of M*, then in the 
absence of an independent reason for preferring one kind over the other, why should 
either of them be redundant? For each will be required, not in order to explain M* 
simpliciter, but in order to explain it in a certain way. M will be required to explain 
                                                 
213 Sober [1999] p.550. A defence of this view can also be found in Jackson and Pettit [1992]. 
214 See Sober [1999] p.547 for this line of response to Putnam. Putnam’s views on explanation are of 
course similar to Yablo’s views on causation. However, I think Yablo would agree that what I have 
called ‘sufficient inducers’ in some sense explain the events they induce, despite containing irrelevant 
causal detail. What he denies is that sufficient inducement is sufficient for causation. 
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M* in a manner that unifies other actual and counterfactual wall-buildings; P will be 
required in order to explain why individual wall-buildings turn out exactly as they do. 
And what is required, is not redundant. 
 
Our second response is similar to the first; we simply note that the extra modal 
information conveyed by an explaining M* in terms of M rather than P, is of use. This 
is because what goes on at other possible worlds determines the truth of actual world 
counterfactuals. For instance, it is true that if Bob had drunk whisky rather than vodka 
last night, he still would have managed to build his wall. It is also true that if he 
hadn’t got drunk at all, he still would have managed to build his wall. Psychological 
explanation has the advantage of explaining the existence of Bob’s wall in such a way 
as to make it transparent why these counterfactuals are true. Explaining it in 
microphysical terms has the advantage of explaining why it is that Bob builds this 
permutation of D, rather than that one. Both of these explanations are interesting, and 
each is novel. It remains to define the sense(s) in which this is true. In order to 
facilitate reference to particular events and their constitutive properties separately, I 
will adopt a more correct notation, shown in the diagram below: 
 
[X,M,t] [Y,M*,t+] 
[x,P,t] [y,P*,t+] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now let [x,P,t] and [y,P*,t+] be our token physical events causally related, and 
synchronically sufficient for token (also causally related) mental events [X,M,t] and 
[Y,M*,t+] respectively. On the basis of the preceding discussion, I propose the 
following definitions of singular and general novelty: 
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Singular novelty: A property F of a cause [x,F,t] has singular novelty just there is 
a token effect [y,G,t+] whose occurrence can not be causally 
explained without appeal to [x,F,t]. 
General novelty: A property F has general novelty with respect to a property G 
just in case it is a causal law that F-events cause G-events, and 
substitution for F in this law with any predicate F’ expressing a 
different property results in a different law, or no law at all. 
 
A few notes before proceeding. For a property F to have singular novelty, an F-
instance must be required in order to causally explain another property-instance. For a 
property F to have general novelty, on the other hand, F must be required in order to 
frame a law. Singular novelty is defined for a property with respect to token events; 
general novelty is defined with respect to classes of events. The connection between 
general novelty and realizer-invariance is as follows: if F is a supervenient and 
multiply realized property, then it cannot be a law that F-events cause G-events unless 
F-instances possess the power to cause G-instances however the F-instances are 
realized. 
 
Now given the above definitions, M does not have singular novelty. The reason is that 
regardless of whether or not causation transmits up (or down, or both) sufficiency 
relations there is, as we have seen, a good sense in which [Y,M*,t+] can be causally 
explained by [x,P,t]. For [x,P,t] causes [y,P*,t+] and by hypothesis [y,P*,t+] is 
synchronically sufficient for [Y,M*,t+]. If this is correct, then we have defined a sense 
in which all supervenient properties are redundant, given the completeness of physics. 
And the sense, I maintain, is that they lack singular novelty as defined. However, if it 
is a law that M events cause M* events (we may assume it is), then M does have 
general novelty. Here is why. Suppose for the sake of argument that causation 
transmits upwards, so that [x,P,t] causes [Y,M*,t+]. Now I suppose that if this is true, 
then it will be a law that P events cause M* events. However, the regularity expressed 
by this law is clearly not the same as that expressed by ‘M events cause M* events’. 
Many M events will fail to be P, and yet succeed in causing M* events despite this. 
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On the other hand, [x,P,t] will have both singular and general novelty.215 It has the 
latter because it is a law that P events cause P* events. And it has the former because 
the occurrence of [y,P*,t+] can not be explained without [x,P,t]. Citing [X,M,t] will not 
explain [y,P*,t+], as instances of (say) mental properties do not explain the precise 
manner of occurrence of their effects. Bob’s desire to build a wall, as we saw, 
explains his building some wall that meets D, but not his assembling the specific 
permutation of bricks that he actually assembles. Now under what conditions is a 
property redundant simpliciter? Well, one candidate definition of redundancy is 
obvious: 
 
A property is redundant iff it has neither singular nor general novelty. 
 
If these remarks are correct, then redundancy arguments are much harder to supply 
than we thought. It is not sufficient to show that all the putative effects of a given 
cause are caused or explained by something else. Rather, we will have to show in 
addition that those effects are explained in the same way by something else. Since 
inducers do not explain the events they induce in the same way as the supervenient 
causes of the induced events, it follows that CP does not entail that all supervenient 
properties are redundant simpliciter. We can now proceed to consider the manner in 
which emergent properties are novel. Emergent properties as standardly construed 
have singular novelty, which violates CP. However, there is room for a weaker 
conception of emergent novelty, according to which emergent properties are 
consistent with CP in virtue of being generally novel but singularly redundant. This, as 
we will see in the next section, makes trouble for the causal argument. 
 
6.3. Three kinds of emergence 
In this section, I will distinguish ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ varieties of emergence. The 
strong variety is characterised by a combination of the metaphysics outlined in 6.1 
                                                 
215 At least on the assumption that P itself is not a supervenient property whose base property would 
rob it of singular novelty by causing its supervenience base. 
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and singular novelty; the weak variety by the same metaphysics, together with general 
novelty. Strong emergence can be further divided into two subcategories, which is 
why there are three kinds of emergence. Broad intended emergent properties to have 
causal powers that exert a downward influence on the physical domain. We can think 
of this in the following way. Suppose an aggregate of physical events with an 
emergent property cause some other event. The causal contribution of the emergent 
property is such that had it not emerged and yet (per nomologically impossible) the 
physical properties of the aggregate remained the same, then the aggregate would not 
have had the same physical effects. This is the kind of thing Broad had in mind when 
he spoke of ‘configurational forces’. Suppose you take an aggregate of physical 
particles. Certain of their properties will, to borrow C. Lloyd Morgan’s phrase, be 
‘additive’.216 Their inertial masses, for instance, can be summed to find the inertial 
mass of the aggregate. We can calculate how much force it will take to accelerate an 
aggregate by adding up the forces it would take to accelerate its components. If there 
are configurational forces in Broad’s sense, then not all the causal powers of certain 
aggregates are like that. If inertial mass were an emergent property of aggregates 
(which of course it isn’t), then we would get the wrong answer by summing the 
masses of the components. Call this strong emergence. 
 
Some clarification is needed at this point. Strong emergence as I conceive it involves 
what Kim calls ‘diachronic downwards causation’.217 The idea is that a property 
emerges synchronically from an aggregate, and displays singular novelty by exerting 
an influence on the physical constitution of some part of the world at a later time. 
Refer back once again to the familiar diagram at the beginning of 6.2. The reason M 
lacks singular novelty, as we saw, is that given CP, there will always be a complete 
alternative explanation of M* available, in the form of P. For M to display singular 
novelty, it must be the case that there is a token event whose explanation requires M. 
                                                 
216 See his [1923] pp.2-3. 
217 See Kim [1999a] pp.18-34 for detailed discussion of downwards causation, culminating in the 
upwards-downwards transmission argument purporting to show that even the putative efficacy of 
strongly emergent properties is pre-empted by that of their physical base properties. More on this in 
7.3. 
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If the event that M is required in order to explain is P*, then this is already 
downwards causation. But if M has singular novelty with respect to the occurrence of 
M*, then given that P* is synchronically sufficient for M*, it follows that M must be 
required in order to explain the occurrence of P*. This is clearly a form of the 
downwards transmission argument, but rather than claiming that same-level causation 
entails downwards causation, the claim I make here is that same-level causation 
together with singular novelty entails downwards causation. I will speculate, in 
passing, that one reason why Kim is so quick to endorse the downwards transmission 
argument is that he does not recognise any kind of novelty other than the singular 
variety. If everything else is, in some way or other, synchronically determined by the 
physical, then the only way for a non-physical property M to exhibit singular novelty 
is for there to be a physical event whose occurrence requires M. And this in turn leads 
to Kim’s dilemma: either non-physical properties violate the completeness of physics, 
or they are redundant. But as we saw in 6.2, recognising general novelty in addition 
enables us to avoid this dilemma, by allowing us to accept a suitably qualified version 
of the second horn. 
 
Now from this it follows that if there are any strongly emergent properties, then 
physics is not causally complete.218 The novel causal powers of emergent properties 
consist in the fact the that atoms and molecules of the aggregates having them have 
causal powers that they would not possess in a world where the trans-ordinal 
emergence laws do not hold; they exert forces that they do not exert just in virtue of 
their physical properties. One consequence is that if you were to take a minimal 
physical “snapshot” at time t of a deterministic world that contains strongly emergent 
properties, then the original and the copy will diverge after t. A point that I wish to 
emphasise, however, is that I do not wish to claim that emergent properties somehow 
take over from the physical properties they emerge from. As I think of these matters, 
the emergence base properties still contribute causal powers; the (physically) 
                                                 
218 Because there will be physical events that do not have complete sufficient physical causes. Kim’s 
upwards-downwards transmission argument (discussed in 5.1) can be marshalled against this point. 
The argument, in my view, is a poor one; we will discuss it in 7.3. 
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unexpected effects are due to extra powers conferred by the emergent properties.219 
The most sensible way to think about this, to my mind, is to hold that strongly 
emergent properties combine with their physical base properties to cause certain 
physical effects, which effects would not occur but for the instantiation of the 
emergents. Physics fails to be causally complete given strong emergence for now 
there will be physical effects that have only partial physical causes: specifying a 
complete, sufficient cause will, in certain cases, involve ineliminable reference to (sui 
generis) non-physical causes. 
 
There are two further possibilities given strong emergence. First, it may be that the 
strongly emergent properties always emerge from aggregates with a particular 
structural property S. This is arguably what Broad has in mind when he speaks of 
‘configurational forces’. If it is the case that aggregates with S have causal powers 
that are not determined by their physical properties, then it is plausibly S itself that has 
an emergent power. Suppose for the sake of argument that mental properties are 
emergent, but that they do not have multiple emergence bases, such that anyone with 
mental property M has structural property S. Nothing in this case prevents the 
identification of M with S. Mental properties will be identical to ‘neurostructural’ 
properties with emergent causal powers that are not determined by the powers of their 
components according to the basic laws that govern their behaviour. The reason I say 
that this is the sort of thing Broad had in mind is that he claimed, inter alia, that 
emergence occurs in chemical compounds, which have the power to bond with other 
such compounds, a power which – so Broad claimed – was not determined by the 
powers of their physical components.220 Second, there is what we may reasonably call 
                                                 
 
219 This seems to be very much how Lowe thinks of these matters as well. See for instance his [1993], 
where he speculates that emergent mental properties exert a co-ordinating influence on otherwise 
disparate physical events in the brain. It is the emergent mental properties together with their neural 
emergence bases that cause behaviour. I will have more to say about this in chapter 7. 
220 We now know that this is not so – the chemical bond can be explained in quantum mechanical 
terms, and so is not emergent. McLaughlin [1992] attributes the fall of emergentism precisely to the 
success of quantum mechanics in explaining chemical forces. While I think it is true that the evidence 
cited by McLaughlin is sufficient to refute emergentism about chemical bonding, I do think it refutes 
emergence simpliciter. Whether or not there are emergent properties is not an all-or-nothing affair – the 
success of quantum mechanics tells us that certain properties are not emergent, but says nothing about 
the emergence, or otherwise, of properties that are, as yet, not quantum mechanically explicable. We 
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‘multiple emergence’ – if the emergent powers are possessed by different aggregates 
with nothing in common to them other than that they have this power, then we will 
need the emergent property itself to explain the emergent power. Suppose multiple 
emergence is true for mental properties. Individuals in the same mental state will have 
different physical properties, and will behave in a way that is not determined by the 
causal powers of those properties. In this case the mental property cannot be identified 
with any structural property. Rather, both physical and mental properties together 
determine behaviour. Let us call the first of our two versions of strong emergence the 
strongly emergent powers thesis; and the second the strongly emergent properties 
thesis.221
 
We turn now to weakly emergent properties, which have all the features of their 
strongly emergent cousins, except that their novelty does not violate CP. This is a 
controversial move; if the emergent properties do not have effects that violate 
completeness, then how are their causal roles novel? The answer should be clear by 
now, for general novelty is consistent with CP. By way of illustrating weak 
emergence, we will consider again the non-emergent property, temperature. The 
novelty of this property compared to particular aggregates of molecules with certain 
molecular velocities consists in its power to cause instances of other thermodynamic 
properties whichever structural property of the aggregate realizes it. As I have argued, 
such causal patterns as these are not duplicated at the microphysical level. But now 
take thermodynamics, and (i) make it functionally irreducible to statistical mechanics, 
(ii) weaken the strength of the modality in your preferred version of supervenience to 
nomological, (iii) let aggregates of statistical mechanical properties be sufficient for 
thermodynamic properties according to trans-ordinal laws that are not physically 
necessary. If the novelty of thermodynamic properties prior to the imagined 
                                                                                                                                            
shall consider in chapter 7 whether there is any evidence against strongly emergent psychological 
properties. 
221 Strongly emergent properties will turn out to be important when, in 7.2, I appeal to strong 
emergence to discuss the putative evidence for CP. My contentions there will be (i) that strongly 
emergent powers are inconsistent the completeness of physics, but not the completeness of the non-
mental, (ii) that strongly emergent properties are inconsistent with both completeness theses, and (iii) 
that both strongly emergent powers and properties are open empirical possibilities given the available 
evidence. 
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transformation was (1) genuine and (2) consistent with CP, then it remains so 
afterwards, despite that fact that by definition, thermodynamic properties are now 
weakly emergent. 
 
A crucial fact about this conception of the novelty of weakly emergent properties is 
that the thing they do that is novel can only be specified if there are causal laws 
relating them to classes of effects, which laws can not be expressed without the 
emergent properties. It is the same as it is with (non-emergent) functional properties. 
Let functional property F’s realization base be f1, f2, f3,…,fn and functional property 
G’s realization base be g1, g2, g3,…,gn. Suppose that on some occasion F is realized by 
f3, which causes a realizer g1 of G. If the novelty of F compared to f1, f2, f3,…,fn is 
that an F has the power to cause a realizer of G however F is realized, then unless G is 
realized by g1, there is nothing novel for F to do, for it will clearly not be a law that F-
events cause g1-events. Note that I do not intend talk of the general novelty of 
functional properties as in any way metaphoric: my contention, as I explained in 6.2, 
is that certain supervenient properties (e.g. functional properties) can capture 
generalisations that are missed at the physical (realizer) level. Now replace 
‘realization’ with ‘emergence’ in the present example. What we have is two multiply 
emergent properties whose novelty consists in its being a law that F-events cause G-
events whatever base properties they emerge from. Weakly emergent properties, then, 
possess general novelty but lack singular novelty. Notice that this sort of novelty 
depends on multiple emergence. It makes no sense to suppose that there could be a 
weakly emergent property with only one base property – for then the novelty of such 
a property’s role compared to that of its emergence base could not be specified, and 
the base property could be substituted for the putative emergent salva the truth of any 
causal laws.222
 
Before proceeding to explain how weakly emergent properties cause a problem for the 
causal argument, I ought first to address a possible objection. The objection holds that 
                                                 
222 On the assumption that substitution of co-referring terms is a permissible inference within the 
context of laws. I return to this issue in my discussion of the heterogeneity problem in 6.5. 
 - 211 - 
weakly emergent properties as I have characterised them are functionally reducible, 
given the conception of functional reduction outlined in chapter 2. This presents me 
with a dilemma – either (i) weakly emergent properties are not emergent after all; or 
(ii) weakly emergent properties are genuinely emergent, but functional reduction as I 
conceive it is too weak to count as reduction. Here is how the objection proceeds. In 
2.4, I argued that it is hugely implausible that the causal roles we use to functionally 
reconstrue a property M to be functionally reduced, can be specified in terms of 
properties of the reducing theory. Rather, the causal roles in question will be specified 
in terms of properties (M*, say) that supervene on properties in the reducing theory. 
Let P be M’s emergence base, and P* be M*’s emergence base. Step (1) of the 
reduction process is fine, for we can treat M as a second-order functional property 
individuated by its causing M*. And M has a putative realizer in P. Now I said in 2.4 
that functional reduction was a matter of finding implementing mechanisms for causal 
relations between supervenient properties, such as the one between M and M*; but 
why is this not possible if M and M* are weakly emergent? Why, in other words, is it 
not sufficient for the functional reduction of M that we explain how M’s emergence 
base causes M*’s emergence base? The answer lies in recognising that M*, qua 
weakly emergent, supervenes on P* with nomological necessity. We cannot explain 
the occurrence of M* just by appeal to P* and physical laws; rather, we will need to 
appeal in addition to the synchronic bridge laws that govern M*’s emergence. It 
follows that we cannot explain how P plays the causal role individuative of M without 
appealing to emergence laws, which hold independently of the laws of physics. Now 
from this it follows that M is functionally reducible not to the physical, but to what we 
might reasonably term the ‘nomological’, or – perhaps better – the natural. If this is 
true, then indeed weakly emergent properties are nothing over and above the natural. 
But this is not inconsistent with their being emergent properties; nor is it inconsistent 
with the suitability of functional reduction for establishing physicalism. We just need 
to be careful about which laws and properties are included in the reducing theory. 
 
If weak emergence is indeed a consistent possibility, then the causal argument for 
physicalism is not deductively valid. First, nomologically necessary sufficiency, 
 - 212 - 
which is compatible with emergence, is clearly sufficient for non-coincidence. 
Second, while strongly emergent properties violate CP, weakly emergent properties do 
not. And third, given that weakly emergent properties have general novelty in just the 
same way as supervenient but non-emergent properties do, weak emergence is every 
bit as consistent with EM as supervenience physicalism. The premises of the causal 
argument, therefore, are compatible with weak emergence, and so do not entail 
physicalism. A further argument against weak emergence is needed. As I said at the 
outset of this section, it is not my intention to defend weak emergence. In fact, I think 
that something is very badly wrong with it, and I will presently spend considerable 
time telling you what I think that something is. The fact remains, though, that 
whatever it is that is wrong with weak emergence, it cannot consist in being at odds 
with any of the premises of the causal argument. It’s worth noting that it isn’t all bad 
for the argument – the emergentist position with which it is consistent is quite close to 
physicalism; as we have seen, the two are often taken to have the same metaphysical 
commitments, differing only as to their epistemologies. Further, as we have seen, the 
argument establishes the falsity of substance dualism – for only if two particulars are 
“made of the same stuff” can one be synchronically sufficient for the other. Since we 
are already committed to the ontological independence of physical stuff in general, it 
follows that mental particulars and properties are ontologically dependent on physical 
particulars and properties. Emergentists agree, but maintain that contra-physicalism, 
some of the properties of physical things are something over and above the physical. 
Now this clearly means that there will be emergent events; mental events, although 
dependent on physical events, will consist in the instantiation of emergent properties 
such that the events would not occur but for the truth of trans-ordinal laws, and so fail 
to occur at worlds that are minimal physical duplicates of this one. I will now give 
two arguments against weak emergence, one epistemological, the other teleological. 
 
6.4. An epistemic argument against weak emergence 
This is a very simple argument that does not tell against the notion of weak 
emergence but rather against weakly emergent mental properties. It depends on an 
epistemological premise to establish its conclusion, which is that putative weakly 
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emergent mental properties would lack general novelty as well as singular novelty. 
But a property that lacks either kind of novelty is redundant; so weakly emergent 
mental properties are redundant. There is nothing, I should stress, in the concept of 
weakly emergent properties that precludes their having general novelty; however 
weakly emergent mental properties are not novel. They lack general novelty in virtue 
of the fact that their explananda (behaviours) are not weakly emergent. I do not think 
that this argument is particularly compelling; this does not concern me, however, as 
the teleological one to follow in 6.5 is much stronger. Here, briefly, is how the 
epistemological argument goes. 
 
Suppose actual mental properties are weakly emergent. Now consider a minimal 
physical duplicate wd of the actual world wa. By hypothesis, no weakly emergent 
mental properties will be instantiated at wd. Unfortunately, our counterparts’ bodies 
move in just the same way they do at wa; they make noise, eat sausages, build walls, 
go to work, and so on. This is because the noises we make, and the walls we build, 
around here, are not weakly emergent – they really are nothing over and above the 
physical.223 We know this because we have pretty good functional reductions of 
things like arm movements, houses, and the manner in which voice boxes succeed in 
making noises, to the physical. The problem for weakly emergent properties is that we 
attribute mental properties precisely in order to account for phenomena that are 
common to wa and wd. But now it follows that any reason for attributing a mental 
property at wa will justify attributing it at wd too, as all the relevant explananda will 
occur just the same. We can appeal to mental properties at wd to predict and explain 
behaviour just as we can at wa; it would be a miracle, then, if wd individuals did not 
actually have the properties attributed. But now it follows that if we are to maintain 
that there are weakly emergent mental properties at wa, mental properties here must 
be instantiated twice over, one set of the non-emergent mental properties that are also 
instantiated at wd, and one set of weakly emergent properties! Now that really is 
redundancy, for at wa we have both the weakly emergent ones that are missing from 
                                                 
223 I note in passing that I am not convinced that this is true of sausages. Indeed, some of the sausages I 
have encountered have seemed to me to be beyond anything one might create by physical means alone. 
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wd, and the functional ones that aren’t, both doing exactly the same thing. Any laws 
that mental events enter into in virtue of their emergent mental properties, they will 
already enter into in virtue of possessing non-emergent mental properties. The 
problem is not, as I said, with the concept of weak emergence; rather, the problem is 
that for mental properties to be weakly emergent, we would need a set of events such 
that there are causal laws governing their occurrence that can only be framed in terms 
of weakly emergent properties. But there just isn’t anything missing from wd that 
would serve to characterise the novel role of putative weakly emergent mental 
properties at wa. The reason this does not count against the notion of weak emergence 
in itself is that it is not a priori that bodily movements, for instance, are not 
themselves weakly emergent. If they were, then there would be something for the 
weakly emergent mental properties to cause. But the actual world isn’t like that, and 
the properties, the causing of which gives mental properties their characteristic causal 
roles, are properties that supervene with physical necessity. 
 
To summarise, the reductio runs as follows. Suppose wa mental properties are weakly 
emergent. Suppose further, as seems scarcely deniable, that the interpretive practices 
we employ to attribute mental properties involve broadly causal-functional criteria. 
Any reason for thinking that mental properties are instantiated at wa is equally a 
reason for thinking they are instantiated at wd too. At both worlds, the attribution of 
mental properties has too much explanatory success to be false, so there are mental 
properties common to both worlds. Emergent mental properties, by hypothesis, are 
not instantiated at wd. Therefore, if there are weakly emergent mental properties at wa, 
mental properties here must be instantiated twice. Now appeals to epistemological 
principles in metaphysical arguments are controversial, and not without reason. What 
would be nice is if we could run an argument against weak emergence that did not 
rely on any such principles. Here is just such an argument, drawing on the so-called 
‘miraculous coincidence problem’. The argument is that in the case of weakly 
emergent properties, we lack an account of how it is that the same property gets to 
emerge from a variety of emergence bases. 
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6.5. A teleological argument against weak emergence 
This argument, if cogent, will not show any inconsistency in weak emergence. Rather, 
it will show that supervenience physicalism has a distinct theoretical advantage over 
weak emergence. The advantage consists in the fact that certain prima facie 
problematic features of supervenience physicalism admit of a teleological 
explanation, whereas exactly analogous problematic features of weak emergence do 
not. In particular, I will argue that the so-called ‘miraculous coincidence problem’ can 
be solved teleologically for supervenience physicalism, but not for weak emergence. 
The miraculous coincidence problem is initially raised by Papineau as a problem for 
Fodor’s antireductionist account of the relationship between sciences at different 
levels.224 This problem is closely related to the debate between Fodor and Kim on 
special sciences, so a summary of the debate is in order before proceeding to the 
argument.225
 
Special science properties, Fodor claims, are both natural kinds and irreducible. Being 
a natural kind means you get to figure in laws; being irreducible means special 
science properties are not identical to physical properties, but supervene on them.226 
Anti-reductionists argue that the multiple realizability of special science kinds means 
no type identities, so no reduction. Reductionists counter that such kinds can be 
identified with, hence reduced to, the disjunction of all their possible realizers. Fodor 
argues against this kind of reduction on account of the heterogeneity of the properties 
in the realization base. The heterogeneity matters because, Fodor claims, the bridge 
laws required for reduction connect kinds to kinds, and a heterogeneous disjunction is 
not a kind. Kinds, for Fodor, are just the entities denoted by predicates that figure in 
laws, and Fodor claims that disjunctive predicates can’t figure in laws. Kim replies – 
                                                 
224 In Papineau [1985].  
225 Fodor’s views on these matters can be found in Fodor [1974] and [1997], while Kim’s most 
important contribution is (arguably) his [1992a]. 
226 As before, this sense of ‘irreducible’ is not to be understood in terms of functional reduction. As I 
conceive of functional reduction, supervenient properties whose causal roles can be fully explained in 
terms of the causal roles of their subvening properties will count as reduced, despite the fact that they 
are not identical to their subvenient properties. In the sense of reduction involved in the Fodor-Kim 
debate, such properties are paradigmatically irreducible. Nothing of import turns on such 
terminological matters. 
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quite rightly, in my view – that if disjunctions can’t figure in laws, then neither can 
special science kinds, at least as long as these latter are conceived in such a way as to 
be necessarily coextensive with disjunctions. This dialectic leaves Fodor in a fairly 
unstable position – nobody really wants to deny that there are special science laws, 
but how can there be if special science kind terms are nomologically equivalent to 
disjunctions, and disjunctions can’t figure in laws? The position in which it leaves 
Kim is little better. He too doesn’t want to deny special science laws, but agrees with 
Fodor that disjunctions are not suitable for framing laws. As we saw in 2.3, Kim 
thinks that in virtue of the heterogeneity of the disjuncts, disjunctions of the realizers 
of special science kinds will not be projectible. To his credit, Kim sees that something 
has to give, and what gives for Kim is multiple realizability – he concludes that 
special science kinds figure in laws only to the extent that they aren’t multiply 
realizable, hence not nomologically equivalent to disjunctions. The two horns of the 
dilemma, then, are Fodor’s position, which seems to entail that there are no special 
science laws, and Kim’s, which seems to embrace the type identity theory in its denial 
of multiple realization. 
 
Fodor does not say exactly why he thinks disjunctions can’t figure in laws; here is a 
brief recap of what he does say. Fodor claims that ‘it’s a law that…’ is not a fully 
truth-functional context, meaning that (at least) some truth functional arguments are 
not permitted therein. Why does this matter? Well, one inference that won’t be valid 
is presumably the inference from ‘it’s a law that X → Y’ & ‘it’s a law that W → Z’ to 
‘it’s a law that (X v W) → (Y v Z)’. If it were, then (since Fodor thinks natural 
kindhood is suitability for framing laws) we could gerrymander new kinds at will by 
creating new laws featuring them. So if we allow the validity of inferences such as the 
one above, then it seems, as Fodor says, that we have to give up the view that the kind 
predicates of a science are those that form the antecedents or consequents of its laws. 
It’s not that any absurdities follow from allowing such inferences, but rather that they 
don’t sit well with a prior theory about which predicates denote kinds. 
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The claim that the context ‘it’s a law that...’ is intensional does rule out the creation of 
disjunctive kinds from truth-functions of existing laws. But it doesn’t tell against the 
suitability of disjunctive predicates for framing laws qua disjunctive. This much ought 
to be clear from the fact that the invalidity of the stated inference form in the context 
‘it’s a law that...’ applies equally to gerrymandered conjunctive kinds. Moreover, this 
line of argument does not depend on the level of heterogeneity of the disjunctions so 
formed. We certainly could gerrymander ‘wildly’ heterogeneous disjunctive kinds if 
contexts like ‘it’s a law that...’ were fully extensional, but the manner in which they’re 
not fully extensional tells equally against all gerrymandered kinds, regardless of how 
similar the original kinds are in their causal potencies. It seems, then, that Fodor’s 
argument is aimed at gerrymanderedness rather than disjunctiveness or heterogeneity. 
But if this is so, then it will not apply to disjunctions that aren’t gerrymandered, and 
disjunctions of the realizers of a given special science kind quite plainly aren’t.227
 
For my part, I think that something like the following must have been implicit in 
Fodor’s thinking on these matters. What if ‘it’s a law that…’ is a fully intensional 
context? Consider the following inference form: from ‘it’s not a law that (F v G) → 
E’ and ‘necessarily H ↔ (F v G)’ infer ‘it’s not a law that H → E’. If the context ‘it’s 
a law that…’ is intensional, then quite clearly this inference is not valid. This would 
yield exactly the conclusion that Fodor wants, the view that the unsuitability of 
disjunctions for framing laws does not entail that special science kinds can’t figure in 
laws. Fodor could maintain his antireductionism, via the thought that disjunctions 
aren’t kinds, and escape Kim’s objection that any problem for disjunctive laws is a 
problem for special science laws. However, the view that ‘it’s a law that…’ is not a 
                                                 
227 It should be noted that Fodor nearly admits as much, in his [1997] p.156, where he considers the 
possibility that some disjunctions may be projectible after all. Multiply realizable kinds, in contrast to 
gerrymandered ones, are coextensive with open disjunctions, in the sense that some of the disjuncts 
will be non-actual realizers of that kind. A closed disjunction, on the other hand, will be some finite 
disjunction such as ‘Jadeite or Nephrite’. Talk of open and closed disjunctions clouds the issue 
somewhat, however, as this distinction does not track the all-important distinction between 
gerrymandered and non-gerrymandered. While I am happy to accept for the sake of argument that all 
closed disjunctions are gerrymandered, not all open disjunctions are non-gerrymandered. For instance, 
the disjunction of all possible realizers of all natural kinds is as open and as gerrymandered as it gets. A 
disjunction of all possible closed disjunctions is also open, as is the disjunction of any open disjunction 
with a closed disjunction. 
 - 218 - 
fully truth-functional context must be sharply distinguished from the view that it’s a 
fully intensional context. The problem in running the above line of argument is that 
Fodor has only given us reason to believe the former, whereas what we need is the 
latter. An example of a truth-functional argument that doesn’t go through in the 
context ‘it’s a law that…’ is sufficient to defeat the view that such contexts are fully 
truth-functional. However, mutatis mutandis, an example of a truth-functional 
argument that is valid within such contexts is sufficient to defeat the view that they 
are fully non-truth-functional. Can we give such an example? Apparently so. For 
instance, from ‘it’s a law that water at a pressure of 1atm boils at 100°C’ and ‘water = 
H2O’ we can infer ‘it’s a law that H2O at a pressure of 1atm boils at 100°C’. So 
substitution of co-referring kind terms looks OK. I can’t think of an argument to block 
inferences such as this one, and clearly the burden of proof is on the proponent of the 
intensional view to provide one. 
 
Let us grant Fodor that gerrymandered disjunctions are not suitable for framing laws. 
The crucial point to note now is that disjunctions of the realizers of functional kinds 
are not gerrymandered. Why? Because in order to count as realizers of a given 
functional property, all the disjuncts must play the causal role that defines it. This is 
where Papineau’s [1985] argument comes in. If special science properties are multiply 
realizable (and so irreducible), then their realizers must be heterogeneous. But in that 
case, something has to explain how all the non-identical realizer properties at, say, the 
physical level, share the causal power constitutive of the functional properties at some 
special science level, say biology. Papineau turns Kim’s argument on its head: Kim 
starts with the heterogeneity of the realization base and works ‘bottom-up’ to show 
that this heterogeneity leads to projectibility problems. Papineau starts with 
projectibility, and works ‘top-down’ to argue that heterogeneous properties play the 
same causal roles, which cries out for explanation. It would be miraculous if all the 
different realizer properties play the same causal roles by coincidence. Whence a 
dilemma: either there is an explanation of the otherwise miraculous coincidence, or 
special science properties are not multiply realizable after all. Papineau does believe 
in functional kinds, and offers teleological explanations of how it is they get to have 
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multiple realizations – the different realizers play the same causal role because they 
were selected for in virtue of their causal powers.228 We already know that this is 
possible for artefacts – you can build a mousetrap out of just about anything, if you 
are clever enough, and have enough time on your hands; the explanation of how they 
all catch mice is teleological. That is what they are meant to do. Papineau’s 
conclusion is that heterogeneity is no obstacle to lawlikeness provided the 
heterogeneous properties in question are selected in virtue of their causal powers. For 
Kim projectibility means uniform realization; for Papineau it means uniform 
realization or selection. 
 
The problem all this generates for weak emergence is that there could not be a 
teleological explanation of how it is that the same weakly emergent property emerges 
from all the different physical properties in its emergence base. This is because 
although weakly emergent properties make novel patterns in relation to each other, 
without the sort of downward causal influence that strongly emergent properties have, 
there just isn’t anything for any selection process to select for. Why would natural 
selection favour biological properties from which weakly emergent mental properties 
emerge over those from which no such properties emerge? The biological fitness of 
an organism depends on properties that are not weakly emergent. We can run a 
parallel argument to the epistemological argument of 6.4: in wd, although the 
emergent properties are not instantiated, there are no corresponding differences in the 
fitness of any organisms that exist there. From this it follows directly, without 
appealing to epistemological premises, that if there are weakly emergent properties at 
wa, then there is no teleological solution to the miraculous coincidence problem for 
these properties. It is important to note that the problem here is not that there is no 
functional reduction of the emergent properties to properties in their emergence base, 
for that will be common to all emergent properties. Rather, the problem is that there is 
no teleological explanation available of the otherwise miraculous fact that the same 
emergent properties emerge from a heterogeneous range of base properties. 
                                                 
228 A similar line of response to Kim is to be found in Block [1997]. 
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 The difference is clear if we reflect on the fact that such teleological explanations are 
available for strongly emergent properties, despite the fact that their causal powers 
can not be explained in terms of those of the properties from which they emerge. A 
range of heterogeneous base properties could be selected for in virtue of being 
emergence bases for a strongly emergent property, as this latter will confer causal 
powers that are not conferred by its base properties. Weak emergence, on the other 
hand, is invisible to selection. Correspondingly, we are left with unexplained 
coincidences. What teleology offers, in essence, is the promise an explanation of how 
there could be irreducible patterns – in the case of weak emergence, it seems, we have 
the patterns without the explanation. Those who have no truck with teleological 
explanations, or think that they do not, in fact, solve the miraculous coincidence 
problem, are left with just the same sort of problem, and it is, I think, a far more 
serious problem that standardly acknowledged.229
 
If the preceding argument is cogent, then it seems Kim may be right in at least this 
much: if mental properties are emergent, then they had better be strongly emergent. 
But strong emergence is inconsistent with CP – so if CP is true, the combination of the 
causal argument with our two arguments against weak emergence entails physically 
necessary supervenience. Now, finally, we come to the question whether the evidence 
for CP is any good. Since both strongly emergent powers and properties are 
inconsistent with CP, to the extent that the evidence for CP is good, it must also be 
good evidence against strong emergence. However, it is not, and so the evidence for 
CP is not good. My contention in what follows will be that the empirical evidence 
available to us at this stage tells against neither emergent powers nor properties. 
                                                 
229 Jonathan Knowles is an example of one who recognises the problem but denies that the teleological 
solution works. See his [1999] for details. 
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7. Emergence and the Completeness of Physics 
The purpose of this chapter is to show that current evidence does not support CP. My 
argument will be directed at the non-triviality argument of 3.2 for the conclusion that 
completed physiology will not make ineliminable reference to mental properties. That 
argument, you will recall, is an induction from past successes in physiology – past 
successes in physiology have all involved entities like bones, muscles, neurones, 
impulses, neurotransmitters and tendons. But this, the argument of 3.2 went, gives us 
good inductive evidence that future successes in physiology will involve appeals to 
entities of a similar sort. And since sui generis mental properties are nothing at all like 
any of those entities, we may conclude that completing physiology won’t require the 
introduction of mental properties. I will treat the conclusion of the non-triviality 
argument (that completed physiology will not involve sui generis mental properties) 
as of a piece with CP. Nothing much turns on this for my purposes, as CP is the 
stronger thesis. My argument will depend on the possibility that mental properties are 
strongly emergent in the sense explained in 6.3. The burden of 7.1-7.3 is to argue that 
current evidence does not tell against the view mental properties are strongly 
emergent. Since strong emergence is inconsistent with CP, if I am right that the 
evidence is consistent with strong emergence, then it follows that the evidence does 
not support CP. If this is so, then there is a serious doubt as to the soundness of the 
causal argument. In the course of constructing my argument, I will explain what kind 
of evidence would support CP. In particular, in 7.4 I argue that the evidence looks very 
much like a functional reduction of psychology to neurophysiology. But as we saw in 
2.2, functional reductions establish supervenience without the need for argument. 
Correspondingly, I argued in 2.4, the reason we need a causal argument for 
physicalism just is that we don’t yet have a reduction of mind. But this in turn means 
that evidence strong enough to support CP would establish physicalism about the mind 
directly, without the need for the causal argument. The soundness of the causal 
argument depends on good evidence for CP; but good evidence for CP renders the 
argument unmotivated. First, then, let us take a look at the kind of evidence that we 
have at our disposal. 
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7.1. The nature of the putative evidence for CP 
In order to understand the problem, we will examine the story that Andrew Melnyk 
tells in favour of the completeness of physics.230 Melnyk actually tells two stories, 
both of which we will consider. Melnyk argues for physicalism via a version of the 
causal argument, and endorses many of the theses I have thus far endorsed. His 
argument turns on versions of EM, CP and a coincidence-based OD. The difference 
between the way Melnyk runs the argument, and the way we have run it, is that rather 
than appealing to universal forms of EM and CP, Melnyk appeals to particular 
existential instantiations of them. Nothing much depends on this difference, as it does 
not matter which particular events you pick. Like me, Melnyk observes that there are 
non-physicalist positions consistent with the premises of his argument, and like me, 
runs broadly epistemological redundancy arguments against these positions. Melnyk 
acknowledges that his causal argument is not deductively valid. In broad outline, his 
overall argumentative strategy is to compare the theoretical merits of physicalism and 
certain non-physicalist alternatives in explaining the otherwise coincidental 
occurrence of the mental and physical causes of bodily movements. I do not take issue 
with any of this; I am in fact in agreement with just about everything Melnyk says 
about what follows from the premises he endorses. As we saw in 6.5, weak 
emergence is at a distinct explanatory disadvantage compared to supervenience 
physicalism. While the problems we attended to there are not the same problems as 
those to which Melnyk draws attention, I think Melnyk and I can agree that given CP, 
physicalism is the best way to make sense of the other premises. What I can’t agree 
with, however, is that the evidence he describes supports CP. 
 
Melnyk asks us to consider a particular decision to clench your fist.231 Fist-clenchings 
are constituted by contractions in the muscles of the forearm. The contractions of 
individual muscle cells we know, says Melnyk, to consist in “sliding, within each cell, 
of protein filaments of one kind over protein filaments of another kind.” Now we also 
know empirically that the proximal causes of such slidings is “the release of calcium 
                                                 
230 In his [2003]. 
231 See his [2003] p.158ff for details.  
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ions from flattened vesicles that form a structure inside the cell called the 
sarcoplasmic reticulum.” The point of all this is to establish that: 
 
(P1) Your decision to clench your fist caused…certain particular releases of 
calcium ions.232
 
Melnyk claims that no transmission principles such as those we rejected in 4.3 are 
required in order to conclude that this is so; rather, he appeals to the principle that 
correlations like the one between a decision to clench your fist and the release of 
calcium ions are best explained by positing a causal relationship between the 
correlated events. Proposition (P1) is the EM of Melnyk’s argument. Clearly his 
intention here is to set the stage for causal competition between the decision and the 
physical causes of the Calcium ions, for which he argues next. Now, as we saw in 4.4, 
mental and physical causes need not compete for the very same effects in order for 
their co-occurrence to be a coincidence that stands in need of explanation. No matter; 
let us grant for the sake of argument that (P1) is true. Melnyk claims that there is 
empirical evidence that weighs in favour of the proposition that 
 
(P2) There were sufficient physical causes for the particular releases of 
calcium ions mentioned in P1.233
 
This is the crucial premise, and plays the same role in Melnyk’s particularised causal 
argument as CP does in the more familiar version. It is no coincidence that of the two 
stories that Melnyk tells about why we should believe P2, one is very similar to the 
non-triviality argument for CP, and the other is an explicit argument for CP from 
which, clearly, P2 follows a fortiori. 
 
The first story Melnyk tells about why we ought to believe P2 is, in my view, very 
close to the non-triviality argument of 3.2 for the completeness of physics. I should 
point out, however, that Melnyk at no point endorses that argument, and takes his first 
                                                 
232 Melnyk [2003] p.158. 
233 Melnyk [2003] p.160. 
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story to be an argument only for the particular claim expressed in P2. Our best 
theories, he claims, show that we can trace the causal ancestry of the release of 
calcium ions back into the brain. The following statement is illuminating: 
 
The releases of calcium ions…are phenomena whose biochemical causal 
antecedents can be traced…first to activities in the motor neurones that 
innervate the muscle, and then to activities in other neurones that interact with 
motor neurones, and so on back into the brain as far as you care to go; the 
reason for thinking this tracing to be possible is that neuro-anatomists have 
actually traced the pathways of bundles of neurones into and out of the brain, 
and the biochemistry of the individual neurones that make up these bundles is 
well understood.234 [My italics.] 
 
The ‘well-understood’ in the italicised passage means well understood physically. We 
have good explanatory physical accounts of how individual neurones work in physical 
terms – although Melnyk does not mention it, there is a branch of physics know as 
‘Biophysics’ that specialises precisely in accounting for things like neuronal firings in 
terms of physical quantities like charge and processes such as ionic diffusion. The 
argument now is this: (i) we can trace the causal ancestry of the calcium ions that 
proximally cause muscle movements back to bundles of neurones; (ii) the functional 
properties of individual neurones is well-understood in physical terms; so (iii) the 
release of ions has a sufficient physical cause. Now Melnyk admits that we do not 
have anything like a complete understanding of each process involved in causing the 
ions to be released. The central feature of the story, I suggest, is that nothing in it 
appeals to sui generis mental properties, or anything like them. Trace the ancestry of 
the fist-clenching back as far as you like; nothing in what we do know about the chain 
of causes seems to require that any of them be irreducibly mental. Understood in this 
way, Melnyk’s line of argument is clearly very close to the one we considered in 3.2 
in support of CP. For in essence, Melnyk’s claim is that however far back we look into 
the causal ancestry of the particular release of Calcium ions under scrutiny, we find 
only biochemical causes. Melnyk goes further, arguing that the biochemical causes 
are themselves physical via the premise that biochemistry is functionally reducible to 
                                                 
234 Melnyk [2003] p.160. 
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physics, but as we saw in 3.2, this is unnecessary. If our current best understanding of 
the causation of bodily movements involves only entities of a similar kind, none of 
which are anything like sui generis mental properties, then it appears that the non-
triviality argument can induce that completed physiology will be non-mental in 
character, which is all we need in order to render the completeness of physics non-
trivial. If muscle movements have causes that don’t look sui generis mental, then a 
fortiori we can be relatively certain that no physical effects are the results of sui 
generis mental causes either. 
 
The second line of argument that Melnyk offers in favour of P2  focuses directly on 
the successes of physics in order to establish CP. This is very similar to the line of 
argument we rejected in 3.2 as containing a sampling error.  This one contains such an 
error as well, as we shall see. Melnyk has this to say about the successes of physics: 
 
[C]urrent physics’ success to date in finding that many physical events have 
sufficient physical causes provides inductive evidence that all physical events, 
including both unexamined physical events and examined-but-as-yet 
unexplained physical events, have sufficient physical causes. 
 
It is difficult to see how any of this could be relevant to the matter at hand. Nothing in 
what a Cartesian dualist has to say involves the movements of atoms in cloud 
chambers being caused by special mental forces. Complete physical explanations of 
what goes on in particle accelerators are perfectly consistent with the incompleteness 
of physics, due (for instance) to special mental forces that cause behaviours. It looks 
as thought the direct argument from physics will fail to convince anyone who isn’t 
already convinced by CP, for the doubters think that there’s something special about 
what goes on in brains that involves non-physical forces. What goes on in particle 
accelerators, while interesting, is by the by. Melnyk considers this problem, and offers 
the following rebuttal: 
 
Current physics shows no sign at all that contemporary physicists expect to 
find any physically anomalous phenomena whatever inside human brains, 
which seem, from the physical point of view, to be quite unexceptional…[the 
biochemistry of brain cells] is apparently no different from that of cells of 
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other types; likewise, presumably, for their physics, given the physical 
realization of biochemistry that I am assuming….235
 
The argument, if I understand it correctly, is this: we understand the biochemistry of 
individual cells to the point where we can be confident their operation is wholly 
explicable in terms of physical laws and properties. Let us grant Melnyk for the sake 
of argument that individual nerve cells are functionally reducible to physical 
properties and laws. This is actually quite plausible. The property of being a neurone 
is plausibly functionalizable, multiply realizable (in the same way, perhaps, that we 
found temperature to be multiply realizable in 2.3), and physically realized. 
Biophysics offers pretty complete explanations of how the physical realizer properties 
of neurones get to play the causal roles that (given functionalization) individuate the 
property of being a neurone. But now, the argument goes, brains are just big bunches 
of these cells stuck together, so we should expect what brains do to be explicable in 
physical terms as well. So much for the evidence; we turn now to the question 
whether it is any good. 
 
7.2. Evaluating the evidence 
We will take Melnyk’s second argument first. Does the fact that the parts of brains 
operate according to physical laws entail that whole brains operate according to the 
same laws? The problem that the appeal to the ‘physically unexceptional’ nature of 
brain cells is supposed to solve is that the success of physics in explaining why atoms 
behave as they does not entail that it will have similar success in explaining why 
brains behave as they do. We can not induce from the fact that isolated atomic events 
have sufficient physical causes to the conclusion that behaviours have sufficient 
physical causes, for the sample in question just isn’t of the right sort. But now it is 
unclear how the appeal to brain cells is supposed to help. Why not just hold that since 
brains are fully composed of atoms, which are physically unexceptional, it follows 
that we should expect no physical anomaly in the behaviour of brains? The problem 
here is that what strong emergentists endorse is precisely the claim that certain 
                                                 
235 Melnyk [2003] p.161. 
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configurations of atoms give rise to properties whose powers are not determined by 
those of their physical base properties. In other words, even though atoms behave in 
one way, if you put enough of them together, properties emerge that possess singular 
novelty. This, you will recall, is defined in terms of there being a token event whose 
occurrence can not be explained without reference to the emergent property. We will 
have more to say about this matter in 7.3; for now, notice that the appeal to brain cells 
adds nothing. If mental properties are strongly emergent, then no single brain cell is 
going to be nomologically sufficient for them; rather, aggregates of brain cells 
possessing certain structural properties will be the minimum units of emergence. So 
again, the appeal to the functional explicability of brain cells in physical terms will 
not convince anyone who isn’t already convinced, that brains do not possess emergent 
mental properties. The sampling error in this case consists in inducing the functional 
reducibility of brains to physics from the functional reduction of neurones to physics. 
Nobody ever held that the effects of individual neurones taken in isolation were the 
sort of things we needed sui generis mental forces to explain. The argument direct to 
CP from the success of physics fails, for just the same reasons as those given in 3.2; 
that brains are ‘physically unexceptional’ is precisely what an emergentist will deny. 
 
Let us return, then, to the much more promising evidence from physiology. In what 
follows, I will argue that everything Melnyk says about the causal ancestry of bodily 
movements is something a strong emergentist about mental properties should agree 
with. Recall from 6.1-6.3 that I think of strongly emergent properties in the following 
way: when you put enough of a certain kind of part together in the right way, the 
composite whole you get behaves in a way that isn’t determined by the causal powers 
of the parts. Rather, the causal powers of such aggregates are determined by the parts 
along with the emergent property itself. In the present case, we can think of it like 
this: strong emergence is the hypothesis that explaining the causal powers of brains 
involves ineliminable reference to mental properties. This seems a perfectly legitimate 
hypothesis – for it is clearly not a priori that all composite entities behave in a way 
that is determined by the laws that govern their parts. Allow for the sake of argument 
that Melnyk is right that biochemistry reduces to physics; from this it follows that the 
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parts of brains obey physical laws. What strong emergentists will deny is that the 
causal powers of whole brains are determined by their physical properties and laws of 
physics: there are physically possible worlds in which brains behave in a quite 
different way to the way they behave around here.236 Now as we saw in 6.3, this 
licenses two possibilities, which I termed the strongly emergent powers thesis, and the 
strongly emergent properties thesis. To recap, if all emergence bases of an emergent 
causal power have the same structural property, then the novel powers are properly 
conceived as powers conferred by the structural property itself (in other words, the 
structural property has emergent powers). If, on the other hand, there are multiple 
emergence bases for an emergent power, then we will need to invoke an emergent 
property to explain it. Now as I said, each of these theses seems to me to represent a 
perfectly plausible empirical possibility. Why should composite events cause just 
what you would expect them to given their constituents? And why, if we accept 
multiple realization as not only possible but actually quite likely, should different 
aggregates of events not exhibit the same non-physically determined behaviour, in 
virtue of a common emergent property? 
 
Before proceeding, a quick note is in order on the relationship between the two 
emergence theses and the two related completeness theses discussed in 3.2, viz. CP 
and the completeness of the non-mental. If the emergent powers thesis is true, then 
there will be no complete physical explanations of bodily movements without appeal 
to the structural properties of the aggregates from which mental powers emerge. But 
these structural properties look nothing at all like anything in current physics. It is 
possible to argue for their inclusion in completed physics, but to my mind this breaks 
the inductive link between current and future theory upon which the non-triviality 
argument rests. Still, the structural properties in question will be non-mental; all that 
the emergent powers thesis claims, on this account, is that there are some non-mental 
structural properties whose powers outstrip the powers of their constituents. Physical 
                                                 
236 Kim runs the supervenience argument against emergence to show that even if strong emergence is 
true, still the causal powers of things with strongly emergent properties are determined by their 
emergence bases, and that as a result, the efficacy of the emergence base properties pre-empts that of 
the emergents. We address this argument in 7.3 below. 
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science broadly construed, whilst arguably rendered incompletable with just physical 
entities, will nonetheless be completable by the incorporation of the structural 
properties that mental powers emerge from. This, as I said in 6.3, is (arguably) the 
kind of thing Broad had in mind when he claimed that certain chemical properties 
were emergent; but all that follows from this view is that chemistry and physics are 
arranged horizontally and are mutually supporting, rather than arranged vertically in a 
hierarchy, as reduced and reducing theories respectively. But now look what happens 
if the strongly emergent properties thesis is true, and the only entities available to 
explain the emergent powers are the mental properties. If this is the case, then physics 
will not be completable without the incorporation of sui generis mental properties. 
Now if that is how things are, then clearly supervenience of the mental on the 
PHYSICAL will be trivial, which is why we need the non-triviality argument to rule 
out positions like the emergent properties thesis. In the remainder of this section, and 
the next section, we will see exactly why the argument fails to do so. 
 
Consider again Melnyk’s causal ancestry argument. Strong emergentists will agree, in 
the first instance, that fist-clenchings have sufficient physical proximal causes, for no 
one could reasonably suppose that mental properties or powers emerge from the 
properties of your hand. The emergence bases for strongly emergent properties are 
most plausibly brain properties, and this being the case, emergentists will continue to 
agree with Melnyk until we trace the ancestry of the clenching back to the brain. This 
is a crucial, but easily overlooked, point. Imagine, for the sake of argument, a 
Cartesian spirit operating a robot by remote control; undeniably, the ghost causes the 
robot’s movements. In the imagined case, the robot’s motion has both physical and 
non-physical causes, occurring at different stages in the same causal chain. 
Emergentists will not deny that emergent properties cause physical events that do not 
possess emergent properties, and whose subsequent effects can be fully explained by 
appeal to physical laws. The brain is supposed to be where the emergent properties 
emerge, and the point at which physical events occur that do not have complete 
sufficient physical causes. But even there, the disagreement is not as stark as it may 
initially appear. For on the conception outlined above, strong emergentists do not 
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need to deny that the effects of emergent events have physical causes; what they will 
deny is that those effects have complete, sufficient physical causes. Nothing in the 
way I have set up the strongly emergent properties prevents the view that it is the 
physical emergence base events together with the emergent event that are causally 
sufficient for the relevant effects.237 But if this much is granted, then a strong 
emergentist should agree with everything Melnyk says! 
 
Consider: since emergent properties supervene on physical properties, emergentists 
must hold that you can trace the causal ancestry of a mentally caused bodily 
movement back to the physical emergence base of the mental event that causes it. The 
locus of the disagreement between CP and emergence is that the former affirms, 
whereas the latter denies, that the physical base events are complete, sufficient causes 
of the movement. It as unfortunate tendency of physicalists to speak as though the 
incompleteness of current theory does not impact on the question whether current 
(limited) explanatory success entails future completability. Melnyk, for instance, 
agrees that we do not have anything like a complete understanding of how neurones 
interact with each other to cause behaviour: “[O]ur biochemical understanding of the 
causal ancestry of calcium ion releases is certainly not complete.”238 The tendency is 
unfortunate because what an emergentist will deny is not that incomplete causal 
explanations of bodily movements can be given in non-mental terms, but that such 
movements have complete, sufficient physical causal explanations! 
 
Nothing in the strongly emergent properties thesis precludes the view that the causes 
of behaviour can be traced back to physical antecedents – in fact, emergence requires 
that they can be so traced. What emergence denies is that behaviours have complete, 
                                                 
237 Lowe [1993] thinks of the relationship between the causal powers of emergent properties and those 
of their emergence bases in a similar way. Emergent properties are best thought of, he claims, not as 
initiating the causal chains that culminate in bodily movements, but as “inducing certain patterns of 
convergence amongst neural events,” (p.638). Emergent properties exert a co-ordinating downwards 
influence on their otherwise unrelated base events; without such an influence, Lowe suggests, the fact 
that such unrelated events manage to combine to cause behaviours would be a coincidence. Lowe 
admits that this speculation is open to empirical disconfirmation – but like me, does not see anything in 
current science to exclude its possibility. What is important for my present purposes is that on Lowe’s 
model, it is mental and physical causes in combination that are the sufficient causes of behaviour. 
238 Melnyk [2003] p.161. 
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sufficient physical causes. But if this is so, then how could it possibly count against 
emergence that we are capable of giving physiological or biochemical explanations of 
behaviour which, by admission of even the most diehard physicalists, are far from 
being complete? Consider again the non-triviality argument, and focus on the sense in 
which past physiological explanations have been successful. As the evidence cited by 
Melnyk clearly shows, we have not yet been successful in giving complete 
explanations of bodily movements in physiological terms. Of course, at certain stages 
complete explanations can be given, for instance the explanation of the causal 
relationship between Calcium ions and muscle contractions. But that is a (relatively) 
complete explanation of the (relatively) proximal causes of those movements. As our 
tracing of neural pathways takes us back into the brain, the explanations become more 
and more incomplete. Now we can all agree that our limited success in this area has 
been achieved without sui generis mental properties. However, no induction from past 
partial explanatory success without mental properties to future complete success is 
going to work – for the absence of mental properties from the account might be just 
what is missing, and the reason why the explanations aren’t complete! Clearly, then, 
the non-triviality argument too contains a sampling error. What the sample ought to 
contain is a stock of (at least fairly) complete non-mental explanations of effects we 
know to have mental causes. What it actually contains is nothing of the sort. Our 
stock of successes in providing incomplete physiological explanations of the 
causation of bodily movement is suitable only for inducing that we will, in future, be 
able to provide further partial explanations of such movements in the same, or 
similar, terms. The contrast with physics is a stark one indeed; the reason we are right 
be confident that no scientist will ever have to leave the physical realm to explain 
what goes on in cloud chambers and particle accelerators, is that we have an excellent 
stock of relatively complete explanations of such phenomena in physical terms. 
 
In the next section, we will appeal to an argument of Kim’s against emergence to 
show how that, in fact, strong emergence is also consistent with our being able to give 
very good causal explanations (much better than the ones we have at present) of the 
effects of emergent mental properties without mentioning those properties at all. The 
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mere fact that a property is not mentioned in such an explanation, as we shall see, 
does not entail that the property lacks singular novelty with respect to those effects. 
Through this, we will give an account of what the evidence would have to look like in 
order to support the view that there are no strongly emergent properties, and so 
provide crucial empirical support for CP. 
 
7.3. The supervenience argument again 
Recall Kim’s argument against supervenient causation, which we explored in 5.1, and 
refer back to the upwards-downwards transmission diagram. Kim runs exactly the 
same two-stage argument against emergence.239 Emergentists need to endorse mental-
to-mental causation from M to M*, which presupposes downwards causation from M 
to P*. But then why doesn’t P, as M’s emergence base, pre-empt the causal status of 
M? As we saw, Kim’s argument involves ‘pushing causation around’ – downwards 
from M to P*, and also upwards and then downwards again from P to M to P*. Since I 
already accept that strongly emergent properties have singular novelty, and that this 
amounts to diachronic downwards causation, I will spare Kim the downwards 
transmission argument, and focus exclusively on the upwards-downwards 
transmission argument.240 As before, this argument purports to show that M’s causal 
efficacy is pre-empted by that of its base property. Allow that strongly emergent 
properties combine with their emergence bases to cause physical effects. Forget about 
mental to mental causation. We can draw the situation like this: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
239 He uses the downward causation argument against emergence in his [1992b] and [1999a]. The 
argument has exactly the same form whether Kim is arguing against emergence or supervenience 
physicalism. The sole difference is that when arguing against emergence, Kim rightly does not appeal 
to CP. In what follows, I will show that this difference is crucial. 
240 Strictly speaking, I should not call it the upwards-downwards transmission argument in the present 
context, for there is no downwards transmission part. But it is only because, as I made clear in 6.2, I 
grant Kim that singular novelty entails downwards causation, that the downwards transmission 
argument is omitted in the present case. 
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Now Kim’s argument against supervenience, you will recall, was that it renders 
mental causation unintelligible. He runs a similar argument against emergence, only 
this time the charge is inconsistency. Strongly emergent properties have novel causal 
powers, says Kim. But now allow that causation is to be understood as nomic 
sufficiency. P is nomically sufficient for M, and the joint occurrence of P and M is 
nomically sufficient for P*. But now it follows that P, as M’s emergence base, is 
nomically sufficient for P*, and so pre-empts the alleged singular novelty of M. So 
contrary to supposition, emergent properties do not have novel causal powers. Here is 
how Kim puts it: 
M 
P P* 
Emergence 
 
The critical question that motivates the argument is this: If an emergent, M, 
emerges from basal condition P, why can't P displace M as a cause of any 
putative effect of M? Why can't P do all the work in explaining why any 
alleged effect of M occurred?....Now we are faced with P's threat to pre-empt 
M's status as a cause of P*….For if causation is understood as nomological 
(law-based) sufficiency, P, as M's emergence base, is nomologically sufficient 
for it, and M, as P*'s cause, is nomologically sufficient for P*. Hence, P is 
nomologically sufficient for P* and hence qualifies as its cause….This appears 
to make the emergent property M otiose and dispensable as a cause of P*; it 
seems that we can explain the occurrence of P* simply in terms of P, without 
invoking M at all. If M is to be retained as a cause of P*…a positive argument 
has to be provided, and we have yet to see one. In my opinion, this simple 
argument has not so far been overcome by an effective counter-argument.241
 
This argument, if cogent, will show that the putatively novel causal powers of 
strongly emergent properties are in fact conferred by their emergence base properties. 
In effect, the argument is that since P contributes M, then any causal powers 
contributed by M will be contributed by P as M’s emergence base. I do not find this 
argument at all compelling, and will give two responses. My first response is that 
                                                 
241 Kim [1999a] p.32. 
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when the upwards-downwards argument is directed against emergence, it lacks a 
crucial justification, in the form of CP, for the conclusion that P pre-empts M’s 
efficacy. Kim fails to fully appreciate just how much of a gap in the argument CP 
leaves. My second response in to argue that there are good general grounds for 
resisting the view that P has the causal powers of M. 
 
First response. I do not deny that P is nomically sufficient for P*. Further, I am 
prepared to grant Kim for the sake of argument that this makes P a cause of P*. What 
I deny, however, is that either of P or M on its own qualifies as a complete, sufficient 
cause of P*. As I stressed in 6.2, the correct interpretation of the emergentist picture is 
that M and P together suffice to causally determine P*. Now crucially, when Kim 
runs this argument against supervenience physicalism, he argues that we cannot view 
P and M as jointly causing P*, for in that case we should have a physical event (P*) 
with only a partial physical cause. The problem with this view, as we saw in 5.1, is 
that it is inconsistent with CP that the causation of a physical event should require a 
non-physical event M in addition to P. But then what makes M dispensable as a cause 
of P* is precisely that P* has a complete, sufficient physical cause, and this is exactly 
what strong emergentism denies! It follows that Kim’s central reason for not taking M 
and P to jointly determine P* is missing when the subject of the argument is strong 
emergence. We can put the same point slightly differently, for the sake of clarity. The 
upwards-downwards argument, directed against emergence, is supposed to show that 
P has any putatively novel powers contributed by M, hence that upwards 
determination is inconsistent with downwards causation. But appealing to CP in this 
connection would merely beg the question – if M exerts a downwards influence 
without which P* would not occur, then CP is false. The argument, if successful, 
ought to entail CP, despite the putative singular novelty of M. 
 
Kim of course realizes all this, which is why he does not appeal to CP in the quoted 
passage. But my point now is that shorn of CP, the argument is really rather weak. 
Three short arguments can be run to undermine it. Since an appeal to CP is out of the 
question, Kim must maintain that nomic sufficiency is sufficient for sufficient 
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causation, in order to conclude that P is causally sufficient or P*. Now we have the 
usual overabundance of causes for P*. The first short argument is this: unless we can 
appeal to CP, why choose P over M as P*’s cause? Why not the other way around? 
And the second short argument: another thing strong emergentism denies (by 
implication) is that nomic sufficiency is sufficient for sufficient causation. P, as M’s 
emergence base, will be nomically sufficient for P*, and also (I grant for the sake of 
argument) a cause of P*; but P will not be a sufficient cause of P*, precisely because 
of the singular novelty of M with respect to P*. P is best seen as a part of the 
sufficient cause of P*, the other part of which is M. And the third: nomic sufficiency 
alone is not sufficient even for causation, let alone complete, sufficient causation. It is 
well-known, for instance, that effects of a common cause are nomically, but of course 
not causally, sufficient for each other. What is missing is an argument from Kim to 
the effect that the nomic sufficiency of P for M is sufficient to allow P to displace M 
as a cause of P*. At the end of the quoted passage above, Kim says: “In my opinion, 
this simple argument has not so far been overcome by an effective counter-argument.” 
I have a counter-argument to Kim’s simple argument. It is simplicity itself, and it goes 
like this: what argument? I note in passing that there is a sense in which we can 
explain the occurrence of P* without reference to M. P’s nomic sufficiency for P* 
means that we can frame explanatory laws covering P and P* that do not mention M 
at all. As Lowe [2003] argues, the nature of emergence makes possible certain 
contexts of explanation in which the emergent properties (although in possession of 
singular novelty) are invisible to investigators. This point is of crucial importance, and 
we return to it presently. 
 
Second response. This is not a direct response to any argument of Kim’s, but is rather 
an attempt to give content to the notion, crucial to my conception of emergent 
singular novelty, that emergent properties contribute causal powers over and above 
those of their emergence bases. Now P above will be a complex physical event – or if 
you prefer, an aggregate’s exemplifying a structural property at some time. While I 
agree with Kim that P is nomically sufficient for P*, I disagree that this violates the 
singular novelty of M. We can give metaphysical content to M’s novelty via the 
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thought that the causal powers of M are not physically determined by the powers of P. 
That is, if there are physically possible worlds at which M is not instantiated and 
aggregates such as P do not cause P*, then M’s novelty will be intact despite the fact 
that P is nomically sufficient for it. If our best physical theories about the causal 
powers of events of the same type as P, tell us that in fact we should expect them not 
to cause events of type P*, then that gives us a reason to think that M is contributing a 
power not physically determined by P. That is, if the power of P to cause P* 
persistently resists functional reduction of P to its components, then eventually we 
may be forced to conclude the singular novelty of M in this case. We would be 
inclined to make such a decision, I suggest, if our theories about the components of P 
could explain their behaviour in isolation very well, but consistently fail just when 
such components are put together in such a way that M is instantiated. In less abstract 
terms, we can put the point like this: if biophysics fails to explain the behaviour of 
neurones just when those neurones are arranged in such a way that they instantiate a 
mental property, then it will look as though the mental property is strongly emergent. 
So much for Kim’s argument against the singular novelty of strongly emergent 
properties. What I want to take from it, however, is the point that the nature of 
emergence entails that despite the fact that M is necessary for P*’s occurrence, as M’s 
emergence base, P is nomically sufficient for P*. This has extremely important 
consequences for the nature of the evidence that would be sufficient to support the 
truth of CP. 
 
Refer back to 2.5, and grant for the sake of argument that we are in fact a bit further 
advanced scientifically than I suggested we are. Specifically, grant the following steps 
in the functional reduction of mind are complete: (i) we have completely 
functionalized the mental properties, and so know exactly what causal powers their 
putative realizers will need to have; (ii) we have located all the (putative) possible 
physiological realizers of mental properties, and as we thought, multiple realization is 
true. Now let the realization base of M be P1, P2,…,Pn. Let vPi represent the 
disjunction of all the Ps. Either the M is strongly emergent with respect to vPi, or it is 
not. Given that nomic sufficiency holds between each Pi and P* even if M is 
 - 237 - 
emergent, it follows that {vPi}→P* is a law regardless of whether or not M is 
emergent. It follows that even if mental properties are strongly emergent, we will be 
able to express laws relating their emergence bases to their effects, laws that do not 
mention the emergent properties at all. But on the reasonable assumption that at least 
some kinds of explanation involve subsumption under a law, it follows that we can 
explain the occurrence of P* without mentioning M, despite M’s singular novelty in 
causing it. Further, these laws will enable us to predict bodily movements on the basis 
of physical properties alone. Why am I telling you this? Well, the successes Melnyk 
cites in support of CP are nowhere near as impressive as the kind of successes we 
would have in the hypothesised situation. Other than irrelevant successes, all Melnyk 
really cites in favour of CP is the traceability of causal chains that culminate in bodily 
movement back into the brain. I do not dispute that this is an interesting fact; but if 
explanation by subsumption and non-mental prediction of motion are compatible with 
strong emergence, then what hope does this fact have of supporting CP? Of course, 
stage (iii) in the functional reduction is the crucial one ontologically, for as we have 
seen, this will consist in providing a physiological explanation of how each Pi gets to 
cause P*. And this, presumably, will involve explaining how things with the 
physiological properties of the Ps play the causal role associated with M, which 
involves, inter alia, the power to cause P*. In other words, showing that a complex 
state P plays the causal role of M will involve showing, given the laws that govern the 
components of P, that P causes P*. And this is precisely what emergence claims we 
won’t be able to do, for part of M’s being strongly emergent is that we would expect 
things with the structural properties of the Pi not to cause P*. 
 
What the above argument shows is that nothing in the theory that mental properties 
are strongly emergent precludes our being able to frame causal laws relating 
neurophysiological event types to bodily movements, without mentioning the 
emergent properties at all. But as I said, on the view that explanation involves nomic 
subsumption, it follows that even our ability to give relatively complete causal 
explanations of behaviour in terms of complex structural physiological properties 
would not discriminate between physicalism and emergence as metaphysics of mind. 
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The differences between these two metaphysics only begin to show when you try 
reducing the explanatory laws to laws governing the behaviour of the parts of the Ps 
above. Emergentism disagrees with physicalism in that it denies that the causal 
relations certain complex events enter into can be explained in terms of laws 
governing their parts. In the case of strong emergence, this means that the differences 
show up when we try to reduce {vPi}→P* to more basic laws, for instance the laws 
Melnyk discusses according to which we explain the behaviours of single brain cells. 
The reason why there is no evidence for CP, in a nutshell, is this: we have yet to even 
discover the Pi such that it is a law that {vPi}→P*, and yet evidence against 
emergence only begins to accrue as we manage to explain how the Ps play the causal 
roles they do in terms of the laws that govern the behaviour of their components. 
 
It will help to cast the argument in less abstract terms. Let M = the desire to sip my 
wine, and its putative realizer P be an aggregate of individual neuronal events; let P* 
be my hand grasping my glass. We can predict and explain the grasp from the 
occurrence of P, without mentioning M, but that does not settle any matters of 
metaphysics. The central metaphysical question here can be stated thus: is P a 
realizer, or an emergence base, of M? The matter can only be settled in favour of the 
realization metaphysic by showing that this instance of P realizes this instance M. But 
that involves showing that things with P’s structure have the power to cause this 
instance of P*. The deduction clearly achieves nothing if it relies on M’s power to 
cause P*, for this too is consistent with strong emergence. Rather, we must deduce M 
from laws that govern the behaviour of P’s component neurones. And that, of course, 
is just a functional reduction of this instance of M to this instance of P. 
 
7.4. Prospects for the causal argument 
The upshot of 7.1-7.3 can be stated as follows. The evidence for physicalism cites 
incomplete explanations of behaviour in physiological terms as evidence for the 
completability of physiology without sui generis mental properties. However, 
emergence does not preclude the possibility of such incomplete explanations as these 
– emergence instead claims only that mental properties have singular novelty not 
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determined according to physical law, so that no complete explanation of behaviour is 
possible in non-mental terms. The non-triviality argument contains a sampling error – 
the successes just aren’t of the right kind, as any good emergentist will agree that 
incomplete explanations of behaviour can be given without citing mental properties. 
In fact, as we saw in 7.3, strong emergence even allows for causal laws relating the 
properties in the emergence base to the characteristic effects of the emergent 
properties, laws that do not mention the emergent properties at all. All that emergence 
claims is that the functional reduction that begins with finding the law {vPi}→P* can 
not be finished. Since we haven’t even found the vPi yet – the determinants (be they 
emergence bases or realizers) of mental properties – it is wholly unrealistic to suppose 
we can prejudge on the strength of what little we do know that whatever these 
determinants turn out to be, their causal powers will be reducible to the powers of 
their non-mental parts. Whence a variation on Hempel’s dilemma for CP: nothing in 
the evidence discriminates between (i) that sui generis mental properties will be 
needed in order to explain the casual powers of the Pi, and (ii) that such properties 
will not be so required. The non-triviality argument fails. 
 
Let me be clear about this much: I do not think that it is impossible to find out 
empirically that physicalism is true. I just think it will take considerably more work 
than most physicalists are prepared to accept. Here is the work that it will take. 
Having discovered the minimum physical base properties (the minimum units of 
determination) for mental properties, you then have to proceed to explain how they 
play the causal roles you used to characterise the mental properties, without, of 
course, appealing to the mental properties to do so. One possibility, of course, is that 
when we discover the physical base properties, we find that everyone with a given 
mental property shares a structural property specifiable in wholly physiological terms. 
Now if this is so, it matters not whether the structural property has emergent powers – 
for as we saw in 7.2, even if it does, we can appeal to the property itself to explain the 
powers. Physicalism (or at least, non-mentalism) can quite happily accommodate the 
view that when you combine physical entities so that they have a specific structural 
property S definable in physical terms, they behave in a way that is neither 
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determined by, nor (it follows) predictable by reference to, the S’s constituent 
physical properties. Whether or not we all do share a physically definable structural 
property when we share a mental property is, it goes without saying, an empirical 
matter; one which, again, current evidence does not decide. 
 
On the other hand, if things turn out as I described in 7.3, then in order to gather 
evidence that CP is true, we must continue with our reduction. In particular, we will 
need to show that the Ps that determine M do so just in virtue of being the P-events 
they are, which in turn will be a matter of appealing to more basic laws that govern 
the behaviour of the events that compose the Pi in order to show that, pace 
emergentism, causing P* is just the sort of thing we would expect them to do given 
their neurophysiological constituents. This is the only way to support the conclusion 
that mental properties are not emergent – for it’s hardly as though you can subtract the 
mental properties from the Pi to see if the they behave in the same way on their own! 
(By hypothesis, each Pi is sufficient for M; the question concerns the strength of 
sufficiency. Is it physical, or nomological?) What we can do, however, is try to 
explain the behaviour of M’s putative realizers in terms of simpler properties that 
don’t realize mental properties. As we saw in chapter 2, if we can explain the causal 
powers of the Pi in the non-mental terms of some reducing theory, then M will count 
as functionally reduced to that theory and its properties, relations, and so on. 
Reduction of some form, I maintain – be it functional or not – is the only method at 
our disposal to show that M lacks singular novelty. If we can explain the effects of an 
M-instance wholly in terms of a Pi,-instance, then by definition the best kind of 
novelty M can hope for is general novelty. So evidence for CP is possible, it just needs 
a physiological explanation of how the physiological base properties of M play the 
causal roles that are required to count among M’s realizers. 
 
Unfortunately, if all this is correct, then the prospects for the causal argument are 
bleak. For if the Ms are functionally reduced, then we have no need of the argument 
in the first place! The argument goes in a circle: (1) we need the argument because we 
lack a functional reduction of mind; (2) the argument can’t be run without CP; (3) 
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evidence supports CP just in case it counts against strongly emergent properties; (4) 
the only evidence that will count against strong emergence is a functional reduction of 
mind. I anticipate an objection to (4), and I will take a moment to explain and rebut it. 
Surely, the objector asks, you demand too much? In support of Melnyk, one might 
argue as follows. Melnyk does not claim that the evidence he cites definitively 
establishes physicalism, only that it is suggestive of its truth. Perhaps, then, I have set 
the bar too high in demanding that strong emergence be demonstrably false before 
endorsing CP? My rejoinder is that I have made no such demand. It is important to 
bear in mind that functional reduction is a ‘case-by-case’ process. Property-instances 
are shown to be realizers of functionalized properties by deducing an instance of the 
latter from the former. To show that strong emergence is false by functional reduction 
alone would require deduction of mental property-instances from (let’s say) 
physiological property-instances for all of the possible physiological properties in the 
putative realization base. If multiple realization is true, then this process could 
conceivably take forever. However, in 7.2 I argued only that the non-triviality 
argument requires “a stock of (at least fairly) complete non-mental explanations of 
effects we know to have mental causes” in order to go through. If we have at our 
disposal a few functional reductions of specific mental property-instances, then I see 
no problem for the induction – for then it will be true that we have, in the past, 
successfully given complete explanations of bodily movements in physiological 
terms. And I for one would have no trouble inducing CP from such a stock; I would 
also have no trouble directly inducing physicalism from the same stock. It is not the 
fact that we do not have a complete set of such explanations that bugs me when I 
evaluate Melnyk’s evidence; it is the fact that we do not have any at all. The putative 
evidence for CP fails to rule out strong emergence, not because there isn’t enough of 
it, but because it just isn’t the right sort of evidence. 
 
A second objection suggests itself. What reason have I given to suppose that there are 
any strongly emergent properties? We know, after all, that there are functional 
properties with physical realizers – properties that are functionally reduced, and 
which, therefore, we know to supervene on the physical. But strongly emergent 
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properties, as I have conceived of them, are on rather shakier epistemological 
grounds. The early British emergentists thought that chemical bonds were emergent; 
but the reduction of the chemical bond to quantum mechanics put paid to that.242 
What reason is there for thinking that mental properties are emergent? Well I confess, 
there is none that I can think of at present. But that isn’t the point. The causal 
argument is supposed to discriminate a priori between empirical possibilities, and in 
the process answer metaphysical questions that have yet to be settled scientifically. It 
matters not one jot that there is no evidence for emergentism; the fact remains that 
given its possibility, there is no current evidence for physicalism either! Notice that I 
fully endorse the view that there could be evidence for either position: a pattern of 
explanatory failure suggests emergence, and a pattern of success suggests 
physicalism. No pattern at all suggests…that more research is needed. 
 
An explanation, even the beginnings of an explanation, of any mental property in 
physiological (or otherwise non-mental) terms, will count as evidence for CP, and will 
correspondingly strengthen the non-triviality argument. But it will at the same time 
count as direct support for physicalism. Reductive explanations go like this: given the 
laws of physics, and these physical properties, we would expect X to behave like this. 
There is no other way, I have argued, to support the view that X’s causal powers are 
not determined by a strongly emergent property. And this, it goes without saying, is 
very good evidence that X is nothing over and above the physical (or alternatively, 
that physical properties are physically sufficient for X). Since we do not have 
anything like a reduction of mind, I claim that we do not know whether or not CP is 
true. This being so, for all we currently know, the causal argument, though valid when 
combined with our additional arguments of 6.4-6.5, is unsound. As such, until the 
relevant empirical facts are in, I recommend agnosticism as a metaphysic of mind. 
                                                 
242 See McLaughlin [1992] for a detailed treatment of this particular case. McLaughlin is of course 
correct that reduction of chemical bonding showed the latter not to be emergent. However, he goes too 
far in claiming that this reduction shows that there are no emergent properties. Plenty of areas are still 
up for grabs, including mentality. 
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Conclusion 
Allow me to summarise the argument of this thesis. The causal argument for 
physicalism, if sound, establishes that physical events are synchronically sufficient for 
mental events. It does not equivocate on the sense of ‘physical’, and relies neither on 
transmission principles nor causal competition between mental and physical causes 
for the same effects, in order to go through. The question whether or not the argument 
is valid, assuming its soundness, amounts to this: are there forms of synchronic 
sufficiency that are consistent with its premises but inconsistent with physicalism? 
The causal exclusion argument, if it were sound, would establish not sufficiency but 
type identity, and there is clearly no question as to whether this latter position is 
consistent with physicalism or not. But the exclusion argument, although valid, is not 
sound, as it relies on a theory of causation that is demonstrably false. The causal 
argument proper relies on no such theory, but is invalid, due to the consistency of 
weak emergence with its premises. The invalidity of the causal argument is arguably 
not fatal, for there are independent reasons for rejecting weak emergence. If the 
argument is sound, then, it forms part of a very strong case for physicalism. 
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the causal argument is sound. Strong emergence 
is not consistent with the premises of the argument, as it involves the existence of 
properties whose causal powers violate the completeness of physics. This being so, 
the putative evidence for completeness, if it is good evidence, will be evidence against 
strong emergence. But the putative evidence for completeness from the current state 
of science does not tell against strong emergence, and so is not evidence for 
completeness. However, we can look to strong emergence to see what good evidence 
for the completeness of physics would look like. 
 
The only way to justify the claim that a property is not strongly emergent is to 
functionally reduce it to the physical. From this it follows that the only way to justify 
the completeness of physics, is to functionally reduce any putative strongly emergent 
properties to the physical. But if a domain of properties is functionally reduced, then 
we already know that physicalism is true for that domain. Although empirical 
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evidence of the completeness of physics is possible, it is the sort of evidence the lack 
of which motivates the causal argument in the first place. Good empirical evidence for 
the completeness of physics is equally good evidence that physicalism is true. We can 
make the same point slightly differently, in terms of the completeness of the non-
mental. The causal argument for non-mentalism, if sound, will establish that the 
mental is nothing over and above the non-mental. The completeness of the non-
mental is equivalent to the claim that mental properties do not possess any kind of 
singular novelty. But the only way to establish that mental properties lack singular 
novelty, is to provide a functional reduction of mental properties to non-mental 
properties. Put differently, the only way to establish that there is no downwards 
causation from the mental to the non-mental is to explain the causal powers of mental 
properties in wholly non-mental terms. But if we have such a reduction, then we 
already know that the mental is nothing over and above the non-mental, in which case 
we do not need the causal argument. 
 
The causal argument for physicalism promises a general argument scheme capable of 
establishing physicalism about any domain of causes that have physical effects. The 
prima facie beauty of the argument consists in the fact that it promises to decide the 
metaphysics of such causes a priori. We now see that the argument fails just where 
we need it to succeed. Until the relevant functional reductions are in place, we have 
no good reason to believe that the completeness of physics is true, hence no good 
reason to believe that the argument is sound. But once these reductions are in place 
for a given domain, the causes of that domain are transparently physical, their 
metaphysics determined a posteriori. At worst, the causal argument is useful but 
unsound; at best, it is sound but useless. The question of physicalism belongs to 
physics. 
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